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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:23 pm
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Results for terrorist financing
124 results foundAuthor: Financial Action Task Force Title: Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector Summary: This report considers casinos with a physical presence and discusses related money laundering and terrorist financing methods, vulnerabilities, indicators to aid detection and deterrence, and international information exchange. The report considers vulnerabilities from gaps in domestic implementation of anti-money laundering to combating the financing of terrorism measures. Details: Paris: FATF, 2009. 77p. Source: Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118343 Keywords: CasinosMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Commercial Websites and Internet Payment Systems Summary: Criminals have shown adaptability and opportunism in finding new channels to launder the proceeds of their illegal activities and to finance terrorism. As the Internet becomes more and more a worldwide phenomenon, commercial websites and Internet payment systems are potentially subject to a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminal organizations and terrorist groups. This study analyses money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks with commercial websites and Internet payment systems with the focus on mediated customer-to-customer websites as the most vulnerable to abuse because of their popularity, accessibility to the public, and high volume of cross border transactions. The analysis also provides a number of case studies that illustrate how mediated customer-to-customer websites can be exploited for ML/TF purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2008. 39p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2008 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118344 Keywords: Internet CrimesInternet SafetyMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Global Witness Title: For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda Moved Into the Diamond Trade Summary: This report examines whether the terrorist group, al Qaeda, has used, and is continuing to use, rough diamonds. The report presents evidence that confirms that al Qaeda have been involved in the rough diamond trade since the 1990s. First in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The report argues that there are several reasons why al Qaeda has used rough diamonds: 1) As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells; 2) To hide money targeted by financial sanctions; 3) To launder the profits of criminal activity; and 4) To convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily transportable. Details: London: Global Witness, 2003. 95p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2003 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 118825 Keywords: al QaedaDiamonds, TradeMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTransnational Crime |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: Financing of Terrorism: Risks for Australia Summary: This paper examines the global environment in which the financing of terrorism occurs, particularly with responect ot eh activities of transnational, organized groups that may have an involvement with terrorist organizations. Consideration is then given to how the financing of terrorism occurs, first through the use of illegally obtained funds and then through financing derived from legitimate sources, sucha as charitable donations, which are diverted for use in terrorist activities. Evidence of the financing of terrorism in Australia is then examined and cases which have been detected and prosecuted in Australia than entail an element of terrorist financing are reviewed. Although the number of cases is small, they are indicative of the fact that Australia is not immune from terrorist activities that are being financed by Australian individuals and organizations. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource; Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 394 Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 118810 Keywords: Organized CrimeTerrorismTerrorism, FinancingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Rees, David Title: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks Pose by Alternative Remittance in Australia Summary: The events of 11 September 2001 have heightened interest in ensuring that all sectors of the financial system are not misused either by criminal or terrorist groups. In addition to conventional banks, money and value can be transferred by alternative remittance providers who have, until recently, not been closely regulated. Regulators are concerned that the informal nature of these businesses may lead to their use by terrorist groups and other criminals. This brief considers the characteristics of alternative remittance businesses, the risks they pose and some of the current responses to these risks. This report is one of three in a suite on this issue by the AIC which also includes Alternative remittance systems in Australia: Perceptions of users and providers and Risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism arising from alternative remittance systems. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 118p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series No. 106; Accessed August 22, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/8/7/{A876C9D4-152E-4FDD-93BB-3F98F8C5ED70}rpp106.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/A/8/7/{A876C9D4-152E-4FDD-93BB-3F98F8C5ED70}rpp106.pdf Shelf Number: 119101 Keywords: Money Laundering (Australia)Terrorist Financing |
Author: Madzima, Jackson Title: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risks in Botswana Summary: Botswana has a relatively good legal foundation to fight financial crime in general. With the second reading of the Financial Intelligence Bill and the regulation of non-financial institutions prone to money laundering, the legal framework will be remarkably enhanced. However, Botswana has not yet undertaken an assessment of its risks and vulnerabilities to money laundering and the financing of terrorism in terms of international requirements. Significantly, Botswana’s legal framework does not recognise the risk of money laundering in either limited- or high-risk situations. This is in spite of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) espousing a country-specific risk analysis and application of a regulative framework for all forms of business relationships. The rationale for adopting the risk-based approach is that a better understanding of the extent, form, production and disposal or use of the proceeds of crime helps to determine the appropriate interventions. Tentative steps towards establishing trends in money laundering and the financing of terrorism have been taken over the past few years. A team of World Bank experts visited Botswana at the end of 2006 to assess the implementation of the FATF anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML and CFT) standards. In early 2007 the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), in collaboration with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa, undertook research to establish trends in money laundering in Botswana. The findings are yet to be publicised. However, what is apparent is that these investigations were by no means exhaustive. This paper is a contribution to the discourse on money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Botswana. It provides an overview of Botswana’s AML/CFT regimes. This will follow a brief outline of the international regulatory regimes for curbing both money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Significantly, the paper subscribes to the view that both these activities exhibit the same characteristics and therefore that their analysis can and should broadly be made within the same framework. An analytical framework woven around the ‘three pillars’ of prevention, enforcement and international co-operation is used in this discussion. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2008. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 184: Accessed August 30, 2010 at: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER184.PDF Year: 2008 Country: Botswana URL: http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER184.PDF Shelf Number: 119705 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Threat Assessment Summary: The Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment (GTA) report provides an assessment of the global systemic money laundering/terrorist financing threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimize the harms they can cause. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Shelf Number: 119711 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Vulnerabilities of Free Trade Zones Summary: Free trade zones (FTZs) are designated areas within countries that offer a free trade environment with a minimum level of regulation. The number of FTZs have increased rapidly in recent years, today there are approximately 3,000 FTZs in 135 countries around the world. FTZs offer many incentives and benefits to the companies that operate within it, such as the exemption from duty and taxes and simplified administrative procedures. However, the absence of strict regulations and transparency of the FTZs which is beneficial for legitimate businesses, also make them highly attractive for illicit actors who take advantage of this relaxed oversight to launder the proceeds of crime and finance terrorism. Through a series of cases studies, this report aims to illustrate the ways in which FTZs can be misused for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 1, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/45/47/44888058.pdf Shelf Number: 119712 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Merritt, Zina D. Title: Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed Summary: The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment. GAO recommends the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in Saudi Arabia to reinstate certain targets related to preventing financing of terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia. State agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-883: Accessed October 7, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Saudi Arabia URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09883.pdf Shelf Number: 116506 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Perelygin, Alexander Title: Metal Fingerprint: Countering Illicit Trade in Precious Metals and Gemstones Summary: International efforts to disrupt terrorist and organized crime networks must pay special attention to how these networks are financed. Global trade in precious metals and gemstones has become a significant source of financing for both organized crime and terrorist groups. As the demand for materials bearing precious metals and stones continues to grow, criminal and terrorist networks will exploit weak national and international monitoring of the trade to finance activities that threaten us all. Public-private partnerships offer a real chance of increasing transparency and monitoring in the trade of precious metals and gemstones, thus undermining the financial foundation of global terrorist networks. Serious efforts have been undertaken by governments, international organizations, and the global business community to stem illegal trade in many commodities used in money laundering and terrorist financing—especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Significant success has been seen in disrupting the trade of illegal rough diamonds through the Kimberly Process. But success has been elusive in the illegal trafficking of precious metals and gemstones. Efficient law enforcement in this area is hampered by the lack of internationally recognized procedures for certifying batches of primary precious metals-bearing raw materials and a lack of well-established methods of identifying the origin of both precious metals and gemstones. These shortcomings complicate the process of distinguishing between legal and criminal supplies and place a substantially greater burden on the due diligence efforts of precious metals refiners and stonecutters to ascertain the veracity of their customers. Russian research institutes and forensic laboratories, led by the mining and metallurgical company Norilsk Nickel, have devised advanced methods to identify the origin of semi-products bearing platinum-group metals (PGM). This methodology can be expanded to other metal groups and gemstones, taking the form of a Platinum Initiative to ensure efficient certification procedures in the international metal trade and strengthen existing certification schemes in the diamond and gemstones industries. In July 2007, an informal international working group, including experts from the private sector, government, and independent think tanks, was established under the auspices of the G8 in order to explore the potential of the Platinum Initiative. The conclusions and recommendations formulated in this policy paper are to a large extent based on the initial findings discussed at the first three meetings of this Working Group held in July and October 2007 and February 2008. Key Recommendations include the following: Develop the Platinum Initiative into a strong industry-focused program that includes: an international register of verified and legitimate traders in PGM; enhanced customs control procedures to identify PGM-bearing goods; internationally shared databases of PGM-bearing raw materials; enhanced control measures in mining and metallurgical companies; an international network of certified forensic and expert laboratories capable of tracing the origins of the goods and commodities in question. Coordinate the enforcement mechanisms of the Platinum Initiative with the relevant international organizations—in particular, the World Customs Organization (WCO), appropriate UN agencies, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the G8 governments. Incorporate data on platinum-metals bearing goods and materials into the existing WCO framework using tracking systems such as the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and the Customs Enforcement Network. Establish standardized procedures for information-sharing between national law enforcement agencies and PGM-producing companies to respond rapidly to the appearance of suspicious consignments of unfinished precious metals-bearing materials on the market. Strengthen the implementation and regulatory framework of the World Bank’s anti-money laundering (AML) program to reflect the significant role of illegal precious metals trading as an instrument of terrorist financing. Details: New York: East West Institute, 2008. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper 4/2008: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.ewi.info/metal-fingerprint-countering-illicit-trade-precious-metals-and-gemstones Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://www.ewi.info/metal-fingerprint-countering-illicit-trade-precious-metals-and-gemstones Shelf Number: 119899 Keywords: Illegal TradeMetal TheftOrganized CrimePrecious MetalsTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Terrorist Financing Summary: Terrorist organisations vary widely, ranging from large, state-like organisations to small, decentralised and self-directed networks. Terrorists financing requirements reflect this diversity, varying greatly between organisations. Financing is required not just to fund specific terrorist operations, but to meet the broader organisational costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organisation and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities. The direct costs of mounting individual attacks have been low relative to the damage they can yield. However, maintaining a terrorist network, or a specific cell, to provide for recruitment, planning, and procurement between attacks represents a significant drain on resources. A significant infrastructure is required to sustain international terrorist networks and promote their goals over time. Organisations require significant funds to create and maintain an infrastructure of organisational support, to sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda, and to finance the ostensibly legitimate activities needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for terrorist organisations. Terrorists have shown adaptability and opportunism in meeting their funding requirements. Terrorist organisations raise funding from legitimate sources, including the abuse of charitable entities or legitimate businesses or self-financing by the terrorists themselves. Terrorists also derive funding from a variety of criminal activities ranging in scale and sophistication from low-level crime to organised fraud or narcotics smuggling, or from state sponsors and activities in failed states and other safe havens. Terrorists use a wide variety of methods to move money within and between organisations, including the financial sector, the physical movement of cash by couriers, and the movement of goods through the trade system. Charities and alternative remittance systems have also been used to disguise terrorist movement of funds. The adaptability and opportunism shown by terrorist organisations suggests that all the methods that exist to move money around the globe are to some extent at risk. Disrupting funding flows creates a hostile environment for terrorism, constraining overall capabilities of terrorists and helping frustrate their ability to execute attacks. Disrupting terrorist financing involves both systemic safeguards, which protect the financial system from criminal abuse, and targeted economic sanctions informed by counter-terrorism intelligence. The study highlights the links between financial tools and wider counter-terrorist activity: the effectiveness of authorities at both detecting and investigating terrorist activity is significantly enhanced when counter-terrorist intelligence and financial information are used together. Looking ahead the study identifies four areas which could be the focus of efforts to further strengthen counter-terrorist financing efforts: (1) action to address jurisdictional issues including safe havens and failed states, (2) outreach to the private sector to ensure the availability of information to detect terrorist financing, (3) building a better understanding across public and private sectors and (4) enhanced financial intelligence to exploit the value of financial investigation as a tool in fighting terrorism. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force/OECD, 2008. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2010 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf Shelf Number: 119764 Keywords: TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Smith, Russell G. Title: The Illegal Movement of Cash and Bearer Negotiable Instruments: Typologies and Regulatory Responses Summary: As part of global regulatory measures designed to minimise risks of money laundering and financing of terrorism, financial institutions and other designated businesses in most countries are required to report certain financial transactions to government regulators. This has increased the probability that transactions involving the proceeds of crime will be detected and reported officially. In order to avoid such detection, serious criminals may simply retain the proceeds of their crimes in cash or use bearer negotiable instruments in connection with their money laundering activities. Although not a new concern, the illegal movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments across borders is likely to continue and although such movements are now regulated, criminals will continue to devise new strategies to circumvent regulatory controls. This paper explores the ways in which covert movements of currency and bearer negotiable instruments currently take place and reviews the regulatory measures that exist to address such activities in Australia. Increased detection and enforcement action, coupled with intensive data collection and analysis, are likely to be the most effective ways in which to address this way of laundering the proceeds of crime. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 402: Accessed October 26, 2010 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/2/3/%7B8239E8CD-681A-401B-B094-414C872418BE%7Dtandi402.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/2/3/%7B8239E8CD-681A-401B-B094-414C872418BE%7Dtandi402.pdf Shelf Number: 120096 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money Laundering Using Trust and Company Service Providers Summary: Trust and Company Service Providers (TCSPs) provide an important link between financial institutions and many of their customers. TCSPs have often been used, wittingly or unwittingly, in the conduct of money laundering activities. This comprehensive typologies report evaluates the effectiveness of the practical applications of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations as they relate to TCSPs. It also considers the role of TCSPs in the detection, prevention and prosecution of money laundering and terrorist financing. Finally, it evaluates the potential need for additional international requirements or sector-specific international standards for TCSPs. This typologies exercise has drawn from the research and conclusions that were made in previous work, such as the 2006 FATF Typologies study "The Misuse of Corporate Vehicles, including Trust and Company Service Providers" ; from analysis of jurisdictions' responses to a questionnaire developed for this project; as well as case studies obtained from various sources. This report presents issues for consideration that should help to reduce the use of TCSPs for money laundering purposes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2010. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/38/46706131.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/4/38/46706131.pdf Shelf Number: 120874 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Finlay, Brian D. Title: Counterfeit Drugs and National Security Summary: The deadly implications of counterfeit drugs are well understood to be a central challenge to the integrity of public health systems around the globe, as well as a direct threat to our individual health and welfare. What is less understood is that the profits from this sinister crime are increasingly being co-opted by an array of organized criminal groups and terrorist entities as a means by which to fund their nefarious operations around the world. As such, counterfeit pharmaceuticals pose a direct threat to national and international security. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), counterfeit drugs could make up as much as half of the global pharmaceutical market, with the largest share of fake products circulating in the developing world where regulation and enforcement capacity is comparatively weak. Though the basis of this estimate is unclear, the figure is especially alarming given the narrow definition of “counterfeit” used by the agency. However, it is clear that counterfeit pharmaceuticals remain one of the world’s fastest growing industries. Recent trends suggest a massive increase in counterfeit drug sales to over $70 billion globally in 2010. This is an increase of more than 90 percent from 2005. Although the counterfeiting of, and trafficking in, all manner of products is on the rise globally — including currency, documents, software, and electronics — no other bogus product has the capacity to harm or even kill its consumer as do illicit pharmaceuticals. Additionally, most other counterfeits are not quite as lucrative. According to a recent report on counterfeit drugs by the global pharmaceutical firm Pfizer, profits from counterfeiting today surpass gains made from heroin and cocaine. These alarming rates of growth are, in part, a result of the growing size and sophistication of drug counterfeiting rings, and the widening involvement of organized transnational criminals and even international terrorist groups looking to fund their illegal and unrelated activities worldwide. Indeed, not only have groups such as the Russian mafia, Colombian drug cartels, Chinese triads, and Mexican drug gangs all become heavily involved in producing and trafficking counterfeit drugs over the past decade, but mounting evidence also points to the direct involvement of Hezbollah and al Qaeda. With increased opportunity to make gains from the pharmaceutical counterfeit industry, nefarious actors are likely to pay even more attention to it in the future. As such, the problem is not only a public health hazard of highest magnitude; it is also a national and international security threat. Details: Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2011 at: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Full_-_Counterfeit_Drugs_and_National_Security.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Full_-_Counterfeit_Drugs_and_National_Security.pdf Shelf Number: 120881 Keywords: Counterfeit DrugsCounterfeit PharmaceuticalsOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Initernational Monetary Fund Title: Kingdom of the Netherlands - Netherlands: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of the Netherlands is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was prepared using the AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004, as last updated in February 2009. The assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained on site during their mission from June 28 to July 13, 2010, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. A list of the bodies met is set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in the Netherlands at the time of the mission or shortly thereafter. It describes and analyzes those measures, sets out the Netherlands's levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations (see Table 1), and provides recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened (see Table 2). The report was produced by the IMF as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the Netherlands. It was also presented to the FATF and adopted by this organization at its plenary meeting of February 2011. Details: Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011. 334p. Source: Internet Resource: IMF Country Report No. 11/92: Accessed April 25 at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1192.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1192.pdf Shelf Number: 121482 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney Laundering (Netherlands)Terrorist Financing |
Author: Padavan, Frank Title: The Counterfeit Connection : The Counterfeit Goods Trade, Intellectual Property Theft and Terrorist Financing: With a Discussion of Illegal Immigration, Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking Summary: This report focuses on the counterfeit goods trade and its connection to terrorism financing. The purpose of the report is to explore the connections between illegal immigration, including alien smuggling and human trafficking, and the counterfeit goods trade and terrorist financing. Details: Albany, NY: New York State Senate Majority Task Force on Immigration, 2005. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 29, 2011 at: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/xK6obNlwCS/NYSL/62700081/9 Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/xK6obNlwCS/NYSL/62700081/9 Shelf Number: 121574 Keywords: Counterfeit GoodsHuman TraffickingIllegal AliensIllegal TradeImmigrationTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Organized Crime Organizations: A Literature Review and Some Preliminary Empirical Results Summary: The financial means of international terror and organized crime organizations are analysed. First, some short remarks about the organization of international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is provided about the financing of terrorist and organized crime organizations, their sources and the various methods they use. Third, an attempt is made to estimate the financial means of terror organizations with the help of a latent estimation approach (MIMIC procedure). The figures show that Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have sufficient financial means. Fourth, some remarks are made about the negative effects of terror on the economy in highly developed countries and some strategies are presented to combat (the financing) of terrorism. Details: Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2010. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4860: Accessed August 12, 2011 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584191 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584191 Shelf Number: 122381 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force. Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group Title: Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have jointly assessed the implementation of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards in South Africa. Among its major findings were: • South Africa has made good progress in developing its system for combating money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT) since its last FATF mutual evaluation in 2003. • The money laundering offence is generally in line with the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, although a lack of comprehensive statistics made it difficult to assess effectiveness. Provisions criminalising the financing of terrorism are comprehensive, although they are not yet tested in practice. • The Financial Intelligence Centre (“the Centre”) is an effective financial intelligence unit. • The confiscation scheme is comprehensive and utilises effective civil forfeiture measures. Since 2003, South Africa has also adopted mechanisms to freeze terrorist-related assets. • The FIC Act imposes customer due diligence, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting and internal control requirements. It should be noted that, after the FIC Act came into force, South Africa implemented a program to re-identify all existing customers. The issue of beneficial ownership has not yet been addressed, however, and South Africa also needs to adopt measures dealing with politically exposed persons (PEPs) and correspondent banking. • The FIC Act covers some designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs); however, South Africa needs to broaden the legislation to cover dealers in precious metals and stones, company service providers, and more broadly cover accountants. • At the time of the on-site visit, there were not adequate powers to supervise and enforce compliance with AML/CFT provisions; however, amendments to FIC Act have been enacted, and when they enter into force this year they will significantly enhance the compliance regime. • South African authorities have established effective mechanisms to co-operate on operational matters to combat ML and FT. South Africa can also provide a wide range of mutual legal assistance, including the possibility to extradite its own nationals. Details: Paris: FATF-GAFI, 2009. 244p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/60/15/42432085.pdf Year: 2009 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/60/15/42432085.pdf Shelf Number: 122753 Keywords: Financial Crimes (South AfricaMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Bricknell, Samantha Title: Misuse of the Non-Profit Sector for Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Summary: The manner in which terrorist organisations finance their activities became a policy focal point after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Non-profit organisations, and charities in particular, were identified as potentially significant contributors to terrorism financing. This premise was based on known links between charitable giving and prominent terrorist groups, and the vulnerabilities of the non-profit sector to misuse. Money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risks to the Australian non-profit sector are thought to be low. However, the impact of such misuse is inevitably high. One of the underlying premises in combating non-profit misuse has been the application of a response proportionate to risk. Australia has based its response on education, sector outreach and peak body codes of conduct, alongside more conventional forms of regulatory control. This paper examines vulnerabilities to ML/TF misuse and the publicly available evidence for actual misuse. It is suggested that the Australian response could incorporate a more uniform commitment from the sector to adopting risk-based strategies, with government providing education for the sector that is based on the identification of specific points of vulnerability. Details: Sydney: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2011. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice no.424: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/421-440/tandi424.aspx Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/tandi/421-440/tandi424.aspx Shelf Number: 122788 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney Laundering (Australia)Terrorist Financing |
Author: FATF-GAFI Title: Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment Summary: Since 1989, the FATF has led efforts to counter the abuse of the international financial system by criminals. Over the years, governments, intergovernmental and multi-lateral organisations, the private sector and academics have made great progress in understanding the threats of money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) and the measures to be taken to make the abuse of the financial system for ML/TF purposes more difficult. But the problem of ML/TF remains and requires ongoing efforts, in particular in the area of detecting and taking enforcement actions against individuals and organisations who conduct these serious illegal activities. The Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment (GTA) report provides an assessment of the global systemic ML/TF threats. The document is aimed at raising the level of understanding of these threats and their negative impact, and help governments to take decisive action to minimise the harms they can cause. The report is based on the in-depth typologies studies and the FATF's Strategic Surveillance Initiative. This initiative was established in 2008, with the following objectives: detect and share information on the types of criminal or terrorist activities that pose an emerging threat to the financial system; develop a more strategic and longer-term view of these threats. This initiative involves the use of a detailed questionnaire which both FATF and FSRB members respond to on a yearly basis. This report was prepared by a team of experts from across the globe. They provided important content, peer review and validation throughout the project with the aim of producing this assessment. The project team comprised members from law enforcement and other agencies responsible for identifying and combating ML/TF from 10 jurisdictions and 8 international organisations. Details: Paris, France: FATF-GAFI (Financial Action Task Force), 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/48/10/45724350.pdf Shelf Number: 123847 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Canada. Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity Financing Watch: October-December 2009 Summary: The Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity Financing Watch presents a quarterly review of news articles summarizing relevant group-based, activity-based and country-based money laundering and terrorist activity financing issues and alerts readers to new financial mechanisms or technologies that could possibly be exploited for money laundering or terrorist activity financing purposes in Canada. The content presented herein is a summary of news articles and does not include any FINTRAC analysis. The views expressed are those of the original authors. References are provided to the respective articles at the end of this document. Details: Canada: Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, 2009. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2012 at http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/watch-regard/2010-03-eng.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Canada URL: http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/watch-regard/2010-03-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 124227 Keywords: Money Laundering (Canada)TerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: ESSAM (Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group) Title: Report on Cash Courier-Based Money Laundering Summary: In general, there are three main methods by which criminal organisations and terrorist financiers move illicit money for laundering purposes. These are (i) the use of the financial system (ii) the physical movement of money (iii) the use of fraudulent trading arrangements. The Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendation IX on Cash Couriers obliges countries to put in place measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligations. The Special Recommendation also requires countries to ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected of been related to terrorist financing or money laundering or that are falsely declared or disclosed Countries should also ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false declarations and disclosures. In cases where the currency or bearer negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing or money laundering, countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones which would enable the confiscation of such currency or instruments. This study used of a detailed questionnaire to gather information on the current practices of cash courier-based money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the ESAAMLG region. The information focused on the ability of the ESAAMLG member countries to detect and combat cash couriers for AML/CFT purposes. This study concludes that cash courier based money laundering is an activity that is present in virtually all ESAAMLG member countries. All ESAAMLG member countries are predominantly cash-based economies and have porous borders, and thereby making the region more vulnerable to cash- courier-based money laundering. Most ESAAMLG member countries have limited or no legislation in place to combat cash couriers and the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks. There is a general shortage of technical expertise and resources required to deal with cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. There is a critical need for training and awareness raising to enhance skills and experience to combat cash courier based money laundering, Looking ahead, there appears to be a number of steps that could be taken within the ESAAMLG member countries to enable national authorities to cope with and combat cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. These measures can be grouped into legislative, effective institutional arrangements, awareness raising, training, and improving domestic, regional and international cooperation. Details: Mombasa, Kenya: ESAAMLG Typologies Working Group, 2008. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: WGTP doc.1 r (2008): Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 124915 Keywords: Money Laundering (Africa)Organized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Suspicious matter reporting - Market Participants in the securities and derivatives sectors Summary: All reporting entities under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act) have obligations to report suspicious matters to AUSTRAC through the submission of suspicious matter reports (SMRs). These reports are a critical source of intelligence in combating serious criminal activity, including organised crime, terrorism financing and tax evasion. In July 2010 AUSTRAC conducted a survey of reporting entities that are Market Participants1 in the securities and derivatives sectors. The survey gathered information about how Market Participants have understood and addressed their SMR and related obligations under the AML/CTF Act. The survey included questions about staff training, transaction monitoring and enhanced customer due diligence (ECDD). This report presents the results of the survey, including aggregated data and analysis. It is a snapshot of organisational capacity and readiness among Market Participants to identify matters that may be reportable to AUSTRAC as SMRs. There are 16 key findings and five areas of ‘outlier behaviour’ that warrant highlighting. Where the report states that a respondent exhibited ‘outlier behaviour’, this indicates that the respondent’s behaviour diverged from that exhibited by their peers, and that they were yet to develop fully effective AML/CTF programs, systems or processes. The report’s findings will be directly relevant to Market Participants. The findings will also be of interest to the broader regulated population, compliance professionals, industry peak bodies, professional associations and academics. Details: West Chastwood, Australia: Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), 2010. 35p. Source: AUSTRAC survey series no. 2: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2012 at http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/surveyseries_market_participants.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/surveyseries_market_participants.pdf Shelf Number: 125219 Keywords: Business CrimesCrime Reporting (Australia)Financial CrimesOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Bagrosky, Michael Patrick Title: The Triple Border Area: A Re-Conceptualization of the Problem and U.S. Policy Summary: The Triple Border Area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay is major hub for international crime that generates billions of dollars annually and is the most important center for financing Islamic terrorism outside the Middle East. The primary criminal activities in the TBA are smuggling and money laundering. The proprietors of these illicit acts include local opportunists, multinational criminal organizations and Middle Eastern terrorist fundraisers. The first argument of this thesis is that the current concept, or view, of the TBA has been too fragmented. There are several different models and theories that address parts of this phenomenon, however, there is no single model that describes how the TBA works and no complete theory that attempts to explain the existence of this phenomenon. The second argument of this thesis is that the U.S.'s policy has been too narrow and the result of this narrowness has contributed to the perpetuation of crime in the TBA. To resolve this problem there needs to be a re-conceptualization of the TBA and U.S. policy. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2009. 185p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed July 24, 2012 at: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553250 Year: 2009 Country: South America URL: https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553250 Shelf Number: 125748 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized Crime (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay)SmugglingTerrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Title: U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History Summary: This hearing examined the money laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing risks created in the United States when a global bank uses its U.S. affiliate to provide U.S. dollars and access to the U.S. financial system to a network of high risk affiliates, high risk correspondent banks, and high risk clients. The hearing focused on a case study involving HSBC, one of the largest banks in the world. Headquartered in London, HSBC has a network of over 7,200 offices in more than 80 countries, 300,000 employees, and 2011 profits of nearly $22 billion. HSBC has been among the most active banks in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It first acquired a U.S. presence in the 1980s; today its leading U.S. affiliate is HSBC Bank USA, known as HBUS. HBUS has more than 470 branches across the United States and 4 million customers. HBUS is the key U.S. nexus for the entire HSBC worldwide network. In 2008, it processed 600,000 wire transfers per week; in 2009, two-thirds of the U.S. dollar payments HBUS processed came from HSBC affiliates in other countries. One HSBC executive told us that a major reason why HSBC opened its U.S. bank was to provide its overseas clients with a gateway into the U.S. financial system. Add on top of that, HBUS’ history of weak anti-money laundering controls, and you have a recipe for trouble. In 2003, the Federal Reserve and New York State Banking Department took a formal enforcement action requiring HBUS to revamp its AML program. HBUS, which was then converting to a nationally chartered bank under the supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or OCC, made changes, but even before the OCC lifted the order in 2006, the bank’s AML program began deteriorating. In September 2010, the OCC issued a Supervisory Letter, 31-pages long, describing a long list of severe AML deficiencies, and followed in October 2010, with a Cease and Desist order requiring HBUS to revamp its AML program a second time. The OCC cited, among other problems, a massive backlog of unreviewed alerts identifying potentially suspicious activity; a failure to monitor $60 trillion in wire transfers and account activity; a failure to examine risks at HSBC’s overseas affiliates before providing them correspondent banking services; and a failure, over a three-year period, to conduct anti-money laundering checks on more than $15 billion in bulk-cash transactions with those same affiliates. To examine the issues, the Subcommittee issued subpoenas, reviewed more than 1.4 million documents, and conducted extensive interviews with HSBC officials from around the world, as well as officials at other banks, and with federal regulators. HSBC has cooperated fully with the investigation. The Subcommittee’s work identified five key areas of vulnerability exposed by the HSBC case history. The five areas involve: •Providing U.S. correspondent accounts to high risk HSBC affiliates without performing due diligence, including a Mexican affiliate with unreliable AML controls; •Failing to stop deceptive conduct by HSBC affiliates to circumvent a screening device designed to block transactions by terrorists, drug kingpins and rogue nations like Iran; •Providing bank accounts to overseas banks with links to terrorist financing; •Clearing hundreds of millions of dollars in bulk U.S. dollar travelers cheques, despite suspicious circumstances; and •Offering bearer-share accounts, a high risk account that invites wrongdoing by facilitating hidden corporate ownership. Details: Washington, DC: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 340p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126117 Keywords: Banking IndustryDrug TraffickingMoney Laundering (U.S.)Terrorist Financing |
Author: Walters, Julie Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime in Australia: Perceptions of Regulated Businesses in Australia Summary: In Australia, legislation was introduced in 2006 that requires specified businesses to forward reports of certain financial transactions to the Australian Government agency, AUSTRAC. As part of the Australian Institute of Criminology’s research in to Australia’s anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism financing regime, a survey was conducted in mid 2009 of all business with reporting obligations to AUSTRAC. This report examines the findings of the survey on the perceptions of Australian businesses to the reporting regime in Australia. Details: Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Research and Public Policy Series 117: Accessed September 13, 2012 at: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Australia URL: http://aic.gov.au/documents/B/B/A/%7BBBA061D1-79A8-4F55-9429-B7390A34E13C%7Drpp117.pdf Shelf Number: 126323 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrimes Against BusinessesFinancial CrimesMoney Laundering (Australia)Terrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Republican Staff Title: Tobacco and Terror: How Cigarette Smuggling is Funding our Enemies Abroad Summary: It has been well-reported that terrorist and criminal organizations are conducting illicit business operations within the United States, sending the profits overseas to finance domestic and international terrorist and criminal organizations. Recent law enforcement investigations have revealed that these profits, estimated to be in the millions of dollars annually in the United States along, are generated in part by illicit cigarette trafficking. Historically, the low-risk, high profitability of the illicit cigarette trade served as a gateway for traditional criminal traffickers to move into lucrative and dangerous criminal enterprises such as money laundering, arms dealing, and drug trafficking. Recent law enforcement investigations, however, have directly linked those involved in illicit tobacco trade to infamous terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda. These startling discoveries led U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security Ranking Member Peter T. King (R-NY) to launch an investigation of the issue. The following staff report - which will focus on the estimated millions of dollars in illicit tobacco profits being funneled to terrorist groups overseas as well as New York State's refusal to enforce tobacco laws - is the result of numerous interviews with law enforcement official at the local, State, and Federal level, as well as open-source research. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, 2007. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2012 at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/412462-tobacco-and-terror-how-cigarette-smuggling-is.html Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/412462-tobacco-and-terror-how-cigarette-smuggling-is.html Shelf Number: 126414 Keywords: Cigarette SmugglingIllegal TradeIllicit TobaccoTerrorist FinancingTobacco Smuggling |
Author: Findley, Michael Title: Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers' and Terrorist Financiers' Access to Shell Companies Summary: For criminals moving large sums of dirty money internationally, there is no better device than an untraceable shell company. This paper reports the results of an experiment soliciting offers for these prohibited anonymous shell corporations. Our research team impersonated a variety of low- and high-risk customers, including would-be money launderers, corrupt officials, and terrorist financiers when requesting the anonymous companies. Evidence is drawn from more than 7,400 email solicitations to more than 3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries. The experiment allows us to test whether international rules are actually effective when they mandate that those selling shell companies must collect identity documents from their customers. Shell companies that cannot be traced back to their real owners are one of the most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes, busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism. The results provide the most complete and robust test of the effectiveness of international rules banning untraceable, anonymous shell companies. Furthermore, because the exercise took the form of a randomized experiment, it also provides unique insight into what causes those who sell shell companies to either comply with or violate international rules requiring them to collect identity documents from customers. Just as the random assignment to control (placebo) and treatment groups in drug trials isolates the effect of a new drug, so too the random assignment of low-risk “placebo” emails and different high-risk “treatment” emails isolated the effects of different kinds of risk on the likelihood of (a) being offered a shell company, and (b) being required to provide proof of identity. Key findings include:1 1. Overall, international rules that those forming shell companies must collect proof of customers’ identity are ineffective. Nearly half (48 percent) of all replies received did not ask for proper identification, and 22 percent did not ask for any identity documents at all to form a shell company. 5. Informing providers of the rules they should be following made them no more likely to do so, even when penalties for non-compliance were mentioned. In contrast, when customers offered to pay providers a premium to flout international rules, the rate of demand for certified identity documentation fell precipitously compared to the placebo. Details: Nathan, Qld: Griffith University, 2012. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/454625/Global-Shell-Games_CGPPcover_Jersey.pdf Shelf Number: 126495 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Illicit Tobacco Trade Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary met in Mexico City, during June 2011. It was at said Plenary where a proposal to conduct typology research work into money laundering and terror financing to be associated with the Illicit Trade in Tobacco (ITT) was accepted. March of 2011 also saw the OECD launch the “Oslo Dialogue” with the aim of promoting a whole of government approach to the tackling of financial crimes and illicit flows. This has been augmented by the G20 calling for strengthened inter-agency cooperation to fight illicit activities as well as the FATF adding tax crimes to the list of predicate offences. The proponents of the typology stated that the illicit tobacco trade was prone to money laundering. Trade was considered to be cash intensive and profitable whilst being accompanied by low levels of risk posed to the criminal groupings (in terms of detection, seizures, penalties, criminal procedure) contributing towards the manifestation of the related illicit activities. Key areas of concern included: a) Loss of revenue to the fiscal authorities. b) The use of the illicitly generated proceeds (i.e., to fund other crimes or the financing of terror). c) The ability to distinguish between illicit activities as undertaken by licit and illicit players in the tobacco sector. d) To identify the extent that governments enforcement agencies prioritise the addressing of illicit trade in tobacco when compared to other crimes. It was furthermore mentioned that the project was to augment work already conducted by the FATF, which included Trade Based Money Laundering (June 2006), Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud (February 2007), ML Vulnerabilities in Free Trade Zones (February 2010) as well as the then recently published Global ML/TF Threat Assessment (June 2010). The identified key objectives were: a) To determine the extent of the Money Laundering and Terror Financing (ML/TF) vulnerabilities associated with illicit trade in tobacco at a global, regional and domestic level. b) To identify relevant case studies and determine trends and patterns from a global, regional and domestic perspective. c) To identify possible indicators which may assist financial and non financial institutions in developing mechanisms to identify, report and counter smuggling activities and the misuse of trade practices. d) To assist jurisdictions and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in knowledge building and the identification of harms, drivers and measures associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. e) To enhance the efforts aimed at curbing ML and TF associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. This document provides a synopsis of the nature and extent of the ML/TF risks currently associated with the illicit trade in tobacco. It contains an overview of the problem statement and the data provided, as well as an analysis of the predicate offences, extent of associated money laundering and terror financing activities coupled lastly to the various jurisdictional enforcement responses to the curbing of this specific phenomenon. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 4, 2012 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Illicit%20Tobacco%20Trade.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Illicit%20Tobacco%20Trade.pdf Shelf Number: 126552 Keywords: Financial CrimesIllicit TradeMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingTobacco |
Author: DiGiacomo, Richard J. Title: Prostitution as a Possible Funding Mechanism for Terrorism Summary: An essential component of defeating terrorist is targeting their financing and fundraising mechanisms. Successfully targeting terrorist financing may disrupt an organization’s existence, prevent an attack, or reduce the harm produced by an attack. As a result of these efforts, al Qaeda faces financial challenges they have not experienced in a decade. Whether in response to these efforts, or as a deliberate strategic shift, terrorist organizations have been extremely adaptive and creative in adjusting their fundraising efforts; specifically turning to criminal enterprises. While there is still debate regarding the level of cooperation between criminal and terrorist organizations, it is generally agreed that terrorist organizations and their affiliates are increasingly relying on criminal enterprises to fund their operations. This thesis will examine whether prostitution is funding terrorism, and if it is logical and reasonable to conclude that a highly adaptable terrorist organization would fund their operations using prostitution. Prostitution is a highly profitable business requiring no specialized skill set and very little cost to entry. The business opportunities are unlimited, and it is business that law enforcement, prosecutors, and the courts do not consider as a serious crime, but rather a harmless vice voluntarily entered into by all parties. A failure to seriously consider prostitution as a funding mechanism demonstrates a potentially fatal lack of imagination. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 9, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=20517 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=20517 Shelf Number: 126651 Keywords: Organized CrimeProstitutionTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: Digest of Terrorist Cases Summary: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) brought together senior criminal justice experts—including Attorney-Generals and Chief Prosecutors—to share experiences and good practices on how to deal with terrorism cases. The outcome is this Digest of Terrorist Cases, giving policymakers and criminal justice officials practical ideas and expert insights on how to deal with a relatively new field of jurisprudence. It complements other UNODC tools that provide guidance on how to address acts of terrorism within a legal framework, like legislative guides. The judicial cases featured in this Digest cover relevant aspects of the international legal regime against terrorism. It provides a comparative analysis of national statutory frameworks for terrorism prosecutions, and it identifies legal issues and pitfalls encountered in investigating and adjudicating relevant offences. In addition, it identifies practices related to specialized investigative and prosecutorial techniques. It also addresses the links between terrorism and other forms of crime (like organized crime, the trafficking of drugs, people and arms), as well as how to disrupt terrorist financing. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2010. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/09-86635_Ebook_English.pdf Shelf Number: 126803 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimeProsecution, Terrorist CasesTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing pose an ongoing challenge for countries in the greater Horn of Africa and the international community as a whole. In addition to negatively affecting the integrity and stability of national financial systems, they also threaten national security and undermine economic development. The Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Regime in Ethiopia: Second Assessment Report builds upon an assessment conducted in early 2012 for a baseline study on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) in East Africa. This second assessment report identifies key areas of progress, limitations and challenges to, and opportunities for the ongoing development of Ethiopia’s AML/CFT regime. It also outlines recommended entry points to further strengthen and expedite AML/CFT efforts in compliance with regional and international standards. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Ethiopia URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/13Feb27_EthiopianFIC-SecondAsmntRpt_TAD_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 128408 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismMoney Laundering (Ethiopia)TerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Summary: This document is intended to provide guidance on the conduct of risk assessment at the country or national level, and it relates especially to key requirements set out in Recommendation 1 and paragraphs 3-6 of INR 1. In particular, it outlines general principles that may serve as a useful framework in assessing ML/TF risks at the national level. The guidance contained in this document takes into consideration previous FATF work, which is still valid reference material. The general principles contained in this paper are also relevant when conducting risk assessments of a more focussed scope, such as in assessments of a particular financial or DNFBP sector (for example, the securities sector) or of thematic issues (for example, the proceeds of corruption related ML). All of these types of assessments (comprehensive, sectoral or thematic) carried out at the national level may also form the basis for determining whether to apply enhanced or specific measures, simplified measures, or exemptions from AML/CFT requirements. Furthermore, while FATF Recommendation 1 does not create specific risk assessment obligations regarding the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the general principles laid out in this guidance could also be used in conducting a risk assessment for this area. The guidance in this document is not intended to explain how supervisors should assess risks in the context of risk-based supervision, although risk-based supervision will likely be informed by a national-level risk assessment. Also, this guidance does not provide further explanation of RBA obligations and decisions for financial institutions and DNFBPs. The FATF has issued separate guidance on implementing the RBA for specific sectors and professions, and that material will be reviewed and, as necessary, modified in light of the revised FATF Recommendations. This guidance document is not a standard and is therefore not intended to designate specific actions necessary to meet obligations under Recommendation 1 and INR 1 or any other Recommendations dealing with the RBA. Criteria for technical compliance and for assessing effectiveness relevant to this and all other FATF Recommendations may be found in the FATF assessment methodology. The practices described in this guidance are intended to serve as examples that may facilitate implementation of these obligations in a manner compatible with the FATF standards. This guidance is structured as follows: This section (1) lays out the purpose, scope and status of this guidance, along with an outline of the core FATF obligations relevant to ML/TF risk assessments at any level. Section 2 lays out general principles that should be taken into account when conducting ML/TF risk assessments at the country or national level. Section 3 discusses how to organise a national-level ML/TF risk assessment, its frequency, and the data and information that could be used while undertaking such an assessment. Section 4 presents a high-level view of the three main stages involved in the ML/TF risk assessment process (identification, analysis and evaluation). Section 5 considers the outcome and dissemination of the risk assessment product. Annexes to this document contain additional information relating to ML/TF risk assessment including summaries of selected national-level assessments. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: FATF Guidance: Accessed May 28, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 128840 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: To Protect and Prevent: Outcomes of a Global Dialogue to Counter Terrorist Abuse of the Nonprofit Sector Summary: This joint CGCC and United Nations report summarizes the outcomes of a multiyear project led by the UN and aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter the risk of terrorism financing through the nonprofit sector, protecting the sector and preventing terrorist abuse of nonprofit organizations. The project included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings. More than 50 states and 80 nonprofit organizations participated in the meetings, in addition to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-style regional bodies, and the financial sector. Details: Washington, DC: , 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/publications/to-protect-and-prevent-outcomes-of-a-global-dialogue-to-counter-terrorist-abuse-of-the-nonprofit-sector/ Shelf Number: 129018 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFinancial CrimesTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Bank for International Settlements. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Title: Sound Management of Risks Related to Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism - Consultative Document Summary: The Basel Committee has a long-standing commitment to promote the implementation of sound policies and procedures to combat money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (FT). Its commitment to combating ML and FT is fully aligned with its mandate to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. Prudent management of risks related to ML and FT along with effective supervisory oversight are critical in protecting the safety and soundness of banks and the integrity of the international financial system. The inadequacy or absence of sound management can increase the exposure of banks to serious risks, especially reputational, operational, compliance and concentration risks. Recent developments, including robust enforcement actions taken by regulators and the corresponding direct and indirect costs incurred by banks due to their lack of diligence in applying appropriate risk management policies, procedures and controls, have highlighted those risks. These costs and damage could probably have been avoided had the banks maintained effective risk-based policies and procedures to protect against risks arising from ML and FT. In February 2012, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) released a revised version of the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (the FATF standards), to which the Committee provided input. The Committee's intention in issuing this consultative paper is to support countries' implementation of the FATF standards with respect to their banks and banking groups, by exploring complementary areas and leveraging the expertise available in both organisations. Therefore, these guidelines are intended to be consistent with and to supplement the goals and objectives of the FATF standards. The Committee has included cross-references to FATF standards in this document in order to assist banks in complying with national requirements based on the implementation of those standards. Details: Basel, Switzerland: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2013 at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs252.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs252.pdf Shelf Number: 129229 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals Summary: Criminals seek out the involvement of legal professionals in their ML/TF activities, sometimes because a legal professional is required to complete certain transactions, and sometimes to access specialised legal and notarial skills and services which could assist the laundering of the proceeds of crime and the funding of terrorism. The report identifies a number of ML/TF methods that commonly employ or, in some countries, require the services of a legal professional. Inherently these activities pose ML/TF risk. When clients seek to misuse the legal professional’s services in these areas, even law abiding legal professionals may be vulnerable. The methods are: •misuse of client accounts •purchase of real property •creation of trusts and companies •management of trusts and companies •managing client affairs and making introductions •undertaking certain litigation •setting up and managing charities The report also describes red flag indicators of ML/TF which may be useful to legal professionals, self-regulatory bodies (SRBs), competent authorities and law enforcement agencies. In this report, over 100 case studies referring to these and other ML/TF methods were taken into account. Some of these case studies show that not all legal professionals are undertaking client due diligence (CDD) when required. Even where due diligence is obtained, if the legal professional lacks understanding of the ML/TF vulnerabilities and red flag indicators, they are less able to use that information to prevent the misuse of their services. The report also challenges the perception sometimes held by criminals, and at times supported by claims from legal professionals themselves, that legal professional privilege or professional secrecy would lawfully enable a legal professional to continue to act for a client who was engaging in criminal activity and/or prevent law enforcement from accessing information to enable the client to be prosecuted. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/mltf-vulnerabilities-legal-professionals.html Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/mltf-vulnerabilities-legal-professionals.html Shelf Number: 0 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: International Best Practices: Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 6) Summary: FATF Recommendation 6 requires countries to implement the targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing, such as UNSCR 1267(1999) and its successor resolutions, and UNSCR 1373(2001). Efforts to combat terrorist financing are greatly undermined if countries do not freeze the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities quickly and effectively. This updated best practices paper reflects the latest relevant UNSCRs in response to challenges faced by countries in the implementation of Recommendation 6. The paper provides best practices that could help countries in their implementation of the targeted financial sanctions to prevent and suppress terrorist financing in accordance with the relevant UNSCRs. Details: Paris: FATF, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/documents/bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html Shelf Number: 129272 Keywords: Financial CrimesTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: International Monetary Fund Title: Panama: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Summary: This assessment of the anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime of Panama is based on the Forty Recommendations 2003 and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and was prepared using the updated AML/CFT assessment Methodology 2004. The assessment team considered all the materials supplied by the authorities, the information obtained on-site during their mission from October 15-29, 2012, and other verifiable information subsequently provided by the authorities. During the mission, the assessment team met with officials and representatives of all relevant government agencies and the private sector. A list of the agencies and entities met is set out in Annex 1 to the detailed assessment report. This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Panama at the time of the mission. It describes and analyzes those measures, sets out Panama's levels of compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and provides recommendations on how certain aspects of the system could be strengthened. Details: Washington, DC: IMF, 2014. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2014 at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1454.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Panama URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1454.pdf Shelf Number: 132120 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations Summary: Terrorist organisations and non-profit organisations have very different objectives, but often rely on similar logistical capabilities: Funds, material, personnel and public influence are key resources for non-profit organisations (NPOs). Terrorist organisations seek the same resources to further their cause, which makes NPOs vulnerable for abuse by terrorists or terrorist networks. FATF Recommendation 8 requires that countries review their laws and regulations to ensure that NPOs cannot be abused for the financing of terrorism. This typologies report examines in detail, how and where NPOs are at risk of terrorist abuse. The report uses case studies as well as input collected from law enforcement, other government actors and NPOs themselves to increase awareness of the methods and risk of abuse for terrorism of the NPO sector, both domestically and internationally. The report highlights that NPOs are at risk of being abused for terrorism at different levels: from the misappropriation of street-level fundraising to the infiltration of terrorist organisations at the programme delivery level to promote their ideology. Details: Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2014. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 25, 2014 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-of-terrorist-abuse-in-non-profit-organisations.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-of-terrorist-abuse-in-non-profit-organisations.pdf Shelf Number: 132780 Keywords: Terrorism Terrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Schanzer, Jonathan Title: Terrorism Finance in Turkey: A Growing Concern Summary: The Financial Action Task Force, or FATF, the international body for setting the global standards to combat terrorist financing, held its plenary session in Paris in mid-February 2014. In the days before the meeting, Bloomberg reported that the Turkish lira weakened and stocks dropped resulting from concerns over a possible blacklisting. Realistically, Turkey was in little danger of joining the short FATF list of countries requiring "counter-measures" (Iran and North Korea). But the markets were jittery because of an ongoing corruption scandal in Turkey, which erupted on December 17, 2013. In the end, the corruption charges had no impact on FATF's ruling. Ankara was merely grey-listed by FATF, as it has been since 2007, due to deficiencies based on technical and legislative criteria. But the market's outsized anxiety underscored the fact that, amidst the corruption scandal, a troubling picture has come into focus. With the Syrian civil war raging just across Turkey's eastern border, reports continue to circulate that Turkey has turned a blind eye to the flow of money and weaponry to dangerous jihadi groups, including al-Qaeda. And while Ankara has been struggling to weaken Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, a client of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey was involved in a massive sanctions-busting scheme with Tehran. Now known as "gas-for-gold," the scheme helped the Iranian regime gain some $13 billion, even as Turkey's NATO allies sought to punish Tehran for its illicit nuclear program. Meanwhile, leaders of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas have been meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdooan in Ankara. In fact, one senior Hamas leader, Saleh Aruri, reportedly resides in Turkey, where he has been allegedly involved in the financing and logistics of Hamas operations. On top of this, in September 2013, Turkey surprised the West by entering into a controversial missile deal with a Chinese defense firm that was blacklisted for selling Iran items for its nuclear program. Many of these reports intersect with the recent corruption scandal. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has rejected most of the allegations, blaming outsiders (notably Israel and followers of the Pennsylvania-based Islamist leader Fethullah Gulen) for a "treacherous plot."[2] Rather than addressing the charges, the AKP has purged the investigators, prosecutors, and journalists involved, threatening the rule of law in Turkey. Washington, for its part, has remained on the sidelines, expressing relatively mild concern about the crackdowns on law enforcement officials and the jailing of journalists, while electing not to mention terrorism finance issues publicly. Washington's silence stems from fears of a fall-out with Turkey, which has been a crucial ally over the years, and is situated strategically at the intersection of Europe and the Middle East. But Turkey's actions constitute a direct challenge to Washington's sanctions regime. Built under two presidents, this layered and intricate sanctions infrastructure has become a crucial tool to combating illicit finance the world over. Moreover, with Iran, Hamas, and al-Qaeda in the picture, how long before elements within the U.S. government-whether the Treasury, State Department, or Congress-feel compelled to issue designations of individuals or institutions tied to terrorism in Turkey? How long before Turkey runs the risk of being viewed as a possible State Sponsor of Terrorism? Such steps seem drastic. But should these problems continue to mount, Washington will have a more difficult time maintaining this important alliance, both because of legal obligations and public perceptions. The window to address these problems is now. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/Schanzer_Turkey_Final_Report_3_smaller.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Turkey URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/Schanzer_Turkey_Final_Report_3_smaller.pdf Shelf Number: 132852 Keywords: Political CorruptionTerrorism (Turkey)Terrorist Financing |
Author: Halliday, Terence Title: Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regimes to Control Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism. Summary: The International Monetary Fund's (IMF, Fund) program on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) has been integrally involved in the global system for AML/CFT in coordination with other key players, particularly the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). AML/CFT assessments, whether by the Fund or other assessor bodies, contribute to the key Fund activities of surveillance, financial support and technical assistance in support of domestic and international financial stability. These evaluations are taken seriously by both assessors and assessed. It is timely to evaluate the IMF's involvement in the AML/CFT system and to reconsider relevant aspects of the FATF standards, methodologies and practices more generally. The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG) obtained agreement from the IMF to conduct an independent critical analysis of IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) during the 3rd round with the intent that the appraisal of past practices might inform advances in IMF and FATF methodologies and practices. Findings of the study are based on extensive interviews at the IMF and the FATF, detailed analysis of documents, close examination of four IMF assessments, site visits to three countries, and review of related literatures. This study finds that the IMF has contributed significantly to efforts that will improve the standards and methodology for assessing AML/CFT systems worldwide. The IMF has shown an openness to independent investigation of its practices; a willingness to ask baseline questions about the objectives and efficacy of AML/CFT regimes; a commitment to experimentation in assessment techniques; an impetus to clarify AML/CFT goals and objectives; leadership in the drive for assessments to appraise whether effective outcomes have resulted from implementation of standards; an investment in highly-qualified experienced assessment teams; undertaken initiatives to find new forms of valid and reliable data; intentions to forge tighter linkages between specific AML/CFT tools and targeted problems in financial systems, e.g., tax evasion, corruption; and effectiveness in raising donor moneys to invest in technical assistance to countries in need of reforms. Details: Chicago: The Center on Law and Globalization (CLG), 2014. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed November 10, 2014 at: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20Money%201.30.2014.pdf Shelf Number: 134007 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTax EvationTerrorist Financing |
Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband Summary: The report makes four main points that run counter to previous conceptions of crime-terror connectivity and the global illicit network. 1) Rather than operating in numerous smaller networks, the criminals and terrorists in our study are largely subsumed (98%) in a single network of 2,700 individuals with 15,000 relationships. Connectivity among actors within the illicit marketplace is relatively high. This should not be construed to say that the network is a cohesive organizational entity. Rather, the phenomenon observed and documented here is a self-organizing complex system built through social connections from the bottom up. 2) By most measures of connectivity, terrorists are more central than almost all other types of criminals, second only to narcotics smugglers. The transnational nature of some terrorist actors allows them to link disparate criminal groups. Importantly our study does not provide evidence that terrorists are shunned by criminal actors because of their ideological motivations. 3) The conventional wisdom that explains crime-terror connectivity as a product of failed or economically poor states is challenged here. Generally speaking, connectivity between terrorists and criminals is highest in resource-rich countries that have little incentive to support substate actors (comparative advantage theory) and resource-poor countries that are incentivized to support criminal or terrorist groups (augment state capabilities theory). 4) Despite the interest surrounding big data and data science, the results of data acquisition and utilization often falls short of their potential. A growing number of data sources and tools offer an opportunity to conduct analyses addressing global challenges like the crime-terror "nexus." Advancing this agenda requires asking questions in unique ways and pursuing creative approaches and partnerships to aggregating and analyzing data. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 89p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2014 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RiskyBusiness_final.pdf Shelf Number: 134009 Keywords: ContrabandCriminal NetworksIllicit GoodsSmugglingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Shetret, Liat Title: Tracking Progress: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: Money laundering and terrorism financing pose a significant threat to security and developmental efforts worldwide and increasingly undermine the integrity of the global financial system and its long-term stability. Many states in the Greater Horn of Africa region are experiencing rapid economic growth and have increasing access to global markets. With predominantly informal and cash-based economies, these states are particularly vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing activities. This vulnerability is further enhanced by absent, nascent, or incomplete financial regulatory mechanisms as well as limited law enforcement and judicial capacities to respond to violations. Poverty, weak governance, corruption, porous borders, and political instability all contribute to the enabling environment for transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups in the Greater Horn region. Although overarching regulatory frameworks and institutional capacities remain low, political interest and technical attention and resourcing is growing in the region. In particular, a willingness to engage on these issues at the national level is rising. This report provides a new assessment of developments related to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/ CFT) efforts in East Africa and the Greater Horn region and offers a review and analysis of 10 countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. It builds on the 2012 baseline study, titled "ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion," and includes two additional countries, Tanzania and Yemen, because of the geographical and strategic importance of these two countries to the cross-border risks shared among Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states and these non-IGAD members. This report combined desk research and analysis with limited in-country visits. To the extent possible, each country's assessment covers similar areas, including a recap of the findings from the 2012 baseline study and a summary of findings and recommendations to date; a broad economic snapshot of the country and relevant political context; progress on AML/ CFT efforts, such as the national legal framework and the operationalization of a financial intelligence unit; ongoing risks and vulnerabilities, largely focused on sectoral risks and concrete implementation of legal frameworks; and emergent entry points for action and further development. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 104p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Tracking-Progress-low-res.pdf Shelf Number: 135379 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney Laundering (Africa)Organized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Passas, Nikos Title: Financial intermediaries - Anti-money laundering allies in cash-based societies? Summary: Many informal cash-based economies run parallel financial systems that are very different to the Western banking concept. Such countries are perceived to have a high risk of money laundering. Looking at Afghanistan, Somalia, and India - where anti-money laundering efforts have yielded mixed results - this paper draws lessons from the operations of financial intermediaries. These countries are considered high risk not only for money laundering and terrorism financing, but also for corruption and political and legal concerns. The issues at hand - risk assessments for remittances, strategies of engaging on the ground, resource management, and alternatives to the existing financial networks - are also valid for other cash-based, low-income societies. In fact, informal remittance channels may provide opportunities to strengthen regulatory and governance capacities. Details: Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: U4 Issue, April 2015, no. 10: Accessed April 29, 2015 at: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/ Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.u4.no/publications/financial-intermediaries-anti-money-laundering-allies-in-cash-based-societies/ Shelf Number: 135403 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Hallaj, Omar Abdulaziz Title: The balance-sheet of conflict: criminal revenues and warlords in Syria Summary: The conflict in Syria is forging new forms of territorial control, and a political economy that is not unlike the patronage system that was previously fostered by the ruling Ba'ath party. As a result of the extended war efforts and the need for revenues to fund them, the national economy is now deeply affected by illicit activities such as trade in antiquities, oil and drugs, as well as smuggling, kidnapping, looting and extrajudicial land expropriations. Warlords and armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) must fund their military campaigns. However, at the same time, they have to balance the extraction of local revenues with the loyalty of the civilian populations they control. At stake are their reputations and their abilities to raise money from foreign donors and to perpetuate their coercive governance. This paper proposes a rough estimate of the size of the funding streams used by loyalist and rebel militias. The paper also argues that the creeds and beliefs that initiated the conflict are no longer the sole motors of violence; indeed, greed is increasingly shaping the nature of hostilities and the strategies adopted by armed groups. As a result, the framework proposed in the Geneva Communique for achieving peace in Syria is not likely to succeed alone in solving the conflict. Recent experiences in other countries suggest that transitional political arrangements for the transfer of power are failing to dislodge war profiteering. Additional approaches to enable a progressive recovery of livelihoods and the provision of local services should be considered a key part of the peacebuilding process. It is also vital to consider other factors sustaining the war economy, including international sanctions and external funding. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2015. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 2, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Syria URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Hallaj_NOREF_Clingendael_The%20balance-sheet%20of%20conflict_criminal%20revenues%20and%20warlords%20in%20Syria_Apr%202015_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135841 Keywords: Illicit TradeLootingSmugglingTerrorism OrganizationsTerrorist Financing |
Author: Willebois, Emile Van der Does de Title: Nonprofit Organizations and the Combatting of Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response Summary: One of the ways in which terrorist organisations raise and transfer funds, is by using non-profit organisations (NPOs). Ever since the adoption of the Special Recommendation VIII on the abuse of NPOs for Terrorism Financing purposes by the FATF in 2001, countries have struggled to find a proper way to address this potential terrorism financing risk. In many important ways however, the work of NPOs deal with the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, so it is essential that in trying to address one aspect of the terrorist threat - terrorism financing - we do not inadvertently diminish the impact of other ways of tackling the issue. This article argues that in discussing the threat and how to address it, policy-makers need to be specific, not tainting the whole sector with the same brush. Virtually all governments already interact with the NPO sector and those avenues should be used for dealing with this issue - it is inefficient and ultimately counterproductive to devise an entirely new regulatory framework. The ultimate objective is to enhance the transparency of the sector- the people in charge of NPOs, their sources of funds and particularly the way those funds are spent. That aim serves a much wider purpose than just countering terrorism financing and touches on many aspects of civil society good governance that the sector itself and others have been debating for a long time. When devising public policy on this issue the contribution of the NPO sector to fighting terrorism be recognized and used to its full advantage. Moreover the sector's own stake in being "clean" and being so regarded by others should be acknowledged, thus making them an indispensable partner in drawing up such policies. For the same reason, self-regulation should be considered. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8547-0 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8547-0 Shelf Number: 135992 Keywords: Counter-TerroristTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Chatain, Pierre-Laurent Title: Protecting Mobile Money against Financial Crimes: Global Policy Challenges and Solutions Summary: Mobile Money is a booming industry in an increasing number of countries worldwide. The project results from increased demand for guidance and technical assistance from governments after the 2008 publication of an exploratory paper, Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial Services, which discussed mobile money and the application of international anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) standards. For most, how to craft a regulatory regime that expands access to financial services to the poor through the development of mobile phone financial services, but compliant with AML/CFT standards remains elusive. Specific AML/CFT regulations related to mobile money have not been issued in many jurisdictions, mainly due to the lack of awareness of the risks these services can pose if the right controls are not in place. Because the international standards for AML/CFT, the Financial Action Task Force's 40 + 9 Recommendations were designed and issued well before mobile money technology and business models became prevalent, even developed countries have begun to face challenges with their regulation. The project team aims to provide practical guidance to jurisdictions and the Industry on how to draft regulations and internal guidelines that allow them to comply with AML/CFT standards with enough flexibility for mobile money to thrive. Specifically, the paper (1) takes stock of new AML/CFT regulations and practices relevant to Mobile money, (2) design guidelines for drafting AML/CFT regulations that cover mobile money and (3) propose examples of best practices for the Industry to include AML/CFT in their own business model. Details: Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011. 195p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8669-9 Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-8669-9 Shelf Number: 122702 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Title: Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara Summary: The Sahara has been a pipeline for smuggling and trafficking of many types of goods for well over a thousand years. Libya, which has ties to Europe dating back to the Roman Empire, has always been a key destination and transit area for many of these illicit flows. Since the fall of Gaddafi, the smuggling and trafficking business involving both armed groups and organized crime networks has increased dramatically in Libya. Instability and state breakdown has allowed the traditional tribal trans-Sahara trade, in drugs, counterfeit products and migrants and arms to grow to around US$43-80m at most, distributed among a large number of traffickers, clans and groups. The increase in flows of money and illegal goods are having repercussions across North Africa and the Sahel. Illicit finances and weaponry from Libya helped facilitate the rebellion in Mali in 2010, and continues to fuel conflict today. More significantly, the high number of migrants along the North African coast has enabled the development of a far more lucrative coastal migrant trade, valued now at US$ 255 - 323 million per year in Libya alone. The value of this trade dwarfs any existing trafficking and smuggling businesses in the region, and has particularly strengthened groups with a terrorist agenda, including the Islamic State. Drawn from a range of open source data and a number of recent interviews across the Saharan region, this brief documents the current scope and scale of trans-Saharan criminal economies and highlights their possible implications on stability and security. The goal of this brief is to provide a timely update of the evidence base on potential conflict drivers in the greater Sahara region, for the benefit of policy-makers, practitioners and researchers. The brief is a collaboration between the Norwegian Centre for Global Analysis (Rhipto) and the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. The brief concludes that given the level of illicit revenue it is currently possible to generate from the migrant flow, preventing Islamic State and coastal Libyan armed groups from becoming involved in or profiting from migrant smuggling should be of greater priority than attempting to cut off the long-established trans-Saharan trade routes passing through the Sahel towards Libya. Details: Geneva: The Global Initiative, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed July 23, 2015 at: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Libya URL: http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf Shelf Number: 136144 Keywords: Financial crimesIllegal TradeTerroristTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities associated with gold Summary: Gold provides an alternative means for criminals to store or move their assets as regulators implement stronger anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing measures to protect the formal financial sector from abuse. The joint FATF-Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering report, money laundering / terrorist financing vulnerabilities associated with gold, identifies the many features that make gold attractive to criminals to use as a vehicle for money laundering: it has a stable value, it is anonymous and easily transformable and interchangeable. The highly lucrative gold market also presents proceed-generating opportunities for criminals at each stage, from mining to retailing. Understanding what makes gold - like other precious metals and stones, such as diamonds - attractive to criminals to legitimise their assets and to generate profits is essential in identifying this sector's money laundering and terrorist financing risks. This report provides a series of case studies and red flag indicators to raise awareness of the key vulnerabilities of gold and the gold market, particularly with anti-money laundering/ countering the financing of terrorism practitioners, and companies involved in the gold industry. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-risks-vulnerabilities-associated-with-gold.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML-TF-risks-vulnerabilities-associated-with-gold.pdf Shelf Number: 136240 Keywords: GoldMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimePrecious MetalsTerrorist Financing |
Author: European Interdisciplinary Analysis Project Title: Criminal Money Management as a Cutting Edge between Profit Oriented Crime and Terrorism. Summary: The strategic orientation of the LKA NRW is adjusted to the future. In this concept it is essential, in particular with respect to the fight against organised criminal groups and terror organisations to act jointly and across national borders - with newest methods like the so-called scenario-technique, to come to a better "pre-thinking" of the criminal future. Once more the LKA NRW sets an initiative in this direction. Beginning in December 2005, the LKA NRW, in cooperation with EUROPOL, the University of Ghent and Turkish National Police (TNP) conducted the inter-disciplinary analysis project EDGE with financial support of the EU `AGIS` funding. In the project, on the one hand the scenario method was examined regarding its usability as an instrument for future oriented strategic planning on the field of law enforcement. On the other hand, the field of `Criminal Money Management` as a cutting EDGE between profit oriented crime and terror-ism was chosen as a relevant topic to conduct this examination. As a result, future scenarios and future robust strategic recommendations were developed. The unique collection and analysis of actual international money flows with an illegal background in Europe and Turkey and the interdisciplinary cooperation of experts from the banking sector, criminological science and law enforcement with a harmonized result have, among others, to be regarded as the relevant outputs of the project. Details: Ghent, Belgium: Ghent University, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy, 2005. 125p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 5, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/Countries/Germany/EDGE_Final_Results.pdf Year: 2005 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/fileadmin/user_upload/Countries/Germany/EDGE_Final_Results.pdf Shelf Number: 136331 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: AsiaPacific Group on Money Laundering Title: APS Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering Summary: 1. Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) was recognized by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its landmark 2006 study as one of the three main methods by which criminal organizations and terrorist financiers move money for the purpose of disguising its origins and integrating it back into the formal economy. This method of money laundering (ML) is based upon abuse of trade transactions and their financing. The 2006 FATF Study highlighted the increasing attractiveness of TBML as a method for laundering funds, as controls on laundering of funds through misuse of the financial system (both formal and alternate) and through physical movement of cash (cash smuggling) become tighter. 2. In recent years APG members have continued to highlight vulnerabilities for TBML, but very few cases investigations or prosecutions appear to have been undertaken in the Asia/Pacific region and very few case studies had been shared. 3. The APG's TBML study aims to build on the existing studies, in particular those of the FATF, in order to study the extent of the prevalence of TBML and highlight current methods, techniques and modus operandi for TBML as well as to identify 'red flags' to detect and respond to TBML. 4. In determining the magnitude of TBML, the study considered why so few cases of TBML have been detected since the FATF's 2006 study. The Paper has sought to clarify and furnish explanations for terms and processes of 'trade finance' which are comprehensible to Money Laundering (ML) investigators. 5. This Paper has focused on TBML occurring in the course of international trade in goods. The study does not include in its scope capital flight, tax evasion, trade in services and domestic trade. The features of the dynamic environment that distinguish TBML from other forms of ML are its occurrence through intermingling of the trade sector with the trade finance sector in cross- border transactions. The foreign exchange market and the long supply chain make international trade particularly vulnerable to TBML. 6. The study included circulation of a questionnaire to APG and FATF members seeking statistically significant indicators. The Paper sets out a number of Case Studies to illustrate trends of TBML. Simplified explanations of the terms and processes of trade finance have been attempted through interaction with the private sector. A brief review of the literature on the subject generated by the FATF, FSRBs and other authors has been made. 7. There is a growing concern on how the rapid growth in the global economy has made international trade an increasingly attractive avenue to move illicit funds through financial transactions associated with the trade in goods and services. TBML is a complex phenomenon since its constituent elements cut across not only sectoral boundaries but also national borders. The dynamic environment of international trade allows TBML to take multiple forms. Details: Sydney: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 2012. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Asia URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Trade_Based_ML_APGReport.pdf Shelf Number: 136353 Keywords: Financial CrimeIllegal TradeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: European Commission. Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security Title: Study on "Best Practices in Vertical Relations between the Financial Intelligence Unit and (1) Law Enforcement Services and (2) Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Reporting Entities with a View to Indicating Effective Models for Feedback on Fol" Summary: The objective of the study was to make an inventory on the provision of feedback between the Reporting Entities (REs), the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and Law enforcement Authorities (LEAs). 25 Member States were visited and a large number of interviews were held. Feedback should be provided and received in the following ways: (1) Feedback should be received by the REs in reaction to the financial reports (STRs) the REs are legally obligated to send to the FIUs of the different Member States. (2) Feedback should be provided by LEAs to the FIUs in reaction on the dissemination by the FIU of financial information on the basis of the STRs received from the REs. The interviews of personnel from the REs, FIUs and LEAs indicated a level of feedback (FIU->RE) as generally recommended in the Best practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback, published in 1998 by the FATF. There are some new developments like indications on quality of STRs being fed back to the REs. The main forms of feedback between those entities (FIU->RE) are however still based on the recommendations of the FATF. Feedback in the 25 Member States consists mainly of general feedback (the organisation of AML-meetings, workshops, statistics, typologies, trends, sanitised cases etc.) and specific feedback (individual or case to case) on the outcome of specific STRs reported by the REs. This last form of feedback seems to be provided in an informal way in most Member States. Some forms of formal obligations to provide specific feedback between FIUs and LEAs and from the FIUs to REs were found in some Member States. It was also found that even if there was a formal obligation for LEAs and the FIU to provide feedback to each other and the REs, this not always meant that feedback was supplied to the REs. The general impression of the AML activities in relation to feedback within the Member States visited by the Team is that most Member States still rely on the "old" recommendations of the FATF (1998) on feedback. New ways to provide feedback are hardly developed. Good communication and information exchange with the REs is not sufficiently implemented in a lot of Member States. Contacts between reporting Entities and the FIU as well as Law enforcement authorities seem to have decreased in some Member States. "The number of meeting, conferences and training sessions have become less and less, AML information is not sent as frequently as in the past, the relation between FIUs, Reporting Entities and Law enforcement, in relation to the money laundering approach has cooled down". General Remarks like this by a number of REs seem to suggest a declining interest in AML activities. A possible explanation for this may be the lack of communication and cooperation within the AML chain (REs, FIUs and LEAs), continuous organisational changes that some institutions are facing, complicated AML legislation and lack of sufficient results in the form of ML convictions. Audits performed in some Member States on the effectiveness of AML Institutions showed few achievements in the fight against ML, and as a consequence, usually a reorganisation of the AML institutions was undertaken in some countries. Some examples of these changes are The Netherlands (2006 MOT to the FIU the Netherlands), The United Kingdom (2006 NCIS to SOCA) and presently Italy (2008). Other Member States have relocated their FIU organisation or created new functions like a police liaisons within their units, e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Estonia. In addition, FIUs and REs expressed their concern about the increasing number of tasks that have been assigned to them in relation to the traditional AML activities and or new specific tasks regarding the financing of terrorism. This report certainly does not pretend to be of a scientific nature but merely an introduction to the problem of feedback. One thing is certain, there is a lot of improvement to be made in the communication and cooperation between the different AML institutions. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2008. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_fiu_and_terrorism_financing_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136357 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationFinancial CrimesInformation SharingLaw EnforcementMoney LaunderingsOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Desta, Tu'emay Aregawi Title: ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the IGAD Subregion Summary: Money laundering and terrorist financing are major, interconnected problems for East Africa and the Horn. As the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 makes clear, they pose a significant threat not only to security but also to development. Both the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) have identified a number of states in the subregion as demonstrating weak implementation of international standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). Some states in the subregion (Ethiopia and Kenya) have even been placed within the FATF International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) process, which can ultimately lead to obstacles to engagement with the international financial system. There is consequently a growing recognition that states in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) subregion stand to benefit in multiple ways from a more concerted effort to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is also, however, a chronic limitation of data and knowledge about the problems of money laundering and terrorist financing and about AML/CFT vulnerabilities, risks, and capacities in the subregion. States of the subregion have their own specific vulnerabilities, challenges, weaknesses, and strengths, even as they share certain cross-cutting challenges. In this Baseline Study, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) set out with support from the Royal Government of Denmark to provide a more detailed and nuanced analysis of AML/ CFT challenges and opportunities in the IGAD region, to inform a better allocation of resources to risk and to potential return on investment. The study is a joint effort developed in response to repeated requests by the ISSP's and the CGCC's governmental, intergovernmental, private sector, and civil society partners in the subregion who sought assistance in obtaining baseline data about money laundering risks and AML capacity in the region and guidance on the data's potential use for CFT efforts. Throughout the project design and execution, emphasis has been placed on local ownership. Experts from the East African and Horn subregion coordinated and conducted the project and, where appropriate, also drew on outside expertise. This included input from members of the Danish, Malawian, and Nigerian financial intelligence units (FIUs). The study was prepared by a project team of 10 independent researchers with logistical support and analytical guidance from the ISSP and the CGCC and an informal advisory group of interested officials, academics, and business professionals from the subregion, serving in a personal capacity. That advisory group met twice in Addis Ababa: in October 2011 to help frame the project and develop the research methodology and in March 2012 to critique the resulting analysis and a draft version of this report. The final draft report was shared with all IGAD member states for further review, interagency discussion, comment, and revision. The ISSP and the CGCC approved this report before publication. This study does not provide an exhaustive catalogue or review of money laundering and terrorist financing risks or AML/ CFT efforts in the subregion. Also, it does not purport to provide a categorical assessment of specific AML/CFT projects in the subregion or a country's "performance." This study did not set out to replicate the technical proficiency or political legitimacy of a FATF or ESAAMLG assessment or peer review. Instead, this study represents the collected views of stakeholders in the subregion, gathered by a group of independent analysts, convened by the ISSP and the CGCC, and guided by our Advisory Group. Our aim was not to pass judgment but to provide some starting points for an inclusive and, we hope, coordinated and evidence-based discussion in the years ahead among many stakeholders - national, international, private sector, and civil society - regarding strengthening AML/CFT capacities in the IGAD subregion. This study explores AML/CFT efforts in Djibouti; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; Somalia, including Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and non-TFG efforts; South Sudan; Sudan; and Uganda and at the regional and subregional level (the African Development Bank [AfDB], the African Union [AU], the East African Community [EAC], the East African Development Bank [EADB], the ESAAMLG, and IGAD). Researchers developed desk analysis that was tested through roughly week-long field visits, during which researchers met with relevant local and foreign government officials, civil society actors, private sector entities, and independent analysts. Twenty to 25 interviews were conducted for most jurisdictions - approximately 160 in all - over the course of 60 days of fieldwork. Interviewers used a semistructured format responding to a common set of research questions. The names and institutional affiliations of interviewees have been withheld to ensure confidentiality; a list of institutions that participated may be provided on request. Due to limited resources and concerns about the physical security of the researchers, a methodology not involving field visits by external researchers was used for Eritrea and Somalia. Analysis for these jurisdictions should be read with additional caution, as further verification of the results may be necessary before they can serve as the basis for policy development. A separate chapter of the Baseline Study addresses each of the covered jurisdictions. As far as possible, each chapter addresses similar issues. - Money laundering and terrorist financing risks and vulnerabilities and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An overview of AML/CFT efforts, including discussion of capabilities and resources (material, legal, human, financial, and political) and how they are perceived by different stakeholders. - An identification of key entry points for international assistance and support to local stakeholders to promote AML/CFT efforts. Details: New York; Addis Ababa: Center on Global Counterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AML_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 136482 Keywords: CounterterrorismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Statewatch Title: Countering Terrorism or Constraining Civil Society? The impact of Financial Action Task Force recommendations on non-profit organisations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia Summary: The Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 galvanised 'pro-democracy- governments in the West into a reaffirmation of their commitment to supporting civil society organisations (CSOs) working under repressive and authoritarian regimes. The US State Department launched a Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society in 2011, and two years later President Obama launched the Stand with Civil Society campaign, "a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society amid a rising tide of restrictions on its operations globally". The European Union (EU) established the European Endowment for Democracy and committed to "a more strategic engagement with CSOs" and the mainstreaming of CSO dialogue across "all external instruments and programmes and in all areas of cooperation". The United Nations is also committed to the "enabling environment for civil society" which it views as central to the realisation of its Millennium Development Goals. Running counter to (and part of the reason for) this recent affirmation of support for the "enabling environment" is the spread of restrictive civil society laws around the world. These laws can prohibit or impede the formation of CSOs, restrict their access to domestic and international funding and hinder their day-to-day operations. The trend toward restriction is demonstrated by reports from the International Centre for Non-profit Law (among others), which has documented the introduction of such laws in more than 50 countries, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. It is a trend that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently described as "global", "lasting" and intimately related to "fundamental changes in international politics". Paradoxically, the changes in international politics cited by Carnegie include international counter-terrorism standards, devised by democratic states after 9/11, which provide a justification for less democratic and repressive governments to introduce restrictive laws and regulatory environments for CSOs. The standards in question, which are explained in the following section, advance the hypothesis that non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable to abuse or exploitation by terrorist groups. Concomitant to this perceived risk is the requirement that all states ensure that they have robust laws and procedures in place to combat the "threat". This problem was first examined in detail in a report we published in 2012 entitled "Legalising Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society". In this follow-up report we revisit the report's core assumption - that these standards are a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive CSO laws - by examining their implementation in 17 countries in central and eastern Europe and central Asia. Details: London: Statewatch, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/fatf-countering-terrorism-or-constraining-civil-society.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/aug/fatf-countering-terrorism-or-constraining-civil-society.pdf Shelf Number: 136498 Keywords: PrivacySurveillanceTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Eren, Yunus Title: The Impact of Land Border Security on Terrorism Financing: Turkey's Southeast Land Border and the PKK Summary: Terrorism has become the one of the major threats facing many states. Understanding the potential sources of and preventing the financial support of terrorist organizations takes an important place in countering terrorism. This thesis focuses on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) financing activities through the land border of Turkey. In doing so, this study mainly examines how the Turkish border security system can stop the trans-border financial activities of PKK along its land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. This thesis also takes the U.S. as a case study in terms of border security measures, and within that framework, makes recommendations for safeguarding Turkey's land borders to prevent financial activities of the PKK terrorist organization without affecting free trade and the economic flow of services. Presently, the Turkish border security system is fragmented and poorly coordinated. Border management is currently split between the army, gendarmerie, police and coast guard. Moreover, international and interdepartmental collaborations are extremely limited. The prevention of cross-border financial activities of the PKK might be accomplished by forming an independent border security agency, adopting modern international standards and the latest technological innovations, and sustaining international and interdepartmental cooperation. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 25, 2015 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38924/13Dec_Eren_Yunus.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: Turkey URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38924/13Dec_Eren_Yunus.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 136575 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Center for the Study of Democracy Title: Financing of Organised Crime Summary: Enhancing the knowledge of the financing of organised crime is an indispensable component of more effective and smarter approaches to prevention and investigation. Accessing capital is a significant constraint for some criminals when they seek to become big players in illicit markets for goods and services, yet the processes and structures involved in the financial investment of criminal markets are largely under-researched. Whilst there is general information available regarding the level of financing required for a criminal group's operations in specific illicit markets - for example, the illicit drugs market is relatively well documented and there is a reasonably sound understanding of the pricing available along the entire value chain of operations, from production prices, smuggling and wholesale prices, middle-level dealing, to retail distribution, as well as with costs of the business - this is not the case with a number of other illicit markets such as organised VAT fraud, illicit excisable goods, smuggling/trafficking in human beings, counterfeiting of goods and money, payment card fraud, and trafficking in stolen vehicles, etc. To enter a criminal market at the wholesale level, organised criminals may need significant financial resources including, but not restricted to, credit facilities. Their need for financing concerns every level of organized crime. However, while millions (upfront and/or on credit) may be needed to enter the cocaine market at wholesale level, participation at the retail level requires only modest resources. The same applies to manifestations of organised crime that do not require entrepreneurial characteristics and are based on predatory activities. For example, small criminal groups may need only several tens of thousands of euros to launch an international banking fraud. The entry costs for many e-crimes are insignificant. Various financial mechanisms and opportunities are available for criminal actors to fund new or existing illicit activities. However, fairly little has been done in terms of systematically analysing or targeting individuals or processes that are mainly involved in the financing of criminal structures and organised criminal activities. The financing of organised crime is the type of horizontal issue that several analyses as well as threat and strategic assessments - analyses and assessments that have been previously criticised us unreliable sources of information on organized crime - often skip, focusing instead on the proceeds of crime, criminal assets and/or money laundering. Official and informal financial services may all be used to finance organised criminal operations in one way or another. Previous research has shown that financiers are often behind the financing of large-scale trafficking of commodities such as cigarettes or drugs. Yet despite the influence of these financiers, they remain outside the scope of analysis of organised crime being done at EU level, where such information is largely omitted. Although considerable research has been conducted on the proceeds of crime and the financial management of several organised criminal activities, the financing of terrorism and money laundering, little has been done in terms of analysing or targeting individuals, structures and processes that are involved in the "preceeds" of crime, especially on crimes unconnected with the financing of terrorism. Little has also been done in terms of analysing whether criminal entrepreneurs engage in a process that disguises a legitimate source of funds that are to be used for illegal purposes, a process that has been defined as "reverse money laundering." Following these observations, a number of academics and law-enforcement officials from across Europe were contacted in order to gather information regarding the respective situations in their countries. It was established that many faced a similar situation, where some operational knowledge on the issue existed, yet (excepting the Netherlands) analytical units had not given much specific attention to it. Therefore, an interest was expressed to gather this knowledge at the EU level, as well as to exchange knowledge and experiences with partner countries where this issue has been paid more attention. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 26, 2015 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317 Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17317 Shelf Number: 136598 Keywords: Human TraffickingIllegal MarketsOrganized CrimeSmugglingStolen VehiclesTerrorist Financing |
Author: Haigner, Stefan D. Title: The Financial Flows of Terrorism and Transnational Crime Summary: Yearly revenues from transnational criminal activity account for USD 1 to 1.6 trillion, and a wide variety of methods is employed to transfer those revenues across borders and launder it. The specific type of crime largely determines the choice of methods. Terrorists, for example, use both "legal" as well as illegal activity, in particular drug dealing, to raise funds, and largely employ the formal financial sector as well as physical cross-border transfers to move funds across borders. Money attributable to terrorism, however, accounts only for a tiny share of international proceedings from illicit activity. Details: Berlin: EUSECON - Department of Development and Security, German Institute for Economic Research, 2012. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: EUSECON Policy Briefing 17: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.399439.de/diw_eusecon_pb0017.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.399439.de/diw_eusecon_pb0017.pdf Shelf Number: 136663 Keywords: Financial CrimesOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Maguire, Tom Title: An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa Summary: A number of myths and misperceptions have grown alongside the illegal ivory trade - none more troubling than the alleged participation of terrorist groups. In East Africa, the Somali terror group Al-Shabaab has supposedly received up to 40 per cent of its running costs through the illegal ivory trade alone. This is a powerful narrative, espoused by some politicians, policy-makers and practitioners. But it is largely wrong. Evidence for Al-Shabaab involvement in poaching and trafficking remains extremely limited and controversial. Briefings given to policy-makers on terrorism and the illegal ivory trade continue to refer to unverified sources. This is a cause for concern: such a narrative risks diverting attention from the trade's main facilitators and, counter-intuitively, from Al-Shabaab's known funding sources. To address these misconceptions, this report explores the complex ecosystems of terrorism, poaching and ivory trafficking in East Africa. Its key findings are that: - Highly networked organised crime groups (OCGs), brokers and corrupt government officials continue to drive the illegal ivory trade across East Africa. Weak legislation and enforcement by security agencies provides a benign environment for their activities - The OCGs, brokers and corrupt officials involved - and the routes and methods used - likely overlap with other forms of organised crime (such as the trafficking of drugs, humans and small arms) - The majority of ivory that transits East Africa comes from source areas on the Tanzania-Mozambique border and in central Tanzania. These are far removed from Al-Shabaab territory - Few, if any, elephants are present directly within Al-Shabaab's area of influence in south-central Somalia and northeastern Kenya. The majority of elephants in Kenya roam at significant distances from the border - There is little evidence of large ivory flows transiting Somalia; established Kenyan and Tanzanian ports remain the primary points for export. This makes the assertion that Al-Shabaab's monthly ivory revenues total $200,000-$600,000 highly unlikely - Estimates of the proportion of Al-Shabaab funds raised from ivory trafficking rely on flawed sums. A range of other sources (including the taxation of charcoal and sugar) are more important to the terrorist organisation - Any Al-Shabaab involvement in the ivory trade to date is likely to have been opportunistic, ad hoc and small-scale. These findings suggest that the illusion of a terrorism - ivory trade nexus distracts policy-makers and law-enforcement agencies from effectively managing limited resources to tackle both terrorist financing and the illegal ivory trade. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201509_An_Illusion_of_Complicity.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201509_An_Illusion_of_Complicity.pdf Shelf Number: 136892 Keywords: Animal PoachingIllegal Wildlife TradeIvoryOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist FinancingWildlife Crime |
Author: Great Britain. HM Treasury Title: UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing Summary: This is the UK's first money laundering and terrorist financing national risk assessment (NRA). In conducting this assessment the aim is to identify, understand and assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced by the UK. Money laundering can undermine the integrity and stability of our financial markets and institutions. It is a global problem. The European Commission's 2013 impact assessment of the EU anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing legislative framework points to global criminal proceeds potentially amounting to some 3.6% of GDP; around US$2.1 trillion in 2009. The best available international estimate of amounts laundered globally would be equivalent to some 2.7% of global GDP or US$1.6 trillion in 2009. Both money laundering itself, and the criminality which drives the need to launder money, present a significant risk to the UK. The laundering of proceeds of overseas corruption into or through the UK fuels political instability in key partner countries. The NCA judges that billions of pounds of suspected proceeds of corruption are laundered through the UK each year. Money laundering is also a key enabler of serious and organised crime, the social and economic costs of which are estimated to be $24 billion a year. Taken as a whole, money laundering represents a significant threat to the UK's national security. The government's 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy set out plans to make it harder for criminals to move, hide and use the proceeds of crime. There is a marked overlap between money laundering and terrorist financing - both criminals and terrorists use similar methods to store and move funds. However, the motive for generating and moving funds differs. Terrorists ultimately need money to commit terrorist attacks. Unlike criminal gangs, terrorist groups involve disparate individuals coming together through a shared motivation and ideology. Finance is an essential aspect of enabling terrorist groups to function, recruit and commit terrorist acts. A lack of funds can have a direct effect on the ability of terrorist organisations and individuals to operate and to mount attacks. There is evidence of terrorist financing activity in the UK and terrorist financing poses a significant threat to the UK's national security. The UK recognises that countering terrorist financing is important in protecting national security. Countering terrorist financing forms a key part of the UK's CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy with the aim being to reduce the terrorist threat to the UK and its interests overseas by depriving terrorists and violent extremists of the financial resources and systems required for terrorism-related activity. Details: London: HM Treasury and Home Office, 2015. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_2015_final_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136990 Keywords: Money LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorism Terrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Mutual Evaluation of Mexico. Interim Follow-Up Report Summary: The level of compliance of Mexico's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations was evaluated in 2008 by a team conformed by representatives from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the FATF-Style Regional Body for South America (GAFISUD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The evaluation led to the country's Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), which was adopted by the FATF Plenary in October 2008. The MER identified several strengths in the country's AML/CFT regime, but also areas of opportunity for its improvement in full consistency with the FATF Recommendations. In this sense, specific observations were made to the case of Mexico, and the country entered into a regular follow-up process. In terms of the FATF regular follow-up process, the Government of Mexico (GOM) has kept the FATF and its members informed of its actions and achievements to fully comply with the observations included in the country's MER. The GOM has previously submitted follow-up reports in October 2010 and October 2011. The GOM is now submitting its Third Follow-up Report. This report intends to provide the FATF and the international community with a comprehensive overview of the overall progress that the GOM has made in the prevention and combating of ML/FT during the past four years. Since the MER was adopted, the GOM has substantially increased its efforts in the fight against ML/FT. These efforts have resulted in important actions to establish a complete and sound AML/CFT legal and institutional framework. As a result, we are convinced that Mexico's current AML/CFT regime is far more advanced than it was before, when the MER was conducted. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 192p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Interim%20Follow-up%20Report%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Interim%20Follow-up%20Report%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137220 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kao, Albert L. Title: Increased Anti-Money Laundering Banking Regulations and Terrorism Prosecutions Summary: After 9/11, anti-money laundering banking regulations were increased to counter terrorism finance. This study attempts to identify whether increasing banking regulations has countered terrorism finance by reviewing terrorism prosecutions. This study looked at federal terrorism prosecutions from January 2004 through April 2009. The study reviewed court documents and case backgrounds for indicators that anti-money laundering banking regulations were useful to the terrorism prosecution by either detecting terrorism financing or by supporting other charges, such as money laundering. The study did not find that banking regulations detected terrorist financing. The avoidance of banking regulations was used to support money laundering charges in two cases; however, pre-9/11 regulations would have sufficed. The study found that increasing anti-money laundering banking regulations had limited effects on countering terrorism financing. How anti-money laundering banking regulations are implemented within a counterterrorism finance regime should be reevaluated. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 1090p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736328 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736328 Shelf Number: 137763 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Sharma, Saswot Raj Title: Terrorist, White Collar and Organized Crime Financing Case Study and Forensic Audit Summary: Terrorism, white collar crime and organized crime usually are inevitable fact and black truth on human civilization. They need funds for operation and all the illicit money gathered cannot be used for operation until and unless it is cleaned by the means on Money laundering. Money laundering usually occurs in three steps: Placement is the transfer of illegal activities' proceeds into financial systems without attracting the attention of financial institutions and government authorities. Money launderers accomplish this by dividing their tainted cash into small sums and executing transactions that fall beneath banks' regulatory reporting levels. Layering is the process of generating a series of transactions in order to distance the proceeds from their illegal source and to obfuscate the audit trail. Common layering techniques include outbound electronic funds transfers, usually directly or subsequently into a - bank secrecy haven,- or a jurisdiction with lax recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and withdrawals of already placed deposits in the form of highly liquid monetary instruments, such as money orders or travelers checks. Integration, the final money laundering stage, is the unnoticed reinsertion of successfully laundered, untraceable proceeds into an economy. This is accomplished through a variety of spending, investing and lending techniques and cross-border, seemingly legitimate transactions. Independent auditors have a responsibility under SAS no. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, to be aware of the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred, indirectly affecting amounts recorded in an entity's financial statements. If an accountant believes the consequences of the money laundering have not been properly accounted for or disclosed on the financial statements, SAS 54 states that the auditor should Criminal Financing Forensic Audit 5 Saswot Raj Sharma /ICAI/ Feb 14 express a qualified or adverse opinion on the financial statements. If the client refuses to accept the auditor's modified report, the auditor should resign. Punishment: Generally internationally the punishment is usually as follows: (a) A person who finances in terrorist activities shall be punished by an imprisonment up to five years and a fine equal to the amount used in offence and where such amount is not identified up to five hundred thousand rupees. (b) A person who commits money laundering offence under Chapter-2 of the AMLA except one mentioned in Sub-Section (1) shall be punished by an imprisonment between one and four years and a fine equal to the amount used in the offence. (c) An additional punishment of ten percent shall be awarded where a public official or the chief or official of a bank, financial institution or non-financial institution is involved in the offence. Details: Kirtipur, Nepal: Tribhuvan University, 2014. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664340 Shelf Number: 137580 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist FinancingWhite-Collar Crime |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. Mexico Summary: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering In South America (GAFISUD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have jointly conducted an assessment of the implementation of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) standards in Mexico. - Mexico has made good progress in developing its system for combating ML and TF since its last assessment by the FATF in 2004. The laws criminalising ML and TF do not however fully meet international standards, and there is scope to significantly improve their implementation. - Laws and procedures do not adequately provide for the freezing without delay of terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. - Co-ordination arrangements amongst relevant government authorities have been strengthened recently but need to be further developed. Further resources are needed for some authorities. - The FIU has strengthened its financial intelligence infrastructure and capacity. It does not currently have direct access to criminal records and the number of staff is low relative to its tasks. - AML/CFT preventive measures are comprehensive, contain risk-based elements, and are being implemented across principal sectors of the financial system. Nonetheless, AML/CFT regulations are still evolving, particularly in non-deposit taking sectors. - All supervisory authorities are implementing fairly comprehensive on-site AML/CFT supervision, though this could benefit from more risk-based processes. - Trust services are the only DNFBP for which AML/CFT measures are in place. Also, no review has been conducted of the non-profit sector to support adoption of measures to prevent unlawful use of legal persons for ML and TF. - Mexican authorities have been co-operating effectively with other countries, particularly in the area of mutual legal assistance and extradition involving ML and related crimes. Details: Paris: FATF, 2008. 338p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Mexico%20ful.pdf Shelf Number: 137228 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney-LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks Summary: The Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks' report, the result of the call for further research into terrorist financing, provides an overview of the various financing mechanisms and financial management practices used by terrorists and terrorist organisations. It explores the emerging terrorist financing threats and vulnerabilities posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), fundraising through social media, new payment products and services, and the exploitation of natural resources. The terrorist financing risks identified in the FATF's 2008 Terrorist Financing report, while still evolving, are as relevant today, as they were back then. However, developments since 2008 have created new terrorist financing risks. The issue of FTFs is not a new phenomenon, but the recent scale of the issue in relation to the conflict in Syria and Iraq is disturbing. FTFs are now considered one of the main forms of material support to terrorist groups. This report sets out the funding needs, sources and methods of FTFs and the challenges associated with combatting them. New technologies have also introduced new terrorist financing vulnerabilities. The broad reach and anonymity associated with social media and new payment methods could make these attractive tools for terrorists and terrorist organisations to use in their financial activities. All terrorists and terrorist groups, particularly large terrorist organisations, will require a financial management strategy to allow them to obtain, move, store and use their assets. Understanding these financial management strategies is essential in developing effective measures counter terrorist financing. This report is not a comprehensive study but rather, aims to provide a snapshot of current terrorist financing risks to raise awareness among FATF members and the private sector. Many of the issues raised in this report require further in-depth research. The report highlights the importance of genuine private/public partnerships to enhance awareness of, and responses to, emerging terrorist financing risks. Such a partnership will facilitate the identification of FTFs and their facilitation networks. Accurate and forward-looking guidance to the private sector, will further improve their monitoring and screening processes and reporting-time on sensitive transactions which may relate to terrorist financing. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 16, 2015 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf Shelf Number: 137284 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Kar, Dev Title: Flight Capital and Illicit Financial Flows to and from Myanmar: 1960-2013 Summary: Myanmar is the most porous economy we have studied in depth. Long isolation, trade restrictions, and attempts to regulate currency exchange rates have combined to drive a substantial part of the economy underground. Totaling the flight capital numbers indicates that Myanmar has experienced largely unregulated financial movements of nearly US$120 billion over the period (a small portion of flight capital may be licit), while total illicit flows amounted to almost US$100 billion. In 2013 alone, unregulated financial inflows totaled some US$10 billion, over 20 percent of GDP. Purely illicit inflows were on a similar scale in that year, at 17 percent of GDP. And these numbers do not include the smuggling of drugs, timber, precious stones, and other goods, transported across various routes and mountain passes to and from India and China, as indicated by a brief selection of satellite images included in the pages following. Interestingly, the greater part of what we can analyze as illicit flows have been inward, in reaction to import controls and to escape import levies. Undervalued and smuggled imports have sustained the weakened economy through years of insularity, isolation, and instability. Tax collection to GDP at seven percent is one of the lowest in the world, undermining the ability of the state to provide adequate health and education services. Corruption, according to Transparency International's Perceptions Index, places Myanmar among the bottom 20 in the world. These are extremely serious challenges for a nation just beginning, haltingly, to emerge from its shadows. Within our focus on financial transparency concerns, we recommend that Myanmar 1) make concerted efforts to adopt and enforce Financial Action Task Force anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing regulations, 2) provide its Customs Department with real-time world market trade pricing data, 3) greatly improve its statistical capabilities, and 4) enhance border security and curtailment of smuggling. For this the nation will need sustained external financial and technical assistance for years to come. Details: Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Burma URL: http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Myanmar-Report-Final-1.pdf Shelf Number: 137330 Keywords: Border SecurityFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingSmugglingTax EvasionTerrorist Financing |
Author: Fanusie, Yaya J. Title: Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking Summary: As the nation's largest professional organization of archaeologists on the Middle East holds its annual meeting this week in Atlanta, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) has released a new report analyzing the strategic role of antiquities trafficking in funding the terrorist group known as Islamic State (IS). The report, "Monumental Fight: Combatting Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking," provides the most comprehensive look to date at IS's involvement in the illicit trade. The report is co-authored by former CIA intelligence analyst Yaya J. Fanusie, now director of analysis at FDD's Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance (CSIF), and Alex Joffe, an archaeologist and historian specializing in the Middle East and contemporary international affairs. The report explains how antiquities looting evolved in the region, analyzes how it fits within IS's overall system of territorial control and governance, and identifies strategies to stem the illegal trade. Fanusie and Joffe explain that although antiquities trafficking may not provide IS as much money as other revenue streams like oil smuggling, "the importance of the antiquities trade for IS lies ... in the market's strategic and operational benefits." Excavation sites are unlikely to be targeted by coalition military strikes. Moreover, they note, looting antiquities does not alienate the local population like IS's other common practices of extortion and theft. To capitalize on this strategic resource, IS completely dominates the antiquities trade in the areas under its control, forcing civilians to be licensed by IS before they can dig for artifacts, and takes 20 percent or more of the revenue from any items sold to smugglers, the report finds. The authors note that IS also leverages its plundering for its global propaganda. The group video records choreographed destruction of pre-Islamic heritage sites in Iraq and Syria to portray itself as a defender of religious purity. The authors point out the irony of IS's antiquities trade; the group makes money through end-buyers who mainly come from the U.S. and Europe--representatives of the very societies IS has pledged to destroy. The authors explain that although the precise smuggling routes, middlemen, and buyers are difficult to uncover because of the market's opacity, a review of official trade data shows an uptick in antiques exiting the Levant since the Syrian civil war began. They argue it is likely that much of this increase comes from looted items masqueraded as legally owned artifacts. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, 2015. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/new-report-outlines-ways-to-combat-islamic-states-antiquities-trafficking/ Shelf Number: 137732 Keywords: AntiquitiesArt TheftIllicit TradeIslamic StateLootingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Ribadu, Nuhu Title: Show Me the Money: Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Tools to Fight Corruption in Nigeria. An Insider Story Summary: The Financial Action Task Force was created during the 1989 G-7 summit in Paris in response to growing concerns over money laundering. It is an intergovernmental body that develops policies and measures to prevent criminals from using the financial system. It studies money laundering and terrorism financing trends and techniques, develops and promotes adequate measures to fight these financial crimes, and monitors its 34 member countries' progress implementing these measures. In 1990, the task force published a plan of action to fight money laundering embodied in a set of 40 recommendations. These recommendations were revised in 1996, and again in 2003, to reflect the evolution of money laundering techniques. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF mandate was expanded to support the global fight against terrorism. In October 2001, the Task Force published another set of eight recommendations, dealing specifically with terrorism financing. Another recommendation was added in October 2004, completing what is now known as the FATF's 40+9 Recommendations. These recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, the financial system and its regulations, and international cooperation. They are meant to prevent financial institutions from becoming safe havens for criminal activities. In the late 1990s, the FATF cast its net beyond its members with an initiative seeking to identify major weaknesses in anti-money laundering systems worldwide. The idea was to encourage countries identified as weak links to implement international standards. In 2000 and 2001, the task force reviewed laws and regulations in 47 countries, selected on the basis of FATF members' experience. The review pitted rules and practices in these countries against 25 criteria. Of the 47 countries, 23 were found to be severely lacking and were declared non-cooperative. Nigeria was one of these 23 black sheep. In June 2001, following the lack of response to its letters, the FATF concluded that Nigeria was unwilling or unable to cooperate in the review of its system, and therefore should be blacklisted. The task force noted a lack of obligation from financial institutions to identify their clients or report suspicious transactions, inadequate criminalization of money laundering, incompetence or corruption within government, judicial or supervisory authorities, and an obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests. In 2002, the U.S. Treasury followed suit and issued an advisory warning to its financial institutions to use extra caution and scrutiny when dealing with transactions involving Nigeria. This was bad news for Nigeria. Being branded as non-cooperative meant that Western financial markets held up their noses. Financial institutions around the world, and particularly those in major financial centers, further scrutinized transactions involving Nigeria, resulting in crippling delays. Nigerian banks had trouble dealing with foreign counterparts. Nigerians wanting to do business abroad faced extra hurdles and were viewed with suspicion. Foreign banks were hesitant to grant letters of credit or loans to Nigerians. The country was becoming a financial pariah. Unlike the high echelons of government, which were blissfully unaware of the FATF decision for a while, local banks and businesses were directly affected and knew all about it. At the same time, Nigerian authorities were keen to obtain relief from the $30 billion in foreign debt owed to the Paris Club of creditors. In a country blessed with such mineral wealth, this crippling debt was another symptom of the mismanagement and corruption that had plagued Nigeria for decades. With the FATF frowning at Nigeria's financial practices and safeguards - or lack thereof - donors were unlikely to be in a debt-forgiving mood. Failure to correct course could result in escalating measures from the FATF. The original blacklisting meant that foreign financial institutions were advised to use extra caution when dealing with Nigeria. But continued failure to cooperate could result in FATF member countries adopting further countermeasures, which could ultimately result in the suspension of all financial transactions with Nigeria. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 2, 2016 at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Nigeria URL: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Showmethemoney.pdf?resourceurlname=Showmethemoney.pdf Shelf Number: 137739 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingProceeds of CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Center for Global Development Title: Unintended Consequences of Anti-Money Laundering Policies for Poor Countries Summary: Money laundering, terrorism financing and sanctions violations by individuals, banks and other financial entities are serious offenses with significant negative consequences for rich and poor countries alike. Governments have taken important steps to address these offenses. Efforts by international organizations, the US, UK and others to combat money laundering and curb illicit financial flows are a necessary step to increase the safety of the financial system and improve security, both domestically and around the world. But the policies that have been put in place to counter financial crimes may also have unintentional and costly consequences, in particular for people in poor countries. Those most affected are likely to include the families of migrant workers, small businesses that need to access working capital or trade finance, and recipients of life-saving aid in active-conflict, post-conflict or post-disaster situations. And sometimes, current policies may be self-defeating to the extent that they reduce the transparency of financial flows. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2015. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 4, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-Unintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/CGD-WG-Report-Unintended-Consequences-AML-Policies-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137758 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Grantham, David Title: Shutting Down ISIS' Antiquities Trade Summary: The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, reminded the world that the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is at war with western civilization. The U.S. government desperately needs a more comprehensive strategy for combating this threat than simply drone warfare and piecemeal deployments of "specialized expeditionary targeting forces." And a top priority of a new, broader campaign should be the destruction of ISIS' financial networks. ISIS and Antiquities. ISIS poses a national security threat to the United States primarily because of the resources it commands. The organization boasts an impressive network of revenue streams, ranging from oil proceeds and racketeering profits to money seized from local banks. But ISIS also profits from its lucrative trade in pilfered Roman, Greek, and other antiquities found in Syria and northern Iraq. This lucrative operation presents a national security dilemma because it helps fund ISIS's international war machine. The U.S. government and international bodies have tried in the past to undermine the global trade in looted antiquities by international conventions that disallow signatory countries from participating in the theft and transportation of looted antiquities. But the illegal antiquities market remains notoriously difficult to regulate. Moreover, officials often treat the illegal antiquities trade as a victimless crime run by criminal organizations. Few acknowledge the definitive links between illegal antiquities and terrorism. The challenges of enforcement and lack of attention keeps the market for illicit antiquities strong. This Is Not a Recent Phenomenon. During World War II, Nazis looted public and private collections from across Europe. Looters reaffirmed the importance of the antiquities market by ransacking regional museums in Iraq in the wake of the First Gulf War. Between the end of the war in 1991, and 1994, eleven museums lost 3,000 artifacts and 484 manuscripts to theft. A majority have yet to be recovered. Years later, the Taliban earned a reputation as a broker of Afghan antiquities, even though it spent enormous time and energy destroying historical landmarks throughout the country. Al Qaeda was also involved in the trade. In 1999, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the plane that crashed into Tower Two of the World Trade Center, tried to sell Afghan antiquities to a German university professor. Atta "claimed that he was selling artifacts in order to purchase an airplane." The Iraqi museums looted after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 only reiterated the national security implications surrounding unprotected antiquities. As of 2008, authorities have only recovered about 6,000 of the 15,000 items stolen. Experts fear that Al-Qaeda offshoots like ISIS are today selling some of the unaccounted for antiquities to fund their terrorist operations. Details: Dallas, TX: National Center for Policy Analysis, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief No. 185: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib185.pdf Shelf Number: 137760 Keywords: AntiquitiesIllegal TradeISISIslamic StateNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption: Assistance to Reporting Institutions Summary: 1. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption, the first FATF Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) effort in the area of corruption, discussed the interrelationship between corruption and money laundering, discovered the most common methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption, and highlighted the vulnerabilities leading to an increased risk of corruption-related money laundering. It listed some of the most significant grand corruption cases and created a useful historical understanding and reference point for further work in understanding the interrelationships between corruption and money laundering. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption ultimately concluded that significant acts of corruption are fruitless without the politically exposed person (PEP) involved having a secondary capability to move and disguise the proceeds of his crime. 2. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption identified areas in which future work could be done, including gaining an understanding of the correlation between certain risk factors and corruption. It also concluded that while effective anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) systems can assist in the detection of the proceeds of corruption and prevent the perpetrators of corruption-related offences from enjoying the proceeds of corruption, historically, reporting institutions have not been effective in detecting corruption-related proceeds. This has occurred for a number of reasons, including that in a number of instances, reporting institutions have failed to engage in appropriate customer identification or otherwise failed to apply AML/CFT controls effectively. In some instances, they were actually complicit, and sometimes willfully blind, in the laundering of funds. 3. This paper is written to assist reporting institutions - those financial and non-financial institutions that have a legal obligation to file suspicious transaction reports, or otherwise engage in AML/CFT due diligence - to better analyse and better understand specific risk factors that may assist them in identifying situations posing a heightened risk of corruption-related money laundering risk. It seeks to answer the question: Are there specific types of business relationships, customers, or products which should lead a reporting institution to pay particular attention to the risk of corruption-related money laundering? As with all FATF typology projects, we seek to answer the question by looking to reported cases to see if we can detect commonalities. In addition, we draw on the industry's and academia's best thinking about risk, as reflected in the published literature, to determine what situations truly represent risk. 4. Within the FATF standards3, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP. It must also take specific measures, in addition to performing normal customer due diligence measures for business relationships, with foreign PEPs: senior management approval for establishing (or continuing) business relationships, take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth or funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. For domestic PEPs and persons entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation, reporting institutions are required to apply the specific enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures set out in Recommendation 12 where there is a higher-risk business relationship. This scrutiny stands at the forefront of the effort to detect and deter the laundering of proceeds of corruption and is certainly necessary. The premise behind the effort is clear: customers in these categories can pose an inherently high risk for money laundering. 5. Understanding risk within the Recommendation 12 context is important for two reasons: First, Recommendation 12 requires a reporting entity to have "appropriate" risk management systems in place to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a foreign PEP, and take "reasonable measures" to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or an individual entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation. To gauge whether a system is "appropriate," or whether "reasonable measures" have been taken, requires an assessment of risk. Second, understanding risk is important after identifying domestic PEPs or relevant individuals from international organisations, in order to assess what level of EDD is necessary. 6. Moreover, experience teaches us that combating corruption-related money laundering must be more than simply ensuring that PEPs receive an appropriate level of scrutiny. Rather, an effective AML scheme requires an assessment of corruption-related risk and protecting against the laundering of corruption proceeds across the spectrum of customers and business relationships, regardless of whether a FATF-defined PEP is involved. 7. Such an approach acknowledges the realities of the methods of laundering the proceeds of corruption. It is a rare case (although not unheard of) for a PEP to enter a financial institution and deposit (or transfer) significant amounts of suspicious money; such action would likely create unacceptable risks to the PEP of detection by reporting institutions. Instead, as Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption noted, corrupt PEPs will take great pains to disguise the identity and the source of the funds in order to place corrupt money in the financial system without suspicion. PEPs use corporate vehicles, sophisticated gatekeepers, cash, and countries with weak money laundering controls to disguise their funds. Their corrupt transactions will often involve an intermediary of some kind, (including family members and close associates), whether within the PEP's jurisdiction or beyond. In some cases, corrupt PEPs will also try to control the mechanisms of detection and regulation within their home jurisdiction to "game the system" in order to disguise the proceeds before the money gets to another jurisdiction. In such cases, implementation of Recommendation 12 by other jurisdictions is necessary, but is not sufficient to detect and deter the movement of corrupt proceeds. Details: Paris: FATF, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf Shelf Number: 137796 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingProceeds of CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Summary: The mandate of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was expanded in 2001 to address the funding of terrorists acts and terrorist organisations. Since that time, combatting terrorist financing (TF) has been a very significant challenge. Important work was done in 2008 to identify a wide variety of TF methods terrorists use to raise, move and use funds. That study addressed the terrorist requirement for funds to include direct costs associated with specific operations and broader organisational costs to maintain infrastructure and promote ideology for the terrorist organisation. Given the rapid development of the terrorist organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), there is a need to understand those funding requirements and associated TF risk. This study represents a snapshot of the revenue sources and financial activities of ISIL been identified to date. However, gaps remain and more work is needed to develop the full picture of ISIL's financial activities and to identify the most effective countermeasures to prevent ISIL from using accumulated funds and disrupting sources of funding. ISIL financing is a constantly changing picture and a very difficult and complicated area to address given the operational situation on the ground. It should be emphasized that terrorism and those who support terrorism can never be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group. ISIL represents a new form of terrorist organisation where funding is central and critical to its activities. This report identifies ISIL's primary sources of revenue which are mainly derived from illicit proceeds from its occupation of territory. These sources include bank looting and extortion, control of oil fields and refineries and robbery of economic assets. Other sources include the donors who abuse Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) and cash smuggling (areas where FATF has conducted in-depth research), to new and emerging typologies which have not yet been addressed by the FATF, such as the extortion of goods and cash transiting territory where ISIL operates and grass-root funding strategies. A number of unique and diverse "case studies" have been provided by countries which describe how ISIL obtains funding and economic support as well as describing mechanisms to utilize these funds. The need for vast funds to meet organisational and governance requirements represents a vulnerability to ISIL's infrastructure. In order to maintain its financial management and expenditures in areas where it operates, ISIL must be able to seize additional territory in order to exploit resources. It is unclear if ISIL's revenue collection through the illicit proceeds it earns from occupation of territory, including extortion and theft, will be sustainable over time. Cutting off these vast revenue streams is both a challenge and opportunity for the global community to defeat this terrorist organisation. While insight into ISIL's oil-related activities is limited, this report provides a snapshot of ISIL's control of gas and oil reservoirs. While this revenue stream was significant after ISIL's initial control of numerous oil fields, their ability to efficiently extract oil, refine it and sell petroleum products have significantly diminished ISIL's earnings. This is need for refined crude and declining oil prices. There have been efforts to suppress the sale of ISIL oil and oil products on regional markets, such as enhanced counter smuggling efforts of the Turkish authorities in the past two years, as well as recent steps taken by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraqi Government authorities to seize suspected ISIL-related shipments of oil and oil products. This has reduced oil's importance relative to other sources of revenue. There is still a need to better identify the origin, middlemen, buyers, carriers, traders and routes through which oil produced in ISIL-held territory is trafficked. This report provides limited insight into the role of financial institutions and Money and Value Transfer Services (MVTS) in ISIL-held territory as well as the role of the larger international financial sector. However, a significant portion of the data related to this subject is of a sensitive nature and could not be included in this public report. There is a risk that MVTS companies in ISIL held territory continue to maintain connections to regional counterparts through which ISIL could conduct funds transfers. At the same time, both the Iraqi government and many major global financial institutions have taken steps to prevent banks in ISIL-held territory from accessing the international financial system.due to coalition air strikes, ISIL. Details: Paris: FATF, 2015. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137994 Keywords: Islamic StateTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Italy. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted an assessment of Italy's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) system, based on the 2012 FATF Recommendations, and using the 2013 Methodology. The assessment is a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of Italy's AML/CFT system and its level of compliance with the FATF Recommendations. Italy has a strong legal and institutional framework to fight ML and TF. Authorities have a good understanding of the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks the country faces. There is generally good policy cooperation, coordination, and financial intelligence gathering and use. The authorities are able to successfully undertake large and complex money laundering and terrorist financing investigations and prosecutions, and beneficial ownership information is generally accessible to authorities. There are areas where improvements are needed. Italy should enhance its ML investigative and prosecutorial action on risks associated with self-laundering, stand-alone money laundering, and foreign predicate offenses, and the abuse of legal persons. Italy should enhance the accessibility of relevant information and dissemination of analysis by its FIU, strengthen sanctions, and improve financial sectors' and DNFBPs' understanding and implementation of requirements for beneficial ownership identification Details: Paris: FATF, 2016. 230p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Italy URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Italy-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 137998 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Anderson, Wesley J.L. Title: Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations Summary: Major Anderson provides an excellent overview of terrorist financing and expands upon how it fits into the broader construct of threat financing. He articulates the significant challenges any government faces in trying to interrupt the terrorist networks use of the global financial system. The sheer immensity of this system provides ample opportunity for terrorists to operate undetected or unhindered. He also highlights that the very international nature of the global economic system presents enormous challenges in trying to coordinate amongst the almost 200 sovereign states that comprise the current world order Details: Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2008. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 08-3: Accessed March 12, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-3andersonDisruptingThreatFinances_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138198 Keywords: TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations Title: Ivory and Insecurity: The Global Implications of Poaching in Africa Summary: Ivory poaching, like all forms of illegal wildlife trade, is a profitable business. Indeed, the U.S. State Department estimates the market price of poached ivory at $400 per pound. Global Financial Integrity recently estimated the global value of the illicit trade in all forms of wildlife, excluding fishing, at between $7.8 and $10 billion. In recent years, organized crime syndicates, militias, and even terrorist elements have taken notice of the profits that can be made in the illegal trafficking of wildlife, generating an alarming up-tick in the scale of the industry and posing serious national security concerns for the United States and our partners. Details: Washington, DC: GPO, 2012. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: S Hrg. 112-602: Accessed march 30, 2016 at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76689/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76689.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76689/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76689.pdf Shelf Number: 138494 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllicit TradeIvoryOrganized CrimeTerrorist FinancingWildlife Crime |
Author: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance Summary: This document sets out the government's plan to stop money laundering and the funding of terrorism. The document outlines: - actions the government will introduce to stop money laundering - when the actions are due to be completed - what the government has done so far - how the government will implement the action plan As part of the action plan, the government is seeking views on: - potential changes to legislation - options to reform the anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism regime Details: London: Home Office, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517993/6-2118-Action_Plan_for_Anti-Money_Laundering__print_.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517993/6-2118-Action_Plan_for_Anti-Money_Laundering__print_.pdf Shelf Number: 138787 Keywords: Money LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: Armenia Summary: This report provides a summary of the AML/CFT measures in place in Armenia as at the date of the on-site visit (25 May to 6 June 2015). It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Armenia's AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. Key Findings - Armenia has a broadly sound legal and institutional framework to combat money laundering (ML) and financing of terrorism (FT). Armenia's level of technical compliance is generally high with respect to a large majority of FATF Recommendations. - Armenia is not an international or regional financial centre and is not believed to be at major risk of ML. The predicate offences which were identified by the 2014 national risk assessment (NRA) as posing the biggest threat are fraud (including cybercrime), tax evasion, theft and embezzlement. The findings of this assessment indicate that corruption and smuggling also constitute a ML threat. The real estate sector, the shadow economy and the use of cash all constitute significant ML vulnerabilities. Competent authorities have assessed and demonstrated an understanding of some, but not all, ML risks in Armenia. - The NRA concludes that the risk of FT is very low. Although Armenia shares a border with Iran, which is considered by the FATF to pose a higher risk of FT, the evaluation team found no concrete indications that the Armenian's private sector and non-profit organisations (NPOs) are misused for FT purposes. There have never been any investigations, prosecutions and convictions for FT. There is an effective mechanism for the implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS). No terrorist-related funds have been frozen under the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). - The financial intelligence unit (FIU) has access to a wide range of information sources and is very effective in generating intelligence for onward dissemination to LEAs. Law enforcement access to information is somewhat restricted by a combination of issues connected with the legislation dealing with law enforcement powers to obtain information held by financial institutions and law enforcement ability to successfully convert intelligence into evidence. Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) did not demonstrate that they make effective use of FIU notifications to develop evidence and trace criminal proceeds related to ML. - The number of ML investigations and prosecutions has increased in the period under review. However, it appears that LEAs target the comparatively easy self-laundering cases mainly involving domestic predicate offences. One ML conviction (described as autonomous) was secured, although the judiciary appears to have based its ruling on the admission that the predicate offence had been committed. Overall, law enforcement efforts to pursue ML are not fully commensurate with the ML risks faced by the country. - Seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities and property of equivalent value are not pursued as a policy objective. It is doubtful whether LEAs are in a position to effectively identify, trace and seize assets at the earliest stages of an investigation, since proactive parallel financial investigations for ML and predicate offences are not conducted on a regular basis. - The banking sector is the most important sector in terms of materiality. Banks understand the risks that apply to them according to the FATF Standards and the AML/CFT Law. However, they have not demonstrated that they have incorporated the risks identified in the NRA into their internal policies. The real estate sector, notaries and casinos pose a relatively higher risk compared to other DNFBPs. Their understanding of risk - The application of customer due diligence (CDD), record-keeping and reporting measures by financial institutions is adequate. Major improvements are needed by the DNFBP sector with respect to preventive measures. - The approach of the Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) to anti-money laundering/counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision is to some extent based on risk. Developments in this area are on-going. Adequate procedures for the imposition of sanctions are in place. However, the level of fines could be improved. The supervision of the DNFBP sector was found to be in need of improvement relative to casinos and notaries, and inadequate relative to real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones, lawyers and accountants. - Most basic information on legal persons is publicly available through the State Register. All legal persons in Armenia are required to disclose the identity of their beneficial owners to the State Register upon registration and, inter alia, whenever there is a change in shareholding. Information on beneficial ownership of legal entities is also ensured through the application of CDD measures by banks. - While all the banks understand that they have to apply freezing of funds to proliferation financing and there is an innovative system in place in financial institutions to ensure that matches are detected, there is a concern that the legal framework based on the AML/CFT Law could be open to legal challenge. Coordination between the different competent authorities involved in this area needs to be further developed. Details: Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2015. 182p. Source: Internet Resource: Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report: Accessed April 26, 2016 at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round5/MONEYVAL(2015)34_5thR_MER_Armenia.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Armenia URL: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round5/MONEYVAL(2015)34_5thR_MER_Armenia.pdf Shelf Number: 138814 Keywords: BanksFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Carlisle, David Title: Targeting Security Threats Using Financial Intelligence: The US Experience in Public-Private Information Sharing since 9/11 Summary: Since the founding of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989, global efforts on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing have rested on the principle that co-operation between the public and private sectors is essential in generating financial intelligence. Recently, however, a consensus has emerged in both the public and private sectors that the frequency and quality of financial information sharing is inadequate. Observers argue that governments do not supply the private sector with sufficient detail about key threats, such as terrorism, for financial institutions to generate high-quality financial intelligence (FININT). On the other hand, private sector reporting of FININT through the traditional Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) process is often slow and inefficient, hindering the ability of governments to act against criminals or terrorists. Fortunately, one relatively longstanding model for public-private information sharing does exist. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001, President George W Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. One aim of the Act was to elevate the role of FININT in identifying and disrupting security threats. Two sections of the Act have particular relevance for promoting public-private information sharing to this end: Sections 314 and 311. Set alongside the traditional SARs regime, Sections 314 and 311 help to sustain a robust, if still maturing, public-private partnership aimed at protecting the US financial system against a broad array of illicit finance threats. This paper offers an overview of the aims of US policy, an examination of the US experience in implementing Sections 314 and 311 of the PATRIOT Act, and a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the US approach. It also draws lessons from US experience and provides seven principles for policy-makers to consider when developing public-private information-sharing arrangements at the national or international level. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper, 2016: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201604_op_financing_patriot_act_final.pdf Shelf Number: 138894 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingPatriot ActTerrorist Financing |
Author: Ernst & Young Title: Counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling: Growing threat to national security Summary: The report, titled, "Counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling: Growing threat to national security", highlights the drivers of financing of terrorism and how activities such as counterfeiting, piracy and smuggling have become channel for sustaining criminal and terrorist activities. It analyzes and provides insight into the links between counterfeiting, smuggling and financing of terrorism. Details: London: Ernst & Young, 2013. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Government-and-Public-Sector-Growing-threat-to-national-security-an-analysis/$File/EY-Counterfeiting-piracy-and-smuggling-Growing-threat-to-national-security.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Government-and-Public-Sector-Growing-threat-to-national-security-an-analysis/$File/EY-Counterfeiting-piracy-and-smuggling-Growing-threat-to-national-security.pdf Shelf Number: 139366 Keywords: CounterfeitingPiracySmugglingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Global Witness Title: War in the Treasury of the People: Afghanistan, Lapis Lazuli and the battle for mineral wealth Summary: new investigation today reveals how Afghanistan's 6,500 year old lapis mines are driving corruption, conflict and extremism in the country. Global Witness has found that the Taliban and other armed groups are earning up to 20 million dollars per year from Afghanistan's lapis mines, the world's main source of the brilliant blue lapis lazuli stone, which is used in jewellery around the world. As a result, the Afghan lapis lazuli stone should now be classified as a conflict mineral. The lapis mines are in the Badakhshan region, once one of the more stable areas in Afghanistan, even at the height of Taliban control. However, violent competition for control of the lucrative mines and their revenue, between local strong men, local MPs and the Taliban has deeply destabilised the province and made it one of the hotbeds of the insurgency. With the Taliban on the outskirts of the mines themselves, as well as controlling key roads into the mining areas, there is now a real risk that the mines could fall into their hands. Global Witness' investigation also includes evidence that the Badakhshan mines are a strategic priority for the so-called Islamic State. Unless the Afghan government acts rapidly to regain control, the battle for the lapis mines is set to intensify and further destabilise the country, as well as fund extremism. The lapis mines in Afghanistan's Badakhshan region are a microcosm of a problem that is replicated across the country, where mining is the Taliban's second biggest source of income. Money from Afghanistan's mines should be an important source of wealth to fund essential services, including security, health and education. Afghanistan sits on over a trillion dollars' worth of mineral, oil and gas deposits, which could provide the government with over $2 billion in revenue a year, if developed properly. But rampant corruption and a failure to secure mining sites means that mines have been targeted by insurgent groups and are now a major contributor to conflict and extremism. The new Afghan mining law, which is currently being amended by the government, fails to include the actions needed to counter this threat, the report warns. Details: London: Global Witness, 2016. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2016 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en-gb/campaigns/afghanistan/war-treasury-people-afghanistan-lapis-lazuli-and-battle-mineral-wealth/ Shelf Number: 139368 Keywords: Conflict MineralsPolitical CorruptionPrecious MineralsTalibanTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force of Latin America Title: Analysis of Regional Threats on Money Laundering Summary: The XXX GAFILAT Plenary approved the implementation of a regional study of threats on money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) of the member countries of the Financial Action Task Force on Latin America with the financial support of the European Union. The pursued objective is for countries to achieve greater effectiveness in mitigating risks and that the resources allocated for this purpose are used more efficiently. Details: s.l.: Cocaine Route Program, European Union, 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: The European Union's Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace: The Cocaine Route Programme: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analysis-of-Regional-Threats-on-Money-Laundering-.pdf Shelf Number: 139951 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Suhr, Brigitte Title: Funding the Fight Against Modern Slavery: Mapping Private Funds in the Anti-Slavery and Anti-Trafficking Sector: 2012-2014 Summary: Modern slavery condemns tens of millions of men, women, boys and girls to lives filled with violence, exploitation and abuse. Unscrupulous criminals prey upon the most vulnerable and marginalised people to generate illegal and unconscionable profits - up to $150 billion each year, according to the ILO. Between 20.9 million and 35.8 million people live in slavery-like conditions today. Around one in four people enslaved in the world are children. However, in recent years, a growing number of anti-slavery and anti-trafficking projects have begun to turn the tide. People have been liberated from servitude. Children at-risk of slavery have begun schooling.2 Lives have been transformed, communities renewed. Funding is absolutely critical to these efforts. Committed donors who share our vision for change are integral partners in the fight against modern slavery. This study sought to quantify the scale, focus and geographic location of private funding for antislavery initiatives, as well as identify promising trends and funding gaps that need to be addressed. Details: London: The Freedom Fund and Humanity United, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2016 at: http://freedomfund.org/wp-content/uploads/Donor-Mapping-Report-for-web-FINAL-30March16-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://freedomfund.org/wp-content/uploads/Donor-Mapping-Report-for-web-FINAL-30March16-1.pdf Shelf Number: 140103 Keywords: Forced LaborHuman TraffickingModern SlaveryTerrorist Financing |
Author: Australia. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre Title: Regional Risk Assessment on terrorism Financing 2016: South-East Asia & Australia Summary: The Syria-Iraq conflict and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 have energised extremists and their sympathisers across South-East Asia and Australia. The region is also dealing with long-running domestic conflicts and insurgencies that share the characteristics of terrorism, even if they are not connected to ISIL or violent global extremism. This highly-charged and dynamic security environment has intensified terrorism financing risks in the region, posing new challenges for authorities. Small-cell terrorist activity, foreign terrorist fighter travel and the growing number of lone actors will see continued use of self-funding to raise funds and cash smuggling to move them. These proven, easy-to-use terrorism financing methods reduce the need for terrorists and their supporters to resort to more complex financial activity or adopt new payment systems. The region's porous land and close maritime borders, as well as informal cash-intensive economies, also influence the continued use of established methods. Terrorism financing funds flowing out of the region are currently channelled mainly into the Syria-Iraq conflict, but comprise only a small portion of international funding to factions fighting in that area. While outflows to foreign conflict zones pose a high risk, concern is growing over signs of funding entering the region to support local terrorist actors. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2016 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/regional-risk-assessment-SMALL_0.pdf Shelf Number: 140160 Keywords: Financing of TerrorismISISIslamic StateRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremists |
Author: Liang, Christina Schori Title: The Criminal-Jihadist: Insights into Modern Terrorist Financing Summary: Terrorism is proving to be an enduring global security threat. Since the late 1990s terrorist groups have become more lethal, networked, and technologically savvy. The world is currently dealing with two global terrorist groups - al-Qaeda and IS - that have recruited affiliates across the globe. In 2014 the lives lost due to terrorism around the world increased by 80 per cent compared to the previous year. Several terrorist groups currently have the ability to control land and hold entire cities hostage. The growing power of terrorist groups is linked to their ability to generate revenue from numerous criminal activities with almost complete impunity. Without funding, terrorist groups can neither function nor carry out attacks. To strip terrorists of their power, world leaders and the international community must work together to combat related crime and to implement and enforce global mechanisms for preventing terrorist financing. This paper provides a snapshot of how modern terrorist groups finance their organisations and operations. It will identify the key issues that are driving the growing nexus of terrorism and organised crime. The paper will also explore the various working relationships between terrorist and criminal groups, outlining under what conditions and to what extent they cooperate. This will help to identify existing and potentially new countermeasures to dry up terrorist funding, and to dismantle and destroy terrorist-criminal networks in the future. Details: Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Strategic Security Analysis, no. 10: Accessed September 14, 2016 at: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/The-Criminal-Jihadist-Insights-into-Modern-Terrorist-Financing Shelf Number: 147742 Keywords: Criminal NetworksJihadistOrganized CrimeTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Trinidad and Tobago Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: 1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML)/ countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures in place in Trinidad and Tobago as at the date of the on-site visit of January 12-23, 2015. It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Trinidad and Tobago's AML/CFT system, and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. A. Risks and General Situation 2. Trinidad and Tobago is currently undertaking its National Risk Assessment (NRA) in relation to money laundering (ML)/ terrorist financing (TF). At the time of the on-site, Trinidad and Tobago had commenced, but not completed its NRA. Draft sector reports had been compiled and preliminary results had been communicated to the relevant sectors, however the Authorities advised that the draft reports could not be shared with the Assessors at that time. The National Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Committee (NAMLC) advised that Trinidad and Tobago was in the process of reviewing, consulting on and finalizing the collated Report before sending to the World Bank. The different Competent Authorities (CAs) including law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have indicated to the Assessors that they are aware of the risk ML and predicate offences pose to the jurisdiction. However no documentation was produced to substantiate the information provided by law enforcement in this regard. The Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (FIUTT) produced information to show that the predicate offences of Tax Evasion, Fraud and Drug Trafficking are some of the highest generators of the proceeds of crime as a result of the suspicious transaction reports (STRs)/ suspicious activity reports (SARs) submitted to the FIUTT. The Assessors were informed that the location of the jurisdiction and its nexus to international trade also makes it vulnerable to cross-border ML risks. The information reflected the volume of currency declarations that were submitted by the Customs and Excise Division to the FIUTT along with the number of cash seizures that occurred throughout the port. The information provided to the Assessors shows that Money Value Transfer Service (MVTS) providers are second only to the banks in filing STRs/SARs to the FIUTT. The large volume of currency declarations being reported to the FIUTT by the Customs and Excise Department coupled with the increasing amount of reports the FIUTT has been receiving from the MVTS providers and the monetary value of cash seized by the Customs and Excise Division are indicators that significant amount of monies are being moved across the border. 3. The offence of Terrorism is not unknown to the jurisdiction. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Officials have indicated that nationals of Trinidad and Tobago are currently being held in Venezuela on suspected terrorist activity offences. The information provided to the Assessors also indicated that Trinidad and Tobago has extradited one of its nationals to New York, USA for terrorist related activities. Currently, LEAs and other intelligence agencies within the jurisdiction have intelligence information to suggest that its nationals are travelling to places such as Syria to fight with terrorist organisations such as ISIS/ISIL. The FIUTT has received information in the form of STRs/SARs which may indicate that some legal entities are engaged in conducting businesses with entities that may be involved in terrorism activities. B. Key Findings Overall Level of Compliance and Effectiveness - Identifying, assessing and understanding risk: Trinidad and Tobago is currently conducting its NRA in collaboration with the World Bank. This assessment is being spearheaded by NAMLC. The Assessors note that Trinidad and Tobago's understanding of risk is limited and there has been varied assessments of such risk by CAs. The NRA, therefore, would be helpful in assisting Trinidad and Tobago with identifying, assessing and mitigating the risk posed by ML/TF. - The Limited Use of Financial Intelligence: Trinidad and Tobago has robust legislation that allows for LEAs to gather financial intelligence and information to investigate ML, TF and associated predicate offences. These enactments being the POCA and the ATA also provides for the LEAs to trace, restrain and confiscate the proceeds of crime. The FIUA allows for the FIUTT to receive, analyse and disseminate financial information to the relevant LEAs. The FIUTT has disseminated several Intelligence Reports (IRs) to LEAs as part of its mandate. Three of these reports have led to the arrest and prosecution of five individuals for ML offences. However, the Assessors observed that a large number of SARs received by the FIUTT are still awaiting analysis or have been filed for intelligence purposes. It should also be noted that a number of the IRs disseminated to the Financial Investigations Branch (FIB) are still under investigation. The Assessors were informed that there has been an improvement in the quality of IRs submitted by the FIUTT as of 2014. - Money Laundering Investigation and Prosecution: LEAs in Trinidad and Tobago considered the risk associated with ML as being medium to high. The jurisdiction has recorded three cases of ML that have resulted in charges being brought against five individuals. The cases are currently pending before the Court. The information provided indicates that these cases were as a result of parallel investigations conducted between the FIB and the Fraud Squad. There are no arrests for stand-alone ML. The investigation of ML is not properly prioritized by LEAs. The lack of ML arrests coupled with the risks associated with the jurisdiction along with the lack of priority given to investigation suggests that the offence of ML is not properly investigated. Furthermore, none of the cases for which persons have been charged with ML have been adjudicated by the Court and this therefore creates a difficulty in determining whether these cases have been properly investigated. In the absence of convictions for ML, it is not possible to say conclusively that matters are being properly investigated. The absence of convictions for the offence of ML means that no sanctions have been applied by the Court. The offence of ML is not given priority within the Court system. - Confiscation: Confiscation is not treated with priority within Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago does not have any confiscation proceedings pertaining to ML, TF or any predicate offences. Recent changes to the POCA have created a loophole whereby confiscation may not be possible if the criminal ML conduct is not linked to a specified offence. - The Seized Assets Fund (SAF) which is for monies seized under the POCA and the ATA has not been properly established as persons have not been appointed to the Seized Assets Committee and Regulations governing the management and operation of the fund have not as yet been developed. - Terrorist Financing: The offence of terrorist financing has been adequately criminalised in the ATA and related regulations. The FIUTT has mandated in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that STRs relating to TF are to be given priority and outlines the procedure upon receipt of these STRs. The Assessors were informed that these IRs were delivered to the relevant person within the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS). There has been no feedback to the FIUTT in relation to these IRs. The Assessors note that a report of TF was submitted since 2013 and there is no evidence to suggest that any actions have been taken against the individuals or entities mentioned in the report. There is no indication that TF is prioritized and properly investigated by LEAs as there has been no designation of entities or persons as terrorists, no assets restrained nor any arrests or convictions for TF offences. The framework for targeted sanctions related to the financing of terrorism needs to be significantly tightened up. There are not adequate sanctions or prohibitions in respect of making funds or facilities available to designated persons and all the requirements for freezing funds are not covered in the ATA. There is no comprehensive policy on the proliferation of financing of weapons of mass destruction and there is no adequate legislation on this issue. There does not appear to be a thorough appreciation of the risk of TF amongst the relevant authorities. There are inadequate resources to effectively investigate and prosecute TF. - Non Profit Organisations (NPOs): NPOs are required to register with the Registrar General's Department however there is no proper AML/CTF policy in relation to the management, supervision and monitoring of these entities. A targeted risk assessment for these entities has not been done as yet, neither are there adequate laws to address this area which means that for most intents and purposes the sector is not being sufficiently regulated. - Preventive Measures - The regulatory framework in relation to preventive measures is largely in place as demonstrated by the level of technical compliance by Trinidad and Tobago. However, significant gaps exist in the manner in which FIs and listed businesses (LBs) in Trinidad and Tobago implement these requirements. Gaps exist in understanding risk, applying enhanced due diligence to PEPS, internal controls and performance of CDD measures based on risk. - Supervision - The supervisory regime undertaken by the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT) is robust and well developed given that it has had significantly more years of experience than the other CAs. Supervision performed by the CBTT is sound. Additionally, the FIUTT as a supervisor has demonstrated its capabilities while the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission (TTSEC) has only recently begun direct AML/CFT supervision. Except for the CBTT there are issues of resources and expertise. Across the board, Regulators have not demonstrated sufficient understanding of risk and applied that understanding to how they regulate on a risk sensitive basis. Sanctions imposed by supervisors have been limited and the range of sanctions available have not been utilised adequately by supervisors. Supervisors need to consider wider use of those powers as well as seeking additional powers such as the ability to impose monetary administrative penalties. - National AML/CFT Policies and Coordination - There is an overall AML/CFT framework in place. The framework is coordinated by the NAMLC. Domestic coordination occurring amongst the key stakeholders has resulted in a number of positive strides within the AML/CFT framework. However, all sectors have not been covered in terms of articulation and thorough dissemination of the AML/CFT policy and in assessing and understanding the country-wide risks. There is need for greater resources to be invested so that all the key agencies are sufficiently funded. - Legal Persons and Legal Arrangements - Trinidad and Tobago is a thriving centre for commercial activity. It has a very active Registrar General's Department (RGD) that oversees the registration of companies, NPOs and the registration of business names amongst other functions. A publicly searchable electronic database for general records of the RGD has been invaluable in increasing accessibility to basic information on companies. Some beneficial ownership information is kept and made available but the accuracy of this is questionable since there is no requirement in the Companies Act to demand and maintain such information. Trinidad and Tobago is not a major centre for legal arrangements. Recent improvements in the filing of annual returns has improved the accuracy of records within the RGD and the verification process but there is still significant room for improvement. No risk analysis pertaining to legal arrangements has been done. - International Cooperation - FIUTT has been working effectively to use mechanisms to share, exchange and respond to requests for information. The FIUTT is able to share information spontaneously. LEAs have not maximised the possibility of exchanging information with their foreign counterparts. Both the BIR and the Customs and Excise Division have limitations in providing or obtaining information from foreign counterparts. Requests for information are not always processed in a timely manner. All the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the Merida Convention, the Terrorist Financing Convention and the Palermo Convention need to be given effect to. A proper case management system does not exist for either mutual legal assistance or extradition cases. There are some limitations in the Mutual Legal Assistance Act that may affect the provision of information. Details: Trinidad & Tobago, West Indies: Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, 2016. 173p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/cfatf-4mer-trinidad-tobago.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Trinidad and Tobago URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/cfatf-4mer-trinidad-tobago.pdf Shelf Number: 140758 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Wesseling, Mara Title: An EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System Summary: The idea for a European equivalent to the US's Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) - an investigative tool for tracing and linking international financial transactions in order to detect terrorist plots and networks - was first proposed by members of the European Parliament and certain EU member states during the 2010 negotiations on the EU-US TFTP Agreement. Under this arrangement, the EU is not allowed direct access to the US system but may submit search requests. Critically, transactions conducted under the auspices of the EU's own pan-European payments initiative, the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which enables bank-to-bank payments within the Eurozone, are excluded from the TFTP, an omission that some refer to as 'the SEPA data gap'. SEPA is the EU-wide single market for payments made in euros that has been progressively established with adoption of the Payment Services Directive (PSD) of 5 December 2007 to facilitate cross-border payments. It refers to both a geographic space and a legal framework, providing a standardised payment format for credit transfers, debits, (credit) card payments and money remittance, as well as mobile and online payments. Financial services providers had to migrate to the SEPA format before 1 February 2014, while non-EU SEPA countries must comply with the SEPA framework by the end of 2016. Article 11 of the EU-US TFTP Agreement specifies that the possibility of introducing a socalled 'EU Terrorist Finance Tracking System (EU TFTS)' would be investigated and that the US would provide assistance and advice in establishing such a system, should this be the result of the investigation. The first impact assessment, produced in November 2013 and detailing the options towards this end, was not taken forward. Nevertheless, a renewed interest in a European system for tracking terrorist finance emerged after the terrorist attacks on the Paris offices of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and further Paris attacks in November of the same year. The latest EU 'Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against Terrorist Financing', published on 2 February 2016, demanded that by December 20165 the European Commission should undertake a new assessment of a possible EU TFTS, which would complement the existing EU-US TFTP Agreement. This paper is structured around two key issues. First, it studies past debates and negotiations concerning the US TFTP in order to highlight those issues of importance should an EU TFTS be created. Second, it examines previous and current proposals, as well as debates, concerning the creation of an EU TFTS, drawing out the differences between previous iterations and current demands. This paper is concerned with identifying the lessons that can be learned from previous experiences and with the analysis of past and current debates on the creation of an EU TFTS. The last section offers further food for thought regarding the possible creation of an EU TFTS. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/op_wesseling_an_eu_terrorist_finance_tracking_system.1.pdf Shelf Number: 140775 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: GAFISUD Title: GAFISUD - 2010 Regional Typologies Summary: The document: "REGIONAL TYPOLOGIES - GAFISUD 2010" was drafted by the International Financial Action Task Force of South America [Grupo de Accion Financiera Internacional de Sudamerica] - GAFISUD, in cooperation with the GAFISUD- European Union Project. It is classified as a document of PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. Consequently, its content may be consulted and utilized by any person, with copyright limitations. As a result of the aforesaid, its reproduction, copy, distribution, etc., in whole or in part, requires GAFISUD's previous authorization. The pertinent request may be addressed to the email: contacto@gafisud.info This document presents some of the mostly used money laundering and terrorist financing methodologies, with the aim of helping the region's reporting entities and the society as a whole in the preventive actions of behaviours associated with money laundering and the financing of crime organizations. This information will allow designing better instruments of control and red flags that will enable authorities to devise or adjust control mechanisms with the purpose of protecting themselves against money launderers or the financing of terrorist groups. The descriptions and examples are based on real facts. However, all such data that may identify situations, individuals or places and additional elements have been amended in order to avoid any search and seizure, damage or breach of material rights. The statements on economic activities do not constitute a conjecture or forecast about truthful and permanent bonds with activities tied to money laundering and terrorist financing. The described behaviour or typology only shows a tendency and the existing risk within the economic activity of being used by individuals engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing. Details: s.l. GAFISUD, 2010. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Regional-Typologies-2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: South America URL: http://www.cocaineroute.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Regional-Typologies-2010.pdf Shelf Number: 144869 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Crabtree, Ben Title: The nexus of conflict and illicit drug trafficking: Syria and the wider region Summary: Evidence of drug seizures shows that captagon has become the major drug in the Middle East, enriching criminal and terrorist networks and fueling conflict across the region, sidelining other drug routes such as the billion-dollar business of Afghan heroin via the Balkan route. With seizures of 69.5 million pills in Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon in 2015 alone, the captagon market has exploded. One captagon pill, sold on the streets in the Gulf countries, would fetch US 10-20$. Thus, the market can be estimated at a worth as much as 1.39$ billion. This means that millions of dollars are being raised from drug trafficking and directly benefit different groups involved in the Syrian conflict. This Global Initiative investigation shows that captagon has become the conflict drug of choice -- not only in directly financing the ever deteriorating war in Syria but also slowly fueling the appetite for conflict: Evidence suggests that ISIS is also not only involved in captagon trafficking but also in prescription drug trafficking and abuse (tramadol). Both captagon and tramadol are used by ISIS fighters to suppress feelings of pain, induce feelings of euphoria and thereby increase levels of violence. In addition, migration and displacement feed into another vicious cycle. As drug trafficking sprawls, so does the potential for increased abuse and addiction by Syrian nationals both within the country and among the refugee populations. Further evidence suggests the increasing vulnerabilities and mental health issues of the displaced population, leading to spiking levels of drug abuse. This new Global Initiative report, launched on 1st of November, is a timely piece of analysis based on field research in six countries. It examines the dimensions of regional drug trafficking and highlights the troubling consequences for the possible resolution of the Syria conflict and the region's long-term stability. This report finds that despite limited reliable information: Drug trafficking and its impact on the rule of law is extensive and chronic, and its impact goes beyond the borders of Syria. This must be factored into development implementations in a post-conflict Syria. Development policies should have a mid- to long term focus understanding the local needs and conflicts and development of the rule of law as a cornerstone for success. Captagon production within Syria has been occurring for at least a decade. However, the current conflict has merely exploited the breakdown of the rule of law to intensify production and trafficking and added a regional facet to the issue, because The current level of conflict within Syria has forced some traffickers to move production of captagon to Lebanon and Turkey and potentially other countries within the region including Sudan. If the conflict worsens for either the regime, FSA, or ISIS and extremist groups, captagon drug trafficking could be moved on a larger scale to neighboring countries. It is unclear if ISIS is a net exporter of captagon due to other more reliable sources of funding (oil, extortion). However, there are clear links between tramadol trafficking and ISIS. Destination markets for captagon are predominantly in the Arab Peninsula and East Africa with consumption in Turkey and Syria also rising precipitously. Overall, drug trafficking and serious organized crime are a significant challenge to some countries in the region, due to newer priorities and limited capacity of law enforcement. Details: Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Syria URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/global-initiative-the-nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking--syria-and-the-wider-region-november-2016_low.pdf Shelf Number: 144991 Keywords: Drug TraffickingISISOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: AUSTRAC Title: Australia's Superannuation Section: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Summary: AUSTRAC assesses the overall money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risk for the superannuation sector as MEDIUM. This rating is based on an assessment of the criminal threat environment, the vulnerabilities within the sector, and the consequences or harms associated with the criminal threat. This assessment relates to superannuation funds regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). The criminal threat environment is varied and multifaceted, ranging from opportunistic offences conducted by individual members, to complex and sophisticated attacks executed by organised crime groups, including from entities based overseas. The size of the superannuation sector ($1.26 trillion in assets)1 makes it an attractive target for money laundering and associated predicate crimes. Fraud is by far the most prevalent predicate crime, with many reported cases of falsified documents and attempted illegal early release of superannuation savings. Many cases of fraud are enabled by cybercrime, with funds observing regular and sophisticated hacking attempts. Terrorism financing is a limited but emerging threat. Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who are generally self funded, have accessed superannuation accounts to finance their activities. The specific characteristics of the superannuation sector that make it vulnerable to ML/TF and predicate crimes include: • the extremely large number of member accounts and volume of transactions • low levels of member engagement, which hampers timely detection of fraud • post-preservation accounts which have few restrictions on making transactions to and from the accounts • voluntary contributions to accumulation accounts by members, where the source of money is difficult to verify • payments to members and outgoing rollovers that are vulnerable to fraud and illegal early release • the growing reliance on online delivery of products and services, resulting in less face-toface interaction with customers and increasing online data storage. Details: West Chatswood, NSW: AUSTRAC, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: http://austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/super-annuation-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/super-annuation-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 140411 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Title: Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures: United States. Mutual Evaluation Report Summary: 1. This report provides a summary of the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures in place in the United States at the date of the on-site visit (18 January 2016 to 5 February 2016). It analyses the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations, the level of effectiveness of its AML/CFT system, and makes recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. A. Key Findings The AML/CFT framework in the U.S. is well developed and robust. Domestic coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues is sophisticated and has matured since the previous evaluation in 2006. The understanding of money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks is well-supported by a variety of ongoing and complementary risk assessment processes, including the 2015 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) and National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA), which were both published. The national AML/CFT strategies, key priorities and efforts of law enforcement and other agencies seem to be driven by these processes and are coordinated at the Federal level across a vast spectrum of agencies in a number of areas. The financial sectors bear most of the burden in respect of required measures under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). Financial institutions (FIs), in general, have an evolved understanding of ML/TF risks and obligations, and have systems and processes for implementing preventive measures, including for on-boarding customers, transaction monitoring and reporting suspicious transactions. However, the regulatory framework has some significant gaps, including minimal coverage of certain institutions and businesses (investment advisers (IAs), lawyers, accountants, real estate agents, trust and company service providers (other than trust companies). Minimal measures are imposed on designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), other than casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones, and consist of the general obligation applying to all trades and businesses to report transactions (or a series of transactions) involving more than USD 10 000 in cash, and targeted financial sanctions (TFS) requirements. Other comprehensive AML/CFT obligations do not apply to these sectors. In the U.S. context the vulnerability of these minimally covered DNFBP sectors is significant, considering the many examples identified by the national risk assessment process. Law enforcement efforts rest on a well-established task force environment which enables the pooling of expertise from a wide range of law enforcement agencies (LEAs), including prosecutors, to support quality ML/TF investigation and prosecution outcomes. Overall, LEAs have access to a wide range of financial intelligence, capabilities and expertise allowing them to trace assets, identify targets and undertake expert financial ML/TF investigations. There is a strong focus on following the money in predicate offence investigations at the Federal level. A similar focus on identifying terrorist financiers in terrorism-related investigations applies. The U.S. investigates and prosecutes TF networks aggressively in line with its risk profile. International cooperation in these areas is generally effective though improvements are underway to further improve the timely handling of (a large volume) of mutual legal assistance (MLA) and extradition requests. Lack of timely access to adequate, accurate and current beneficial ownership (BO) information remains one of the fundamental gaps in the U.S. context. The NMLRA identifies examples of legal persons being abused for ML, in particular, through the use of complex structures to hide ownership. While authorities did provide case examples of successful investigations in these areas, challenges in ensuring timely access to and availability of BO information more generally raises significant concerns, bearing in mind risk and context. At the Federal level, the U.S. achieves over 1 200 ML convictions a year. Many of these cases are large, complex, white collar crime cases, in line with the country’s risk profile. Federal authorities have the lead role in all large and/or international investigations. There is however no uniform approach to State-level AML efforts and it is not clear that all States give ML due priority. The AML system would benefit from ensuring that a range of tax crimes are predicate offenses for ML. The Federal authorities aggressively pursue high-value confiscation in large and complex cases, in respect of assets located both domestically and abroad. The authorities effectively resort to criminal, civil and administrative tools to forfeit assets. At State and local levels, there is little available information, though it appears that civil forfeiture is vigorously pursued by some States. The U.S. authorities effectively implement targeted financial sanctions for both terrorism and proliferation financing purposes, though not all U.N designations have resulted in domestic designations (mainly on the basis of insufficient identifiers). Most designations take place without delay, and are effectively communicated to the private sector. The U.S. Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) is used by thousands of FIs across the U.S. and beyond which gives the U.S sanctions regime a global effect in line with the size, complexity and international reach of the U.S. financial system. The U.S has had significant success in identifying the funds/other assets of designated persons/entities, and preventing them from operating or executing financial transactions related to terrorism and proliferation. Only minor improvements are needed in this area. AML/CFT supervision of the banking and securities sectors appears to be robust as a whole, and is evolving for money services businesses (MSBs) through greater coordination at the State level. The U.S. has a range of sanctions that it can and does impose on FIs as well as an array of dissuasive remedial measures, including informal supervisory actions. These measures seem to have the desired impact on achieving the supervisory objectives. The most significant supervisory gap is lack of comprehensive AML/CFT supervisory processes for the DNFBPs, other than casinos. Details: Paris, FATF, 2016. 266p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140443 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. House. Committee on Financial Services Title: Stopping Terror Finance: Securing the U.S. Financial Sector Summary: Terrorist financing describes a form of financial crime in which an individual or entity solicits, collects, or provides funds "with the intention that [these funds] may be used to support terrorist acts or organizations." While terrorists can benefit from big donations of deep-pocketed financiers sympathetic to their cause, terrorist financing often involves relatively small-dollar amounts and itself is just a subset melting into the larger stream of all financial crime occurring in the international financial system. The threat to national security from terrorist financiers is real, so while U.S. policymakers have long recognized the idea that "following the money" through the retail banking system can help combat terrorism and related forms of illicit finance, new financing technologies have arisen since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks that require constant renewal of detection and disruption methods. In December 2015, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warned that "further concerted action urgently needs to be taken … to combat the financing of … serious terrorist threats...." Two months later, in February 2016, FATF noted that the scope and nature of terrorist threats had "globally intensified considerably." According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department), these threats collectively represent a source of risk generally to the United States, and to the financial system in particular. Specifically, Treasury concludes: [t]he central role of the U.S. financial system within the international financial system and the sheer volume and diversity of international financial transactions that in some way pass through U.S. financial institutions expose the U.S. financial system to TF [terrorist financing] risks that other financial systems may not face. The bipartisan Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing of the Financial Services Committee (Task Force) was authorized for two six-month terms during the 114th Congress to probe the growing terrorist financing problem. The Task Force held eleven hearings, and its 21 Members systematically examined how select terror groups and actors acquire and move funds illicitly. The hearings featured expert testimony from current and former U.S. government employees, with witnesses from both the U.S. and overseas, on a wide range of topics. The Task Force recently concluded its work with two wrap-up hearings, one of which featured testimony from two senior Treasury Department officials on how the agency is coordinating its efforts to fight terrorist financing. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 2016. 191p. Source: Internet Resources: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/terror_financing_report_12-20-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147795 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Ralby, Ian M. Title: Downstream Oil Theft: Global Modalities, Trends, and Remedies Summary: At peak prices, tapping a Mexican pipeline of refined oil for only seven minutes could earn a cartel $90,000. In 2012 alone, hydrocarbons fraud cost the European Union €4 billion in lost revenues. In Nigeria, 30 percent of all hydrocarbons products are smuggled into neighboring states. An estimated 660,000 cars in Morocco and Tunisia run all year long on fuel smuggled from Algeria. In its first year, a fuel marking and vehicle tracking program in Uganda reduced the amount of adulterated fuel from 29 percent to as little as 1 percent. But at the same time, the regulators who test the state’s fuel marking program routinely steal 22 liters per truckload, amounting to 1.2 million liters per year at one border crossing alone. Theft, fraud, smuggling, laundering, corruption. Hydrocarbons crime, in all its forms, has become a significant threat not only to local and regional prosperity but also to global stability and security. Combating this pervasive criminal activity is made only more difficult by the reality that many of those in a position to curb hydrocarbons crime are the ones benefiting from it. This is the first major study of refined oil theft around the globe, and while Part I provides only a limited snapshot of the problem, it offers useful insight into the modalities of theft, the culprits responsible, the stakeholders who suffer, and the approaches that could change the illicit dynamics. Part I examines the contours of illicit hydrocarbons activity in ten case studies: Mexico, Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Uganda, Mozambique, Thailand, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the European Union (including the United Kingdom). The modalities of theft across these geographically and contextually disparate cases range from low-level tapping, siphoning, adulteration, and smuggling to extremely sophisticated maritime operations involving extensive networks of actors to brazenly corrupt dynamics in which states lose billions of dollars per year while their officials profit from those losses. Illicit activity is highest in states where oil is refined, but the most common determinant of oil theft is a significant price discrepancy between one state and its neighbor. Other factors in neighboring states— instability, currency imbalances, and lack of border controls—also impact the extent to which a state experiences downstream illicit activity. Areas where there are few fuel distribution centers are particularly ripe for organized criminal groups to fill the void. At the same time, security forces, regulatory authorities, company insiders, terminal workers, and officials at every level are all potential participants in illicit hydrocarbons schemes that rob governments of revenue and enrich the individuals involved. Some mitigation efforts—most notably fuel marking and vehicle tracking—have proved extremely useful in efforts to stem illicit activity and regain lost tax revenue. But others, including closing borders, have had little, if any, effect. This report is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the culprits, modalities, and amounts of downstream illicit hydrocarbons activity. It details each of the case studies and examines the forms of hydrocarbons crime, highlighting who benefits, who suffers, and, to the extent possible, how much is being lost by governments in the process. Part II draws on the details of the case studies to analyze trends in the global illicit market. Part III then focuses on the various stakeholders and their reasons and opportunities for mitigation, and provides concrete recommendations about what might be done. Fuel is vital to human life, and everyone wants a discount. Across the globe, people are willing to break the law in order to pursue that discount. The global scourge of illicit downstream hydrocarbons activity remains relatively invisible. This study, in shining a light on it, constitutes the first step toward effectively addressing this pervasive, yet unrecognized threat to global security, stability, and prosperity. Details: Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Global Energy Center, 2017. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2017 at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Downstream_Oil_Theft_web_0106.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Downstream_Oil_Theft_web_0106.pdf Shelf Number: 147797 Keywords: Natural ResourcesOil IndustryOil TheftOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Collin, Matthew Title: The Impact of Anti-Money Laundering Regulation on Payment Flows: Evidence from SWIFT Data Summary: Regulatory pressure on international banks to fight money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) increased substantially in the past decade. At the same time there has been a rise in the number of complaints of banks denying transactions or closing the accounts of customers either based in high risk countries or attempting to send money there, a process known as de-risking. In this paper, we investigate the impact of an increase in regulatory risk, driven by the inclusion of countries on an internationally-recognized list of high risk jurisdictions, on subsequent cross-border payments. We find countries that have been added to a high risk greylist face up to a 10% decline in the number of cross border payments received from other jurisdictions, but no change in the number sent. We also find that a greylisted country is more likely to see a decline in payments from other countries with weak AML/CFT institutions. We find limited evidence that these effects manifest in cross border trade or other flows. Given that countries that are placed on these lists tend to be poorer on average, these impacts are likely to be more strongly felt in developing countries. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2016. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 445: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-anti-money-laundering-SWIFT-data.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/impact-anti-money-laundering-SWIFT-data.pdf Shelf Number: 145092 Keywords: Financial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingWhite Collar Crime |
Author: Keatinge, Tom Title: Lone-Actor and Small Cell Terrorist Attacks: A New Front in Counter-Terrorist Finance? Summary: As the threat from lone-actor and small cell terrorism evolves, this paper examines the financing of both disrupted and successful plots since 2000 in Great Britain, France and Australia. These plots often require minimal amounts of funding, making proactive identification through financial means challenging. Nonetheless, this paper highlights a number of key themes that warrant further investigation, showing the potentially disruptive role that financial intelligence can play. Efforts to disrupt the funding of Daesh have taken up a significant amount of the time and resources of policymakers, law enforcement and the military. These efforts have also involved mobilising the private sector, particularly banks, oil companies and antiquities dealers. However, little attention has been paid to understanding and addressing the financing associated with the plots (whether successful, failed or disrupted) of lone actors and small cells that have acted beyond Daesh-controlled territory. This paper seeks to provide insight into the financing connected with a sample of 63 lone-actor and small cell terrorist plots in Great Britain and France since 2000, including those that are religiously inspired, right wing, nationalist, and single issue. The aim is to inform thinking and raise awareness among those charged with tackling this threat. The report also draws on a similar study by Australia's financial intelligence unit, AUSTRAC, thereby providing an overview of lone-actor and small cell terrorist finance from the perspective of three countries, each with individual and distinct experiences. What is clear from both studies is that the simplicity and spontaneity of these attacks, particularly those attempted by a lone assailant as opposed to a dyad or triad, means that assailants are often able to make use of their own funding resources, offering limited opportunities for traditional counter-terrorist financing (CTF) approaches to reveal financial indications of plans prior to their execution. Despite this challenge, the research conducted for this paper has highlighted a number of key themes that it is hoped can contribute to the approaches taken by law enforcement and security authorities as they adapt their CTF response to the evolving threat posed by such terrorists: While there has been an undoubted need to focus on disrupting the significant financing accrued by Daesh over the past two years, a comprehensive CTF strategy should not lose sight of the fact that lone actors and small cells operating at home present a considerably more immediate threat to citizens than Daesh, given that the latter mainly operates in Iraq and Syria. Although it has traditionally been the case in many countries that terrorist financing has been addressed separately from broader financial crime, the increasing intersection of lone actors and small cells with low-level criminality suggests that this separation needs to be reconsidered. Investigations need to at least acknowledge this emerging connection and create dedicated inter-agency links to combat it. Attacks undertaken with knives have certainly resulted in casualties; however, the use of firearms (particularly automatic weapons) has resulted in casualties on a far greater scale. As such, increased focus should be placed on identifying and disrupting financial flows related to the trade in illicit firearms. Information about the financial tools employed by lone actors and small cells must be more widely disseminated to raise awareness among those agencies and actors = in both the public and private sectors - who are less familiar with terrorist financing techniques. These might include certain types of retailer, payday lenders and student loan companies, as well as online payment systems that may increasingly be the target of terrorist-related fraud. Closer monitoring of the welfare system is also advised, in light of cases identified where benefits were used to fund terrorist plots. The financial patterns of lone actors and small cell operators are often indistinguishable from legitimate financial behaviour, and proactive identification of these individuals through financial reporting remains challenging. National financial intelligence units must therefore act as a critical bridge between national security and law enforcement agencies (that identify subjects of interest via non-financial means) and the private sector, to allow financial institutions to conduct more targeted monitoring. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed January 30, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_op_lone-actor_and_small_cell_terrorist_attacks.1.pdf Shelf Number: 145541 Keywords: Counter-terrorismLone Wolf TerrorismTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Mazzitelli, Antonio L. Title: The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10 Summary: The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel's growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine "Highway 10" among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=whemsac Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=whemsac Shelf Number: 146980 Keywords: CocaineDrug TraffickingTerrorist Financing |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: UNODC Regional Programme in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy: Preventing and Countering Illicit Trafficking and Organized Crime for Improved Governance, Justice and Security Summary: The Caribbean is situated in the midst of some of the world's major drug trafficking routes, between the worlds main drug producing countries to the South and the major consumer markets of the North. The geographic location of the region, the general lack of adequate law enforcement capacities to effectively monitor vast coastlines, as well as its susceptibility to exogenous shocks, are some of the factors explaining the Caribbean's extreme vulnerability to the threat of transnational organized crime and its various manifestations. The nature of these challenges makes regional cooperation and a coordinated response key factors in addressing the increasing plague of transnational crime, which threatens not only regional security, but also sustainable development and growth. 2. The UNODC Regional Programme (2014-2016) in support of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy serves as an overarching policy framework for UNODC’s technical assistance to the Caribbean region. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 'Crime and Security Strategy 2013' (CCSS) clearly illustrates the areas of greatest concern regarding regional security and outlines a set of Strategic Goals aimed at strengthening the region's capacity to combat transnational organized crime and its manifestations. In an effort to support the region in achieving these Goals, UNODC has worked closely with the CARICOM Secretariat and its Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) to align technical assistance in such a way that these main areas of priority are adequately addressed, while avoiding any duplication of initiatives. 3. The Regional Programme consists of the following five sub-programmes, which not only reflect the range of thematic areas covered by the UNODC mandate, but also directly target the priority goals of the CARICOM Strategy: (i) Countering transnational organized crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism; (ii) Countering Corruption and Money Laundering; (iii) Preventing Crime and Reforming Criminal Justice; (iv) Drug Use, Prevention and Treatment and HIV/AIDS and (v) Research, Trend Analysis and Forensics. These sub-programmes will guide the development of concrete UNODC projects and initiatives to be implemented in the region. The indicative budget of the Regional Programme, for its 3-year timeframe, stands at US$ 11,690,257. 4. The direct responsibility for the implementation of the initiatives included in this Regional Programme will lie with the UNODC Regional Office for Central America and the Caribbean in Panama (ROPAN). Standard UNODC rules and procedures will be observed, so as to ensure the appropriate level of internal oversight and evaluation. Furthermore, in line with the regional consensus on programme management, UNODC will adhere closely to agreed coordination and oversight mechanisms, through the submission of annual reports to the CARICOM Council of Ministers for Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE), which will provide strategic guidance to and oversight of the Regional Programme’s implementation, so as to ensure adequate coordination in the implementation of activities at the regional level. . 1CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013, Chapter 1 (Strategic Security Environment), paragraph 1.6. 2 The CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy 2013 was adopted at the Twenty-Fourth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, 18-19 February 2013, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The Strategy, which is based on a 3-year timeframe, is the authoritative reference and guiding document for security issues within CARICOM. 5. This Regional Programme (2014-2016) is an over-arching policy framework defining the joint priorities for UNODC’s technical assistance to Caribbean Member States, in alignment with and in support of the implementation of the CCSS. In their "Political Declaration on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorism and other Serious Crimes in the Caribbean", which was approved by the Caribbean Member States during a Ministerial Conference on 'Illicit Drug Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism as Challenges for Security and Development in the Caribbean' (Santo Domingo, 17-20 February 2009), the participating Member States requested “UNODC to prepare, in coordination with regional and sub-regional partners, thematic programmes identified by the region, covering the priority concerns”. UNODC's Regional Programme constitutes the key element of UNODC's response to this request as well as to the more recent calls by Member States in the region for a revitalized engagement of the Office in the Caribbean. These requests are a consequence of the perception, by Governments in the region, of the increased threats that are posed to Caribbean societies and institutions by transnational organized crime. There is a strong recognition that, in order to prevent and counter the problem of illicit drugs and organized crime affecting the Caribbean, there is a need for enhanced technical cooperation and assistance by UNODC. 6. The Programme has been developed in close collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat, the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), the Regional Security System (RSS), the Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS), as well as Member States in the region (through programming missions as well as discussions with Permanent Missions), and reflects the key priorities of regional and national stakeholders. Substantively, the Regional Programme is underpinned by and alligned with the Strategic Goals outlined in the CCSS. 7. The Regional Programme also draws significant elements from the Caribbean Community Action Plan for Social and Development Crime Prevention 2009-2013, as it fully incorporates its main pillars and updates its priorities for the period 2014-2016. 8. In the context of the CCSS, this Regional Programme will therefore cover Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. Strategic and programmatic synergies will also be sought with Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the framework of CARIFORUM. 9. The Regional Programme is designed as a strategic tool that reflects the region's main priorities for action, and ensures complementarity with the various on-going and future initiatives of UNODC and its main partners in the region in the area of justice and security. It provides a roadmap towards providing required expertise, technical tools and services to enhance national and regional capabilities to prevent and counter organized crime, including drug trafficking and terrorism, by building stronger societies based on the rule of law and human rights. It promotes regional cooperation and integration, and supports regional and country-level capacity building, as determined by existing national needs, priorities and specificities. 10. The overall vision is that, by the year 2016, countries of the region will be in a position to count on strengthened institutions and cooperate in an effective and sustainable manner to counter the destabilizing impact of organized crime. While the ultimate attainment of this vision depends on the commitment of countries in the region and their international partners, UNODC, through the development of this Regional Programme, reiterates its commitment to support the realization of this vision through its engagement at the regional, sub-regional, national and local levels, in close collaboration with the CARICOM Secretariat, CARICOM IMPACS and other relevant regional security insitutions, such as the RSS and CASSOS. Details: New York: UNODC, 2013. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ropan/UNODC_Regional_Programme_Caribbean/UNODC_Regional_Programme_for_the_Caribbean_2014-2016_in_support_of_the_CARICOM_Crime_and_Security_Strategy_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ropan/UNODC_Regional_Programme_Caribbean/UNODC_Regional_Programme_for_the_Caribbean_2014-2016_in_support_of_the_CARICOM_Crime_and_Security_Strategy_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 146652 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug-Related CrimeMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Heissner, Stefan Title: Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State's Financial Fortunes Summary: About this Study • The so-called Islamic State has often been described as the richest terrorist organization in the world. • This estimate of Islamic State revenues for the years 2014–2016 results from a collaboration between EY and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London. It is based on a systematic review of open source information about the finances of Islamic State in its core territory in Syria and Iraq. Key Findings • Estimates vary widely. It remains impossible to say exactly how much money Islamic State has at its disposal. • The group's most significant sources of revenue are closely tied to its territory. They are: (1) taxes and fees; (2) oil; and (3) looting, confiscations, and fines. We have found no hard evidence that foreign donations continue to be significant. Similarly, revenues from the sale of antiquities and kidnap for ransom, while difficult to quantify, are unlikely to have been major sources of income. • In the years since 2014, Islamic State’s annual revenue has more than halved: from up to $1.9b in 2014 to a maximum of $870m in 2016. There are no signs yet that the group has created significant new funding streams that would make up for recent losses. With current trends continuing, the Islamic State’s "business model" will soon fail. Assessment • Evaluating Islamic State finances through traditional approaches towards "countering terrorist finance" leads to serious misconceptions. Islamic State is fundamentally different because of the large territory it controls and the unique opportunities this offers for generating income. • Conversely, its reliance on population and territory helps to explain the group's current financial troubles. According to figures provided by the Global Coalition, by November 2016 Islamic State had lost 62 per cent of its mid-2014 "peak" territory in Iraq, and 30 per cent in Syria. From a revenue perspective, this means fewer people and businesses to tax and less control over natural resources such as oil fields. Prospects • There are good reasons to believe that Islamic State revenues will further decline. In particular, capturing Mosul, the Caliphate's "commercial capital", will have a significant detrimental effect on Islamic State finances. • Nevertheless, Islamic State, and its Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) predecessor, have repeatedly demonstrated that financial and military setbacks can be overcome. • Moreover, the decline in revenues may not have an immediate effect on the group’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks outside its territory. While hurting Islamic State finances puts pressure on the organization and its state-building project, wider efforts will continue to be necessary to ultimately defeat it. Details: London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London: 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-States-Financial-Fortunes.pdf Shelf Number: 141335 Keywords: CaliphateIslamic StateTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Miller, Rena S. Title: Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress Summary: Anti-money laundering (AML) refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Despite the existence of longstanding domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers remain challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals exploit. According to United Nations estimates recognized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, criminals in the United States generate some $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering. Rough International Monetary Fund estimates also indicate that the global volume of money laundering could amount to as much as 2.7% of the world's gross domestic product, or $1.6 trillion annually. Money laundering is broadly recognized to have potentially significant economic and political consequences at both national and international levels. Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by a variety of factors. These include: the scale of global money laundering; the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system; the introduction of new and emerging threats (e.g., cyber-related financial crimes); the ongoing use of old methods (e.g., bulk cash smuggling); gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes; and the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws. AML Policy Framework In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits. Key elements to the BSA’s AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions. Moreover, federal authorities have applied administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools. In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA's AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Although CFT is not the primary focus of this CRS report, post- 9/11 legislation provided the Executive Branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Policy Outlook for the 115th Congress Although CFT will likely remain a pressing national security concern for policymakers and Congress, some see the beginning of the 115th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. Such efforts could further address issues raised in hearings and proposed legislation during the 114th Congress, including beneficial ownership, the application of targeted financial sanctions, and barriers to international AML information sharing. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the Executive Branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Some observers have gone further to propose broader changes to the BSA/AML regime. The 115th Congress may also seek to address tensions that remain in balancing the policy objectives of improving financial services access and inclusion while also accounting for money laundering risks and vulnerabilities that may result in the exclusion (or "de-risking") of others from the international financial system. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44776: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44776.pdf Shelf Number: 145581 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingNational SecurityOrganized CrimeProceeds of CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Stiles, Daniel Title: Ivory Trade, Terrorism and U.S. National Security: How Connected Are They? Summary: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. This report examines the contention advanced by the United States government that poached ivory is being used to finance insurgency and terrorist groups in Africa. 2. The report also analyzes whether any organized groups that engage in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in Africa pose a national security threat to the United States, which also has been posited by the government. 3. The U.S. government has used these contentions as a justification for imposing severe new restrictions on the import, export and sale of elephant ivory in the U.S. as declared in USFWS Director's Order No. 210. 4. The three groups that have specifically been named in U.S. documents as financing their activities with poached ivory, and which pose a national security threat, are AlShabaab, the Lord's Resistance Army and the Janjaweed. Each of these groups is examined in this report. 5. This report concludes that the only group under review that poses a national security threat to the U.S. is Al-Shabaab. The evidence that they engage in elephant poaching and finance their terrorist activities with ivory has been found lacking in credibility. 6. The Lord's Resistance Army has poached ivory and exchanged tusks for food and other goods, including possibly arms, at a low level. The LRA do not, however, pose a security threat to the U.S. 7. The Janjaweed have engaged in extensive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, but they pose no current security threat to the U.S. The Janjaweed do not advocate an extremist Islamic philosophy such as that articulated by Al-Qaeda. Their hostile, scorched earth style military activities have been confined to non-Arab African populations of the Sudan and Central African Republic. 8. The severe new restrictions on trade in legal ivory already in the U.S., therefore, are based on a false premise. Restricting trade in legal ivory in the U.S. will have absolutely no effect on the financing of groups that pose a security threat to the U.S. 9. There is illegal ivory in the U.S. that has been smuggled in. The smuggling would no doubt continue even with further trade restrictions, as it is already illegal so new law will change nothing. The U.S. authorities have been ineffective in administering law already in existence, which is sufficient to control the illegal importation of new ivory from poached elephants if enforced properly. 10. The current elephant poaching crisis is caused by East Asian ivory dealers and carving factories buying poached ivory. Effective policy to reduce elephant poaching should therefore be directed at them, not at law-abiding American citizens. Details: Unpublished report, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Confidential Draft: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://danstiles.org/publications/ivory/42.Ivory&National%20Security.pdf Shelf Number: 146424 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal TradeIvoryNational SecurityTerrorist FinancingTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife Crime |
Author: Crosta, Andrea Title: The White Gold of Jihad: Al-Shabaab and the Illegal Ivory Trade Summary: Coordinated bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, on 11th July 2010, claimed the lives of 76 people as they watched the World Cup final and catapulted the terrorist group responsible, Somalia's al-Shabaab, onto the world stage. The threat presented by this militant Islamist group with close links to al-Qaeda dominated recent African Union talks in Uganda and has prompted moves to strengthen the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia. But while attention is focused on sending more troops into the war-torn country, little attention is being paid to the ways in which al-Shabaab - a hard line, well-organized and compartmentalized organization - is financing its activities. Over the last 18 months, we've been investigating the involvement of al-Shabaab in trafficking ivory through Kenya, a trade that could be supplying up to 40% of the funds needed to pay salaries to its fighters. Kenya is no stranger to the threat posed by Somalia to its herds of elephants and rhinos, whose numbers are still recovering from the poaching onslaught suffered in the 1970s and ‘80s. Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) is constantly on the alert for incursions of Somali gangs – or bandits as locals call them – into the country's north eastern territory to poach elephants and rhinos. In 2007, 3 rangers died at the hands of Somali bandits as they crossed the Tana River on their way to Tsavo National Park. The incursion was halted but the cost in human life was high. All too often, however, the bandits slip across the border undetected, in their quest for the white trophy that is ivory. One can try to recount the poacher’s steps as they make their way to Meru National Park, east of Mount Kenya. In the early hours of the morning, a small group of elephants led by their matriarch approach a waterhole, unaware that three bandits are hiding just a few meters away, their AK-47 automatic rifles ready for action. With tusks worth nearly 3500 KSh or nearly US$50 per kilo, the elephants offer a lucrative prize to these trained ex-soldiers of Somali origin, desperate to make a living. The elephants begin to bathe in the mud of the waterhole. They have an acute sense of smell so the bandits know they have to act swiftly before the elephants can react to the threat of danger. The leader signals to the others as they fix their sights on the matriarch and a large male standing hunched together – the three calves won’t fetch enough money for them to bother with. A burst of automatic fire drops the two elephants instantly to the ground. The matriarch is fatally wounded but still alive as the bandits hack out her tusks, watched helplessly by the young calves. Shocked and traumatised, they will have little chance of surviving alone. The bandits load their prize and head out to safety. The leader takes out his cell phone and writes a quick message, ‘brother we have some goods to deliver, around 40 kilos, contact our cousins and lets make the deal’. In a Nairobi restaurant, a cell phone jerks into life and a young well-dressed Somali checks the screen. He reads the message carefully and takes out a notepad. The notepad reveals a page full of numbers and quantities in kilos. He marks down the amounts and adds them all together in his head. Using a small Iridium Sat phone he dials a number with a Somali prefix. On the other end, a man sitting in an office in Kismayo, Somalia picks up the call – is office is heavily guarded by Shabaab militiamen – their signature black flag waving on a pole above their heads . He notes down the quantities and sets a date for the pick-up. Unfortunately, poaching incidents likes Meru and illegal trafficking in ivory are still rampant in Africa. With demand soaring and a market price in Asia of over US$1500 per kilo, for most poaching gangs it is a simple matter of money. Moreover, the desperate political and economic situation in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia or Sudan perpetuates the poaching, which continues to be among the most lucrative criminal activities available. However, in common with other criminal activities involving exploitation of resources and environmental destruction, the poaching is backed and driven by foreign interests, in this case by the flourishing markets in Asia. Today, law enforcement agencies around the continent work together with INTERPOL and other international agencies, such as the Lusaka Agreement Task Force, to fight the illegal trade in wildlife and to implement rules agreed under CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. It is well known that criminal syndicates are involved in the trade, using sophisticated smuggling methods, bribing port personnel and customs officials, and using their own entrepreneurial activities as a cover for their smuggling operations. For the last twenty years, Kenya has led the war against trade in ivory and rhino horn. Established in 1989, the KWS has been in the forefront not only of actively protecting Kenya’s wildlife and national parks, but also in investigating and arresting felons, and in international negotiations under CITES to try to maintain a ban on international trade in the face of strong opposition. Surrounded by porous borders, Kenya has long been a transit point for illegal ivory. In an attempt to crack down on this trade, KWS recently stepped up pressure at the country's ports and airports where ivory is smuggled out. As a result, dealers looking for fast money and an easier market have turned to a new player in the game – Al Shabaab. Details: Los Angeles: Elephant Action League, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 6, 2017 at: https://elephantleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Report-Ivory-al-Shabaab-Oct2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://elephantleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Report-Ivory-al-Shabaab-Oct2016.pdf Shelf Number: 146409 Keywords: Animal PoachingElephantsIllegal IvoryIllegal TradeIvory TradeTerrorist FinancingTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife Crime |
Author: Ralby, Ian M. Title: Downstream Oil Theft: Implications and Next Steps Summary: On January 13, 2017, the Atlantic Council launched a major study on downstream oil theft at its inaugural Global Energy Forum in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Downstream Oil Theft: Implications and Next Steps draws on the launch event to examine the implications of the study's findings and to suggest tangible next steps in both further investigating this global scourge and beginning to confront it effectively Details: Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2017 at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Implications_and_Next_Steps_RW_0316.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Implications_and_Next_Steps_RW_0316.pdf Shelf Number: 144704 Keywords: Natural Resources Oil Industry Oil Theft Organized Crime Terrorist Financing |
Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: ExtremismExtremist GroupsJihadistsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorist RecruitmentTerrorists |
Author: Hayes, Ben Title: The impact of international counter-terrorism on civil society organisations: Understanding the role of the Financial Action Task Force Summary: This report examines the impact of international counterterrorism frameworks on the work of civil society organisations. In particular, it explains the role of the Financial Action Task Force in setting international standards that affect the way in which civil society organisations are regulated by nation-states, their access to financial services, and their obligations to avoid proscribed organisations and other entities deemed to pose a 'terrorism' risk. The introduction to the report frames these developments in the context of the 'shrinking space' of civil society organisations. This narrative describes a new generation of restrictions and attacks on the legitimacy and actions of non-profits and social justice organisations. Chapter two introduces the counterterrorism frameworks that have most affected civil society. This includes UN Security Council measures on combating terrorism, the new international CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) agenda, the FATF's counterterrorist financing requirements, and the EU's development and implementation of these measures. Chapter three examines the worldwide proliferation of restrictive civil society laws and their relationship to the FATF's recommendations on the regulation of the non-profit sector. It draws on existing research showing how these have been used as a vehicle for the imposition of restrictive legislation across the globe, and augments this discourse with new evidence, examples and case studies. It also considers the prospects for reform, and the potential for the FATF to engage proactively in preventing further restrictions. Chapter four addresses a relatively newer phenomenon: the financial exclusion of civil society organisations and resulting from the 'due diligence' obligations mandated by the FATF. Driven by ever-tighter demands on financial institutions to scrutinise their customers for links to terrorism, crime and corruption - and underscored by substantial fines for failures due diligence - banks and intermediaries are cutting ties with non-profits and refusing to process "suspicious" cross-border transactions. This is a process that economists have termed 'de-risking'. While more research is needed, examples show how financial exclusion can fundamentally compromise the ability of affected non-profits to implement their programmes and fulfil their mandates. Chapter five examines the impact of terrorist 'blacklisting' and sanctions regimes more widely on activities such as peacebuilding and the provision of humanitarian assistance. It shows how the rigid interpretation of states' obligations by the FATF is exacerbating what have become often intractable problems for conflict resolutions organisations and NGOs working at close proximity to conflict zones or 'suspect communities'. The report draws three main conclusions. First, without fundamental reform to the FATF's non-profit sector recommendations, the proliferation and legitimisation of restrictive counterterrorism laws is likely to continue unabated. Second, the FATF is undermining international law by directly promoting laws that contravene states' human rights obligations, even where the draft laws have been criticised by UN mandate holders. Third, a rights-based approach to financial services in which the onus is on the banks and regulators to service non-profits and process transactions is the only way to address this particular problem of de-risking. The report makes 11 recommendations to civil society organisations, national and regional parliamentary committees, national governments and the FATF. It also encourages civil society organisations concerned about the developments described in this report to join the international coalition of organisations established to engage with the FATF and create and 'enabling environment' for civil society. Details: Berlin: Bread for the World - Protestant Development Service Protestant Agency for Diakonie and Development, 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis 68: Accessed June 24, 2017 at: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.brot-fuer-die-welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Analyse/Analysis_68_The_impact_of_international_counterterrorism_on_CSOs.pdf Shelf Number: 146364 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCountering ExtremismFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorist FinancingViolent Extremism |
Author: union des fabricants (unifab) Title: Counterfeiting and terrorism Summary: Remember that counterfeiting is defined as the reproduction or total or partial use of an intellectual property right without authorisation from its owner. It currently represents up to 10% of world trade and costs an estimated 40,000 jobs per year in France and 2.5 million to G20 countries. In 2009, the OECD assessed the global financial impact of counterfeiting at between $250 billion and $500 billion. We estimate that in 2015, "counterfeiting will represent a turnover of over $1.700 billion world-wide. This is more than the value of drugs and prostitution combined". The counterfeiter therefore aims to create confusion between the original product and the counterfeit product, in order to benefit from another's reputation or the result of investments made by the true holder of an intellectual property right. From a legal viewpoint, digital piracy (music, film, software, book, graphic) is therefore a form of counterfeiting, as is the production of fake brand items. In France, counterfeiting is governed by the Code of Intellectual Property in Articles L 335-2 to L 335-9 for the infringement of copyright and related rights, L 513- 4 for the violation of pictures and models, L 613-3 for the infringement of patents, and L 713-2 and L 713-3 for the infringement of trademarks and services. In France, counterfeiting is covered under both civil and criminal law. Thus, under criminal law, counterfeiting is punishable by three years imprisonment and a 300,000 euro fine, with penalties increased to five years' imprisonment and a 500,000 euro fine when the acts are committed by an organised group, or when they concern products that are hazardous to consumer health or safety. However, the proven presence of counterfeiting within terrorist organisations raises questions about the adequacy of current criminal penalties, and particularly how they are applied. Terrorism is also punishable under the Criminal Code. This defines a terrorist act as an act pertaining to "an individual or collective undertaking aimed at seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror" (Article L 421-1 CC amended by Law of 13 November 2014). It covers two categories of offences: - First, existing offences committed in relation to a terrorist undertaking. It therefore concerns common crimes in specific circumstances which give them a specific nature; - Second, a number of offences defined independently, without reference to an existing offence. The funding of a terrorist undertaking therefore represents a specific offence (Article 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code). Which is punishable by 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of 225,000 euros. However, the penalty is increased to 20 years' imprisonment, with a fine of 500,000 euros for those directing or organising a terrorist group. Unifab' publication of this report aims to provide an insight into the links between terrorism and counterfeiting, as well as demonstrating that this illegal activity is a favourite method for financing terrorist actions. This study deals with industrial and commercial counterfeiting, in addition to the infringement of copyright. However, it excludes the falsification of means of payment and administrative papers. Moreover, it is primarily based on information collected from companies, the media, professional and public organisations, and european and international agencies. Details: Paris: unifab, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/documents/11370/71142/Counterfeiting+%26%20terrorism/7c4a4abf-05ee-4269-87eb-c828a5dbe3c6 Year: 2016 Country: France URL: https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/documents/11370/71142/Counterfeiting+%26%20terrorism/7c4a4abf-05ee-4269-87eb-c828a5dbe3c6 Shelf Number: 146942 Keywords: Consumer FraudCounterfeit ProductsCounterfeitingTerrorist Financing |
Author: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Title: Measuring the Magnitude of Global Counterfeiting: Creation of a Contemporary Global Measure of Physical Counterfeiting Summary: Counterfeiting today represents a tremendous and ever increasing global threat. Counterfeit products- from goods and merchandise, tobacco products and industrial parts to currency and medicines - circulate across the globe. Yet these products cause real damage to consumers, industries and economies. First and foremost, counterfeit goods jeopardize consumers and pose a serious safety risk: fake toys contain hazardous and prohibited chemicals and detachable small parts; brake pads made of compressed grass; counterfeit microchips for civilian aircrafts; all these and many more may and tragically already have led to injuries and deaths. Counterfeit products also result in detrimental effects on economies due to decreased innovation, loss of revenue and taxation, and higher employment rate. Disturbingly, a growing body of evidence draws a clear link between physical counterfeiting and terrorist groups which exploit the easy-made money and high profit margin to fund terror activities around the world. The continuous growth of the global counterfeiting industry is a major cause for concern. Fueled by the proliferation of internet use and social media platforms, the magnitude of global physical counterfeiting is estimated to have increased considerably since the beginning of this century. One prominent example for this increase is reflected in the OECD's studies on global counterfeiting. In its first study from 2008 - The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy - the OECD estimated that global trade of counterfeit goods accounted for 1.9% of world trade in 2007, or 250 billion USD. In its recently published study of 2016 - Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact - the OECD now estimates that global trade-related counterfeiting accounts for 2.5% of world trade, or 461 billion USD. A key finding from these two OECD studies is that global counterfeiting has grown both organically with a growth rate of 0.6% (of its estimated share of world trade), and, since world trade has in itself increased constantly since 2009, also grown in its overall dollar figure. In this context, the US Chamber's Measuring the Magnitude of Global Counterfeiting study seeks to make a contribution to this growing body of literature and complement the OECD's work in two ways: 1. The study provides a deep-dive analysis of trade-related physical counterfeiting on a comparative level, and; 2. It provides a breakdown of the share of the global rate of physical counterfeiting (as both a percentage and with a USD figure) for the 38 economies included in the 2016 U.S. Chamber of Commerce's GIPC International IP Index (fourth edition published in February 2016) based on new modeling of an economy's propensity for counterfeiting, including factors such as broader levels of IP enforcement and estimated rates of corruption. The study makes the following key findings: 1. China alone is estimated to be the source for more than 70% of global physical trade-related counterfeiting, amounting to more than 285 billion USD. Physical counterfeiting accounts for the equivalent of 12.5% of China's exports of goods and over 1.5% of its GDP. China and Hong Kong together are estimated as the source for 86% of global physical counterfeiting, which translates into 396.5 billion USD worth of counterfeit goods each year. 2. Despite China and Hong Kong's dominant share of global counterfeiting, a considerable amount of physical counterfeiting activity as share of world trade can be attributed to other economies as well. Indeed, the level of counterfeiting activity attributed to some economies is substantial and bears significant economic and public health implications, both locally and internationally. 3. In addition to the modeled estimates of rates of global physical counterfeiting and percentage attributed to each economy, this report has also examined the value of seized counterfeit goods in the 38 economies sampled and the World Customs Organization (WCO). The value of counterfeit goods seized and reported by customs authorities today from our sample of 38 economies ($5.2 billion) represents slightly less than 2.5% of the global measure of physical counterfeiting of $461 billion dollars. This suggests that though customs authorities' activities yield results and their efforts are highly laudable, the extent of their successes still represents "a drop in an ocean." This does not mean to say that economies should not continue to step up efforts to combat counterfeiting. Recent actions taken by economies include enhancing customs authorities' scope of action, strengthening IP protection, introducing targeted measures aimed at deterring counterfeiting, and joining international trade and enforcement initiatives. Taken together, these steps are expected to increase economies' ability to limit counterfeiting activities both domestically and globally over time. 4. Our analysis of seizure data from customs authorities shows that the dearth of seizure data is acute. Of the 38 economies examined in this study, only a third of the customs authorities publish data. Moreover, only a small proportion of these publish reliable, consistent, and detailed seizure statistics. Additionally, the data are often focused on intermittent seizures of varying scope and so do not necessarily reflect systematic efforts against counterfeiting. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Global Intellectual Property Center, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 30, 2017 at: http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/themes/gipc/map-index/assets/pdf/2016/GlobalCounterfeiting_Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/themes/gipc/map-index/assets/pdf/2016/GlobalCounterfeiting_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 146943 Keywords: Counterfeit ProductsCounterfeitingIllegal TradeOrganized CrimePirated GoodsTerrorist Financing |
Author: Schneider, Friedrich Title: Restricting or Abolishing Cash: An Effective Instrument for Fighting the Shadow Economy, Crime and Terrorism? Summary: This paper has four goals: First, the use of cash as a possible driving factor of the shadow economy is investigated. Second, the use of cash in crime, here especially in corruption, is also econometrically investigated. The influence is somewhat larger than on the shadow economy, but it is certainly not a decisive factor for bribery activities. Some figures about organized crime are also shown; the importance of cash is diminishing. Third, some remarks about terrorism are made and here a cash limit doesn't prevent terrorism. Fourth, some remarks are made about the restriction or abolishment of cash on civil liberties, with the result that this will extremely limit them. The conclusion of this paper is that cash has a minor influence on the shadow economy, crime and terrorism, but potentially a major influence on civil liberties. Details: Paper presented at International Cash Conference 2017 - War on Cash: Is there a Future for Cash? 25 - 27 April 2017, Island of Mainau, Germany. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 13, 2017 at: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/162914/1/Schneider.pdf Shelf Number: 147226 Keywords: BriberyCivil LibertiesCorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of CrimeShadow EconomyTerrorist Financing |
Author: Europol Title: From Suspicion to Action: Converting financial intelligence into greater operational impact Summary: The structure of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), their activities, working practices, and methods of recording and analysing information vary considerably across the EU. There is limited harmonisation among EU Member States (MS) beyond the obligation to establish an FIU. This makes any comparison of the implementation and effectiveness of the EU antimoney laundering directives and the effectiveness of suspicious transaction reporting difficult, if not impossible. - Just 10% of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) are further investigated after collection, a figure that is unchanged since 2006. - Over 65% of reports are received by just two Member States - the UK and the Netherlands. - The overall number of reports sent by the regulated sector continues to increase. In 2014, the EU FIUs received almost 1 million reports. Volumes are likely only to increase, in particular as virtual currency providers come into regulatory scope and services using distributed ledger technology (DLT) enter the mainstream. - Between 0.7-1.28% of annual EU GDP is detected as being involved in suspect financial activity. - Together banks and MSBs are the source of the majority of STRs sent to the FIUs. Certain sectors are noted for their low levels of reporting, in particular high value goods dealers and bureaux de change. - Reporting on terrorist financing accounted for less than 1% of reports received by FIUs in 2013-14. - The use of cash is the primary reason triggering reporting entities to report suspicion, however in Luxembourg, where cash issuance is almost double its GDP, the use of cash is not a common reason for reporting. - The 'symmetrical' exchange of information between FIUs may prevent crucial information contained in STRs reaching authorities tasked with criminal investigations. Europol could assist in overcoming this barrier through acting as a pan-European hub for STRs enabling integration with other sources of information stemming from multiple agencies across Europe and beyond. - New technology presents challenges to the current antimoney laundering framework. The increasing digitalisation of financial services results in growing volumes of transactions and extremely large data sets requiring computational analysis to reveal patterns, trends, and associations. The use of analytics is therefore becoming essential for both reporting entities and FIUs to cope with information and fully exploit its potential. - The growing demand for online services and related internet payment systems poses considerable challenges to the EU policies concerning money laundering and terrorist financing. The development of borderless virtual environments call for reflection on how to adapt policies which are meant to be supervised only at national level, while the underlying business is already transnational and globalised in its own nature: there is an urgent need for a supranational overview. - The embedment of the FIU.net project at Europol presents an opportunity for greater operational cooperation bet. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2017 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/suspicion-to-action-converting-financial-intelligence-greater-operational-impact Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/suspicion-to-action-converting-financial-intelligence-greater-operational-impact Shelf Number: 147357 Keywords: Economic Crime Financial Crime Money Laundering Terrorist Financing |
Author: Shortland, Anja Title: Closing the Gap: Assessing Responses to Terrorist-Related Kidnap-for-Ransom Summary: GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO be concerned about kidnapping as a source of terrorist finance. A host of international commitments, underpinned by UN Security Council Resolutions and domestic laws, forbids the commercial resolution of terrorist-related kidnappings and prevents governments from making concessions to terrorists. Yet, it is also common knowledge that, in practice, the UN ban lacks the support of key signatories, who prioritise the immediate preservation of life over their counterterrorism commitments. The authors argue that the current approach increases the returns from kidnapping for groups designated as terrorist organisations by the UN (hereafter 'designated terrorists') and increases the terrorist threat to citizens of all states. This paper highlights the negative unintended consequences of the status quo: a partially applied ban, where some governments make concessions to terrorists. When some governments negotiate on behalf of their citizens, kidnapper expectations and ransoms escalate. Terrorists abuse hostages whose governments refuse to negotiate in order to raise the pressure on countries which do. Because of the official ban, government negotiations are conducted in secret. This makes it more difficult to share information that might assist negotiation strategies, help track the money and identify the perpetrators after ransoms are paid. This paper outlines three different options which would help to 'close the gap' between the commitments of some governments and their actions in response to the kidnapping of their citizens by designated terrorists. - The first option requires a global, rigorously applied and scrupulously monitored commitment to prevent any concessions to terrorist organisations. This would eliminate hostage-taking as a source of terrorist finance, although terrorists might still kidnap for propaganda purposes. However, the paper shows that the international community remains polarised and is not ready to commit to enforcing such a ban. - A second option is that governments exit from the market for hostage negotiations and decriminalise private resolutions of terrorist hostage incidents. The insurance sector already offers effective solutions for the prevention and resolution of criminal kidnappings. These solutions would become available for those exposed to the risk of terrorist kidnap. - A third option would be a new policy framework modelled on existing private sector solutions. Private entities would be allowed to make financial concessions, but governments would create effective (multilateral) institutions to monitor and minimise such payments. The main aim of the paper is to precipitate an open, honest and inclusive policy debate on this intractable problem. In the long run, terrorist financing through kidnapping should be eliminated by adopting the first option. However, the authors argue that the unsatisfactory status quo can be immediately improved by shifting responsibility for ransoming from governments to the private sector. Eventually, public opinion may shift in favour of a genuine 'no concessions' policy. This would be greatly encouraged by efforts to collect evidence that supports the development of a clear policy narrative linking ransom payments to subsequent terrorist attacks. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed September 20, 2017 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201709_rusi_closing_the_gap_shortland_and_keatinge_web.1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201709_rusi_closing_the_gap_shortland_and_keatinge_web.1.pdf Shelf Number: 147422 Keywords: Kidnapping Ransom Kidnapping Terrorism Terrorist Financing |
Author: Zerzan, Andrew Title: Policing Financial Services: Surveying the Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Regime Summary: The anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism international (AML/CFT) standards were created over twenty years ago by the world's biggest economies. Since then, the standards have become increasingly implemented globally. They have established a regulatory regime in which many different public institutions play a role. The majority of these public institutions are not traditionally involved in crime fighting or counter-terrorism so certain challenges exist, especially for those in developing countries. For instance, the AML/CFT rules dictate how people of all types can connect - or not connect - to the financial sector. The paper provides an overview of what the standards mean for public institutions and highlights challenges that have surfaced to date. The intended audience is the development community so that it is better informed in its efforts to improve the application and revision of the standards, which is currently underway. High-level findings: The regime that countries must put in place is complex and there are many interdependencies. The effectiveness of the system relies highly on ensuring that all key elements are in place. If one part of the system is missing, it is likely to greatly hinder effectiveness of the rest. Interaction between the standard setter and developing countries, especially the poorest, is very little. There has been some improvement in dialogue via intermediary organizations but a direct link has not been established. This will have an impact on how the standards are written as well as their effectiveness in these countries. Interpretation of the standards has prompted countries to create regulatory frameworks that are highly data-driven. This means that effectiveness hinges greatly on a country's ability to both collect data from a great number of sources as well as analyze it. Whether this is the right approach for developing countries with low capacity needs to be assessed. Details: London: GSMA, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2017 at: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.t.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/policingfinancialservicessurveyingtheantimoneylaunderingregulatoryregime2011.pdf Shelf Number: 147516 Keywords: Counter-terrorismFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingTerrorist Financing |
Author: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group - ESAAMLG Title: A Special Typologies Project Report on Poaching, Illegal Trade in Wildlife and Wildlife Products and Associated Money Laundering in the ESAAMLG Region Summary: 1. The majority of ESAAMLG member countries have vast resources in wildlife, which during the last few years have seen unprecedented targeting by both individuals and syndicates involved in poaching and other illegal wildlife activities. This typology project focused on poaching and illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products and associated money laundering in the ESAAMLG Region. 2. Illicit wildlife trafficking is one of the most lucrative types of transnational organized crime today, with annual revenues estimated to be between USD 7.8 billion and USD 10 billion per year1 (excluding fisheries and timber). These illegal proceeds are suspected to be laundered into the financial systems worldwide. 3. Common to wildlife poaching is its localized and cross-border phenomenon which is often orchestrated by well organised, sophisticated and at times heavily armed poachers. The cross border nature of poaching puts the illegal activity beyond the capacities of most governments in the Region. Poaching invariably transcends into illegal wildlife trade which has been associated with well organised crime groups which through the unlawful trade and complex laundering means of the proceeds have amassed a lot of resources. The resources include immediate large amounts of disposable cash, modern technology and established corrupt transportation routes. 4. The Independent newspaper, a daily publication in Britain, reported on 6 February 2014 that the dangerous criminal networks that run the global wildlife trade have been allowed to persist and prosper as a result of "chronic government failures" to treat them seriously. The report further states that the industry (dealing in illegal wildlife business) is the world's fourth biggest illegal trade after narcotics, human trafficking and counterfeiting. Feedback from regional wildlife NGOs (using former Police officers as consultants), indicated that the criminal networks involved in smuggling drugs, humans, extra are almost always the same networks involved in smuggling wildlife products. This is because they already have an established "network" - and the wildlife product is just a different product. 5. The ESAAMLG region, given its vast resources in wildlife is uniquely placed to study and uncover the illegal trends in this industry, in an effort to assist governments of its member states and other stakeholders in setting up an informed policy framework on wildlife resources. 6. The findings in this report also confirms that despite arresting traffickers and seizing illegal wildlife products, law enforcement have failed to arrest or convict, let alone confiscate/forfeit illegally acquired assets by the criminal masterminds wreaking havoc in this area across Africa. A report by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), which has been investigating illegal wildlife trade for more than three decades states; "Despite record seizures of illegal ivory, not a single criminal kingpin involved in the international illegal trade of ivory has been prosecuted and convicted to date. That is a damning indictment. With less than 3,500 wild tigers left, elephant numbers plummeting and rhinos under attack again, we need to get it right,". 7. Azzedine Downes, a researcher on wildlife poaching, in an article titled; "When it comes to poaching, hate the crime not the criminal", highlights factors contributing to wildlife poaching being: the amounts of money generated, low risk of arrest, lenient penalties, killing and thefts done quickly, inexpensive and little social stigma associated with the crime (compared to other crimes such as murder, robbery, kidnapping, etc). The ESAAMLG Region, through this study found indications which may support the above factors as contributing to the ever increasing incidences of wildlife poaching and associated wildlife illegal trade in the region. 8. The ramifications of poaching and other wildlife crimes and illegal trade are horrendous. ESAAMLG member countries' future generations stand the possible risk of not seeing the wonderful wildlife which the Region has been naturally enriched with. This study found that cultural beliefs which do not have their origin in the ESAAMLG Region and the huge financial benefits derived from wildlife illegal trade and their successful laundering could be some of the factors fuelling poaching of wildlife in the Region. In summary the study, among other things, presents indications, trends and typologies to help understand how these crimes are organised, identify the players, proceeds generated and their movement with specific attention being paid to the laundering trends of the illegal proceeds. Ultimately the study is intended to influence policy change by the ESAAMLG member countries in their approach to combatting illegal wildlife activities and mitigate the gaps in combating wildlife crimes and laundering of the generated illegal proceeds. 9. The project was approved by the ESAAMLG Council of Ministers at its meeting in Luanda, Angola, in September 2014. The project team consisted of Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. Namibia was the project chair. C. Executive summary 10. This typology report primarily looks at the poaching, trafficking and the proceeds thereof (illegal trade), in the ESAAMLG member countries and Africa as a secondary part of the scope. Given the significant demand for wildlife and wildlife products harvested in member countries, it is clear that there are significant financial flows associated with these crimes. Such financial flows constitute proceeds of crime, and thus fall within the ambit of money laundering, and to a certain extend these financial flows may in one way or the other be used to support terrorist financing activities in Central Africa. 11. The major finding is that wildlife crimes, particularly rhino and elephant poaching are escalating at alarming levels, with extinction being a reality. The study further found that a number of vulnerabilities in wildlife crime combatting frameworks across the various member countries are exploited by syndicates committing these crimes. The most common shortcoming highlighted by member countries as a hindrance to adequate and effective combative efforts is the general lack of resources for the various wildlife crime combative stakeholders aided by corrupt public officials. 12. The report aims to provide an overview on the: - Predicate offences of wildlife crimes; - Syndicates and persons committing these crimes and their methods of operation; - Notable trends and typologies in the flow of finances related to these crimes; - Notable preventative measures in place to mitigate these wildlife crimes and related financial flows; - Areas within combative and intelligence frameworks that may need improvement; Destination countries (regions) of poached wildlife products. 13. The study found that there is a growing demand for wildlife and wildlife products mostly in the Asian countries and U.S.A. In an effort to supply this demand, it came to the fore that organized transnational criminal syndicates have created networks that facilitate the execution of poaching and related wildlife crime activities and the trafficking of wildlife and wildlife products from mainly African countries to consumer destinations in Asia and U.S.A. These networks involve recruitment of locals who are in the ESAAMLG region into poaching activities for minimal financial rewards, the bribing of authorities at crucial points of entry and exits such as border posts and airports to help facilitate the smuggling of wildlife and wildlife products, ultimately compromising the border security. 14. It is however worth noting that despite the case studies indicating a lucrative business with significant financial gains in trading wildlife products such as ivory, almost all ESAAMLG member countries could not provide details on financial flows such as methods and techniques used to fund poaching activities in cases investigated. This is compounded by the fact that most ESAAMLG member countries' economies are predominantly cash based. Additionally, the study could not obtain data and information related to methods used to pay for the wildlife and wildlife products by end users and/or kingpins of the organized criminal syndicates, in the consumer countries. This lack of information in itself may explain why authorities in member countries did not paint successful wildlife crime combatting efforts as per information requested for this study. 15. The study equally found that the FIUs in member countries are hardly involved in investigative operations (tactically or strategically) concerning wildlife crimes. Apart from South Africa, LEAs in other member countries such as the police and the various environmental authorities do not have engagements through formal MoUs with the resident FIUs, let alone foreign FIUs, in an effort to coordinate and benefit from the strengths of one another. It goes without saying that despite the transnational nature of wildlife crimes, countries generally reported poor international cooperation as an area of concern in the combatting of wildlife crimes. 16. The study equally reviewed counter wildlife trafficking efforts in Asian countries, as destinations of wildlife and wildlife products. It is worth noting that information requested from most of the countries identified as the largest consumers of illegal wildlife products harvested from ESAAMLG member countries has to date not been provided by the relevant authorities in those countries. In two of the countries where wildlife and wildlife products from ESAAMLG member countries are consumed, it was surprising to find that these countries have only criminalised possession of wildlife and wildlife products, if same is originating from within their jurisdictions. This means, in these countries, being found in possession of wildlife and wildlife products from Africa is not a criminal offence. 17. Despite the various counter wildlife trafficking laws in most Asian countries advocating for investigative authorities to liaise with and involve the countries of origin of the wildlife and wildlife products seized or found in their jurisdictions, there were hardly any cases provided by such jurisdictions to show if this is indeed happening. In almost all cases provided for this study, by Asian countries, the wildlife crime investigations do not engage with relevant African authorities and the seized wildlife products such as rhino horns and elephant tusks are destroyed, if not reserved for local state museums. These factors may point a need to strengthen international cooperation, with the aim of enhancing combative efforts both locally and in consumer jurisdictions. Details: Dar es Salaam - United Republic of Tanzania: ESAAMLG Typologies Working Group, 2016. 131p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 8, 2017 at: https://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Typologies%20Report%20on%20the%20Wildlife%20Crimes%20and%20Related%20ML.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Typologies%20Report%20on%20the%20Wildlife%20Crimes%20and%20Related%20ML.pdf Shelf Number: 148054 Keywords: Animal PoachingIllegal Wildlife TradeIvoryMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeTerrorist FinancingTrafficking in WildlifeWildlife CrimeWildlife Trafficking |
Author: The Sentry Title: The Terrorists' Treasury: How a Bank Linked to Congo's President Enabled Hezbollah Financiers to Bust U.S. Sanctions. Summary: The same banks used by kleptocratic governments to divert state assets can also be used by terrorist financing networks. This is what has taken place at one prominent bank in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Individuals and entities subject to U.S. sanctions, in connection with Hezbollah, used the bank to move money through the international banking system, despite several warnings from bank employees that doing so could violate U.S. sanctions. This was not just any bank. BGFIBank DRC, the institution that processed the transactions, is run by President Joseph Kabila's brother and has been mentioned in a recent scandal in Congo involving the alleged diversion of public funds from state-owned mining companies and the national electoral commission. As set out in this report, in 2011 bank employees at BGFIBank DRC raised the alarm with senior officials at the bank, in writing, about a series of transactions. The concern was that the transactions involved companies linked to financiers of Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based terrorist group and political party. The main entities in question were subsidiaries of Kinshasa-based business conglomerate Congo Futur, a company under U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctions. Among the recipients of the warnings was Francis Selemani Mtwale, the bank's CEO and brother of President Joseph Kabila. But the bank's relationship with Hezbollah-linked companies continued. BGFIBank DRC even went so far as to request that certain transactions be unblocked by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) after other banks refused to process them. And BGFIBank DRC continued to engage in correspondence with Congo Futur-affiliated company representatives in 2016. This raises major questions about the bank's ability and willingness to fulfill its sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance obligations. BGFIBank DRC has been reported to have been used to divert significant public funds in Congo, including millions of dollars in withdrawals by Congo's electoral commission, and transfers of $8 million in cash in irregular "tax advances" from Congo's largest state-owned mining company, Gecamines. Published reports raise serious questions about the bank's regulatory and compliance regime. Inadequate anti-money laundering compliance and sanctions enforcement standards at banks can empower a wide range of criminal groups and corrupt actorsand ultimately undermine governance and contribute to instability in Congo and elsewhere. Members of civil society have suggested that business interests could be part of the reason Kabila, who has sparked a violent nationwide political crisis by recently overstaying his presidential term limits, has maintained an iron grip on the presidency. In the example profiled in this report, BGFIBank DRC's approach to enforcing sanctions has allowed Kassim Tajideen - described by the U.S. government as "an important financial contributor" who "has contributed tens of millions of dollars to Hizballah" - and his network to maintain access to the global financial system despite being placed under U.S. sanctions in 2009 and 2010. The documents reviewed by The Sentry also show links between Congo Futur and other firms under Kassim Tajideen's control. These documents indicate that Congo Futur subsidiaries used BGFIBank DRC to operate accounts and make wire transfers after both Congo Futur and Kassim were placed under U.S. sanctions, despite warnings from bank employees that the bank should not do so. This is despite repeated public assertions from both Kassim and one of his brothers who is not under U.S. sanctions, Congo Futur General Manager Ahmed Tajideen, that the Kinshasa-based conglomerate had no links to any of the Tajideens under U.S. sanctions. Congo Futur has continued to thrive in Congo despite U.S. sanctions; it even maintains financial ties to the Congolese government and has received government contracts. These continued relations raise serious questions about the Congolese government's reliability in the fight against global terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit finance. Congo Futur has risen and remained prominent despite facing sanctions and the Kabila regime's decreasing legitimacy. BGFIBank DRC has been used to facilitate Congo Futur's access to the U.S. financial system, despite sanctions. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentry Project, 2017. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2017 at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/TerroristsTreasury_TheSentry_October2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: Shelf Number: 148095 Keywords: Financial CrimesMoney LaunderingTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group - ESAAMLG Title: Typologies report on money laundering related to illicit dealings in and smuggling of motor vehicles in the ESAAMLG region Summary: Motor vehicles play a vital role in the economic and social growth of every country. However, motor vehicles have recently become instruments and a source of illegally obtained financial gains for criminal syndicates and individuals. This study was aimed at identifying vulnerabilities of money laundering and terrorist financing associated with illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling through case studies from the region in order to identify the trends and methods used to launder the proceeds generated from the illicit dealing in and smuggling of motor vehicles. The study further identifies gaps and efforts put in place by governments and other stakeholders to address illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling. The study also identifies the role played by those involved in the illicit dealing in and motor vehicle smuggling and its economic and social impact thereof, the source and destination of smuggled vehicles, the licensing and supervision of motor vehicle dealers and the modus operandi. The study establishes how the illicit generated proceeds are or have previously been laundered and whether proceeds can be linked with the funding of other crimes including funding of terrorist activities. Based on the case studies, it is clear that bonded warehouses and Financial Institutions are being misused to facilitate money laundering activities with the real estate being the most vulnerable area where the proceeds are used. The study has also shown that insurance companies are widely affected by fraudulent claims made by motor vehicle owners who illegally export their vehicles and later report them stolen. Details: Dar es Salaam - United Republic of Tanzania: ESAAMLG, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Presented at the 24th Joaquim Chissano International Conference Centre ESAAMLG Task Force of Senior Officials Meeting 24 - 30 August 2012 Maputo, MozambiqueAccessed November 10, 2017 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Illicit%20Dealings%20in%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Motor%20Vehicles%20Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Illicit%20Dealings%20in%20and%20Smuggling%20of%20Motor%20Vehicles%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 148125 Keywords: Automobile TheftMoney LaunderingSmuggling of GoodsTerrorist FinancingVehicle Theft |
Author: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group - ESAAMLG Title: Report on Cash Courier - Based Money Laundering Summary: In general, there are three main methods by which criminal organisations and terrorist financiers move illicit money for laundering purposes. These are (i) the use of the financial system (ii) the physical movement of money (iii) the use of fraudulent trading arrangements. The Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendation IX on Cash Couriers obliges countries to put in place measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a declaration system or other disclosure obligations. The Special Recommendation also requires countries to ensure that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected of been related to terrorist financing or money laundering or that are falsely declared or disclosed Countries should also ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false declarations and disclosures. In cases where the currency or bearer negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing or money laundering, countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones which would enable the confiscation of such currency or instruments. This study used of a detailed questionnaire to gather information on the current practices of cash courier-based money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the ESAAMLG region. The information focused on the ability of the ESAAMLG member countries to detect and combat cash couriers for AML/CFT purposes. This study concludes that cash courier based money laundering is an activity that is present in virtually all ESAAMLG member countries. All ESAAMLG member countries are predominantly cash-based economies and have porous borders, and thereby making the region more vulnerable to cash- courier-based money laundering. Most ESAAMLG member countries have limited or no legislation in place to combat cash couriers and the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks. There is a general shortage of technical expertise and resources required to deal with cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. There is a critical need for training and awareness raising to enhance skills and experience to combat cash courier based money laundering, Looking ahead, there appears to be a number of steps that could be taken within the ESAAMLG member countries to enable national authorities to cope with and combat cash courier based money laundering and terrorist financing. These measures can be grouped into legislative, effective institutional arrangements, awareness raising, training, and improving domestic, regional and international cooperation. Details: Dar es Salaam - United Republic of Tanzania: ESAAMLG, 2008./ 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2017 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Cash_Courier_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 148126 Keywords: Financial Crimes Money Laundering Terrorist Financing |
Author: Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group - ESAAMLG Title: Typologies Project Report on the Vulnerabilities on Money Laundering Related to Trafficking in Persons in the ESAAMLG Region Summary: The purpose of this report is to present the research findings on the vulnerabilities of money laundering related to trafficking in persons in the ESAAMLG region. The conclusions of the report are based on analysis of questionnaire responses received from the member countries and literature on trafficking in persons in general. Trafficking in persons is a growing global socio-economic problem as its criminality negatively affects communities. In 2008, the UNODC estimated global trafficking in persons to be the third largest profitable criminal activity (USD 32 billion, of which sexual exploitation accounted for one-third of the amount) after drugs and arms trafficking. The member countries of ESAAMLG are experiencing the negative effects of trafficking in persons perpetrated by either nationals of the region or foreign criminal networks. It is clear from the findings that the ESAAMLG region is a source, transit and destination for trafficking in persons. East African countries and South Africa are noted as the predominant transit and destination countries, respectively. Although trafficking is largely a cross-border activity, there is growing evidence that internal trafficking particularly of young women from rural areas to the major cities is on the rise. The main factors contributing to the increasing international and domestic prevalence of trafficking in persons include; low socio-economic development, political instability and disparities in income levels within the member countries. Further, this report observed that all ESAAMLG member countries signed and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Organised Crime's Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons especially Women and Children. Nonetheless, most member countries have not enacted specific national legislation criminalising trafficking in persons in a manner consistent with the international instruments. Additionally, charges, investigations and prosecutions relating to offences of trafficking in persons are conducted under various national criminal legislations which the study found to be insufficient to effectively combat the problem. As a result, the institutions and resources to deal with this problem are generally inadequate. This has in turn made trafficking in persons a low-risk but high-profit making criminal activity, promoted by the lack of appropriate legislation and institutional capacity. Details: Dar es Salaam - United Republic of Tanzania: ESAAMLG, 2011. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10,. 2017 at: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/HUMAN-TRAFFICKING-Report-Mauritius-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/HUMAN-TRAFFICKING-Report-Mauritius-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 148127 Keywords: Human Trafficking Money Laundering Terrorist Financing |
Author: AUSTRAC Title: Stored Value Cards: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Summary: AUSTRAC assessed the overall ML/TF risk associated with the use of stored value cards (SVCs) to be medium, and their vulnerability to criminal misuse to be high. The report found that the risk level of individual SVCs varies significantly depending on the features of the specific product. Travel cards that can be reloaded and redeemed offshore in cash carry significantly higher levels of risk than low value retail gift cards. The most common crime-types in which SVCs are implicated are money laundering and cyber-enabled fraud. Of particular concern is the use of SVCs for terrorism financing purposes. The risk assessment contains detailed information to assist industry understand the risks associated with SVCs and how they can mitigate these risks. Details: Canberra: AUSTRAC, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2017 at: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/stored-value-cards-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/stored-value-cards-risk-assessment-WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 148274 Keywords: Credit Card FraudFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist Financing |
Author: Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) Title: Typologies Report on Cash Transactions and Cash Couriers in West Africa Summary: The geographical territory of West Africa is occupied by fifteen countries that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, (The) Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Of these fifteen (15) countries, eight (8)belong to a common currency zone known as the Union Economique Monetaire de l'Afrique de l Ouest (UEMOA), which has common monetary regulations. The economy of the West Africa region is largely cash-based, characterised by a large and growing unregulated informal sector which is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing. Money Laundering (ML) is a process whereby the origin and ownership of funds generated by illegal means is concealed. The process of ML usually involves three stages: (1) the introduction of the proceeds of crime into the financial system (placement); (2) transactions to convert or transfer the funds to other locations or financial institutions (layering); and, (3) reintegrating the funds into the legitimate economy as "clean" money and investing it in various assets or business ventures. Terrorist financing (TF), on the other hand, is the direct or indirect financial support provided to criminals for the purpose of carrying out acts that involve violence and or intimidation of populations. Such funds could be derived from either legitimate or illegitimate sources. Although there are factual differences between money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF), both processes may use common intermediaries such as cash transactions. Indeed, money laundering and terrorist financing are a threat to international peace and security. Nature and Types of Cash Transactions Cash transactions are a particular problem, especially in developing economies where the formal payment systems are inadequate or where the populace has little confidence in their use. Even in some developed economies, cash transactions constitute a specific money laundering and terrorist financing problem. For example, about 52% of case files transmitted to prosecutorial authorities by the Belgian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2005 featured cash transactions. The types and patterns of cash transactions that are at risk of money laundering and terrorist financing include the following : - exchange transactions, involving the exchange of one currency into another or the conversion of smaller denominations into bigger ones; - money remittance transactions, within or outside the country, often for mutual settlement. One of the potential risks here is that false identities may be used, thus making regulation, even where it does exist, difficult; - cash deposits on bank accounts, either by the account owners or by a third party; - cash withdrawals from accounts; and - cross-border transport of physical cash concealed in items such vehicle spare parts, pockets, commercial airlines parcels, suitcases and handbags. Details: s.l.: GIABA, 2007. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2017 at: http://www.giaba.org/media/f/107_typologies-report-november-2007.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Africa URL: http://www.giaba.org/media/f/107_typologies-report-november-2007.pdf Shelf Number: 148672 Keywords: Cash TransactionsMoney LaunderingProceeds of CrimeTerrorist Financing |
Author: Webb, Emma Title: Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector Summary: The British taxpayer has handed over more than L6 million to charities that are currently, or have been in the past, used by extremists to further their radical agenda, according to a new report from the Henry Jackson Society. The report's case studies are illustrative - so L6 million is likely the tip of the iceberg. The money is enough to fund 27,328 hospital beds per day, the annual salary of 234 infantry soldiers, or the salary of 264 new teachers - but instead, it is being handed over to individuals some of whose involvement in extremism can be traced back to the Islamist scene in the early 2000s. Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector finds that, despite more than a decade of attempts to improve regulations, a concerning number of UK-registered charities continue to fund and support extremism. Figures from across the Islamist spectrum, including the Muslim Brotherhood, form a network which seeks to delegitimise and push out moderate voices, while masquerading as representatives of 'true' Islam. For example, Helping Households Under Great Stress (HHUGS) is involved in prisoner advocacy - but extreme and illiberal individuals are involved at all levels of the organisation, from trustees to supporters, speakers and beneficiaries. The Charity Commission - legally unable to de-register these 'bad' charities - has been particularly ill-equipped to deal with these organisations. Its powers have been extended in recent legislation, but the public is still waiting for those new powers to be put to use to tackle this problem. The report makes a number of recommendations, including: The Charity Commission must urgently exercise the powers given to it under the Charities Act 2016 to direct the winding up of charities and the removal of inappropriate trustees - as well as become much more proactive in checking the background of trustees. The Government should consider increasing the resources available to the Commission so that they can effectively implement their new powers. HM Revenue & Customs should work closely with the Commission to prevent the misuse of Gift Aid. Ofcom should be granted more powers - and use its current powers more effectively - to deal with channels providing a platform for extremist content, individuals or fundraising for extremist charities. Crowd-funding and event platforms such as Eventbrite, JustGiving and Virgin Giving should do more to prevent extremist charities from raising money and advertising events through their websites. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 172p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Shelf Number: 149289 Keywords: CharitiesExtremist GroupsIslamist ExtremistsTerrorismTerrorist Financing |
Author: Council on Foreign Relations Title: How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, Criminals, and Dictators Summary: The Panama Papers leak of eleven million documents in April 2016 revealed that former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the brother-in-law of Chinese President Xi Jinping, longtime friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin, drug kingpins, and even a soccer megastar had something in common: they all channeled money through anonymous shell companies. Anonymous shell companies are entities that usually employ few or no workers, do not conduct any substantive business, and allow their owners to store or route money while hiding their identities. Because of the secrecy they can provide, anonymous companies represent an important nexus of corruption, money laundering, transnational organized crime, and terrorism, which directly harm U.S. interests. As one of the main facilitators of anonymous companies, the United States should pass legislation to disclose ownership information for all companies, increase federal contract transparency, and boost other business and government transparency mechanisms at home and abroad. Doing so would significantly cut back on the ability of terrorists, criminals, and their ilk to use American corporations, real estate, and trusts to finance activities that harm the United States and its foreign interests. Details: Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 10, 2018 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CFR-How%20Anonymous%20Shell%20Companies%20Finance%20Insurgents,%20Criminals,%20and%20Dictators.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/CFR-How%20Anonymous%20Shell%20Companies%20Finance%20Insurgents,%20Criminals,%20and%20Dictators.pdf Shelf Number: 150136 Keywords: Corruption Financial Crimes Money Laundering Organized Crime Terrorist Financing |
Author: Veen, H.C.J. van der Title: National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering for the Netherlands Summary: Dutch policy to prevent and combat money laundering is based on the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and EU directives and regulations. The FATF - an intergovernmental body set up by the G7 in 1989 - focuses on global prevention of money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The majority of the FATF's recommendations has been adopted into the fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, applicable to all EU member states. In short, Article 7 of this directive obliges EU member states to implement a risk-based policy against money laundering and terrorist financing and to establish a National Risk Assessment (NRA). The goal of this NRA is to identify the ten most significant risks relating to money laundering in terms of their potential impact and to assess the 'resilience' of the policy instruments designed to prevent and combat money laundering. Resilience entails the functioning of policy instruments (including legislation), whereby the following is applicable: the greater the resilience, the more the risks are combatted. This initial NRA also describes a number of lessons learned that could be taken into account in the process of subsequent NRAs. Details: The Hague: WODC, 2017. 105p. Source: Internet Resource: Cahier 2017-13a: Accessed July 2, 2018 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202017-13a_2689c_Full%20text_tcm29-328683.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/Cahier%202017-13a_2689c_Full%20text_tcm29-328683.pdf Shelf Number: 150759 Keywords: Economics and CrimeFinancial CrimeMoney LaunderingRisk AssessmentTerrorist FinancingUnderground Banking |
Author: Nelleman, Christian Title: World atlas of illicit flows. A RHIPTO-INTERPOL-GI Assessment. Summary: This atlas of illicit flows presents over a thousand smuggling routes worldwide of goods and services associated with environmental crimes, drugs and people. Conflict and terrorism are today funded on an unprecedented scale by transnational organized crime and by illicit revenue from natural resources. While it is not possible to establish with certainty the exact value of revenues flowing to criminalized groups and non-state armed groups, it is possible to generate a rough snapshot based on the major non-state armed groups. The proceeds of environmental crime - which encompasses not just wildlife crime, but also fuel smuggling and illicit mining of gold, diamonds and other minerals and resources - have become the largest source of income for non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations. Combined, environmental crimes, including those that involve the sale or taxation of natural resources, account for 38% of the financing of conflicts and of non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups; followed by drugs (at 28%); other forms of illegal taxation, extortion, confiscation and looting (26%); external donations (3%); and money extorted through kidnapping (3%). This evidence-based report aims to quantify how these illicit flows finance the major non-state armed groups. Broadly speaking, environmental crimes generate the single-largest overall threat finance to conflicts today. The lack of criminal investigation, enforcement efforts or attention from the international community has enabled environmental crime to provide a 'free ticket' to armed criminalized groups and war profiteers, and it is gaining increasing interest as a source of financing among insurgents, terrorist groups and criminal cartels, in addition to their traditional financing sources from drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. The interest in natural resources is rising, especially gold and other minerals, and timber, among many armed and criminal groups, and this can be currently seen in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Colombia, Peru and Central America, and South East Asia. The biggest source of revenue - that is, from one single illicit product category - for non-state armed groups in conflict is drugs, which, as mentioned, account for 28% of their funding. Most of this revenue comes from taxation of drugs by groups such as FARC and the Taliban. Illegally procured oil, gas, gasoline and diesel provides 20% of their income (this was the predominant source of financing for Islamic State in 2014 and 2015). Illegal income from oil is also crucial for organizations outside of the seven main global insurgent and terrorist groups discussed in detail here, including funding organized crime in conflict zones. Gasoline and diesel smuggling is a key source of criminal networks' financing particularly in parts of Latin America, Libya and Nigeria. After drugs and oil, taxation and extortion, and illegal mining, follow, with both representing 17% of revenue. Then, kidnapping for ransom, and external funding and donations each represent 3%. Charcoal and antiquities constitute 1% each, but these categories feature more predominantly as financial sources in particular regions, especially charcoal. Combined, these illicit flows directly fund an estimated 96 900 full-time fighters, and an unknown number of part-timers, associated with the seven most notable non-state insurgent and terrorist groups, plus the multitude of non-state armed groups active in north-eastern DRC. Details: RHIPTO -Norwegian Center for Global Analyses, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized crime, 2018. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2018 at: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Atlas-Illicit-Flows-FINAL-WEB-VERSION-copia-compressed.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Atlas-Illicit-Flows-FINAL-WEB-VERSION-copia-compressed.pdf Shelf Number: 151733 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Environmental Crime Money Laundering Natural Resources Offenses Against the Environment Organized Crime Smuggling Terrorist Financing |
Author: Rekawek, Kacper Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Kick-Off Report Summary: The most well-known ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, saw individuals who in the past had been involved in organized crime and illegal trade graduate into the ranks of the world's most successful terrorist organisation. It is now widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are no longer radicals first and foremost but criminals who turned to political violence at some stage throughout their ordinary crime careers. Thus a threat emanating from the "crime-terror nexus" hangs over Europe. GLOBSEC, an independent, non-partisan, non-governmental organisation which aims to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy, responded to this threat by developing a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Our project titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? will: collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 12, 2018 at: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: https://www.globsec.org/projects/criminals-terrorists-back/ Shelf Number: 152909 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime-Terror NexusIllegal TradeSecurity TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |
Author: Houben, Robby Title: Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Legal context and implications for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion Summary: More and more regulators are worrying about criminals who are increasingly using cryptocurrencies for illegitimate activities like money laundering, terrorist financing and tax evasion. The problem is significant: even though the full scale of misuse of virtual currencies is unknown, its market value has been reported to exceed EUR 7 billion worldwide. This paper prepared by Policy Department A elaborates on this phenomenon from a legal perspective, focusing on the use of cryptocurrencies for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion. It contains policy recommendations for future EU standards. Details: Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, 2018. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 16, 2018 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf Shelf Number: 152976 Keywords: Cryptocurrency Financial Crimes Money Laundering Tax Evasion Terrorist Financing |
Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: A Scoping Study of Illicit Financial Flows Impacting Uganda Summary: Insufficient levels of financial transparency-globally and domestically-and government accountability in Uganda, coupled with a regulatory system that can incentivize financial crimes, are helping to drive high levels of illicit financial inflow and outflows in the country, which are undermining development efforts. Uganda will struggle to meet its goal of rising to middle income status and reducing its reliance on foreign debt unless it increases efforts to combat the commercial tax evasion, corruption, and money laundering of criminal proceeds and terrorist financing. Three policy areas should be the central focus for the government: eliminate the allowance and use of anonymous companies in the economy, reduce the ease and volumes of trade misinvoicing, and enforce anti-money laundering laws, particularly within the banking sector. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) in Uganda are part of a broader political economy dynamic where continued economic growth and development are hampered by corruption, impunity, and an opaque extractive sector. The growth in Uganda's economy and its role as a haven for legal and illegal activities stemming from neighboring countries like South Sudan, create perverse opportunities for illicit financial flows. The central government has a decent capacity to combat these opportunities for IFFs on paper, but its willingness or capacity to act to curtail IFFs is lagging. Trade misinvoicing is the most significant area of illicit financial flows in Uganda that can be estimated using publicly available data. From 2006-2015, the latest years for which the necessary data are available, potential trade misinvoicing amounted to roughly 18 percent of total Ugandan trade over the ten-year period. The figure for possible outflows is some 10 percent of total trade, and for possible inflows it is around 8 percent of total trade (2006-2015). Viewed in dollar terms, the potential over- and under-invoicing of imports from 2006-2015 was approximately US$4.9 billion, and over- and under-invoicing of exports may have reached US$1.7 billion. Uganda's laws and regulations on financial transparency and anti-money laundering have the strongest influence on illicit financial flows, and there are notable gaps in the framework the Government of Uganda has in place to address the sources, transfer methods, and motivations of IFFs in the country. In particular, laws governing corporations in Uganda are generally weak in so far as they do not require the official identification of the beneficial owners of companies or the complete identity of all shareholders in a company. The government's anti-money laundering regime mostly exists on paper and could do with strengthening. The Financial Intelligence Authority, which was only recently established, acknowledges this shortcoming and is working to enhance its performance in helping to prevent, track, and prosecute money laundering in the country. Uganda's extractive sector and the presence of numerous transnational crime markets add to the importance of both financial transparency and anti-money laundering. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2018. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed October 16, 2018 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/A-Scoping-Study-of-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Impacting-Uganda.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Uganda URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/A-Scoping-Study-of-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Impacting-Uganda.pdf Shelf Number: 152979 Keywords: Corporate CorruptionCorporate CrimeFinancial CrimeIllicit Financial FlowsMoney LaunderingTax EvasionTerrorist financing |
Author: Global Financial Integrity Title: Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 Developing Countries: 2006-2015 Summary: This is the latest in a series of reports, issued on a roughly annual basis by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), which provides country-level estimates of the illicit flows of money into and out of 148 developing and emerging market nations as a result of their trade in goods with advanced economies, as classified by the International Monetary Fund. Such flows - hereafter referred to as illicit financial flows (IFFs)-are estimated over the years from 2006 to 2015, the most recent ten year period for which comprehensive data are available. In addition to updating the estimated IFFs GFI has presented in the past, this report widens the scope of its research and uses a more detailed database published by the United Nations (UN) along with updated measures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data it has used previously. This report presents estimates of IFFs based on both data sets. GFI defines IFFs as "money that is illegally earned, used or moved and which crosses an international border." Currently, the World Bank, IMF, UN, and the OECD use a similar definition. This study underscores the point that trade-related IFFs appear to be both significant and persistent features of developing country trade with advanced economies. As such, trade misinvoicing remains an obstacle to achieving sustainable and equitable growth in the developing world. Details: Washington, DC: GFI, 2019. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2019 at: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GFI-2019-IFF-Update-Report-1.29.18.pdf Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GFI-2019-IFF-Update-Report-1.29.18.pdf Shelf Number: 154642 Keywords: Corporate CorruptionCorporate CrimeFinancial CrimeIllicit Financial FlowsMoney LaunderingTax EvasionTerrorist financingTrade Misinvoicing |
Author: Colomina, Pierre Title: From Criminals to Terrorists and Back? Quarterly Report: France Summary: The worse ISIS terrorist atrocities in Europe, including the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks, were undertaken by individuals who had been involved in criminality and illegal trade before they joined the ranks of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisation. It is no longer widely assumed that Europe's terrorists are radicals first and foremost: the bulk of them are criminals who turned to political violence along the way. The threat of a "crime-terror nexus" therefore hangs over Europe. In view of this, GLOBSEC - an independent, non-partisan, nongovernmental organisation aiming to shape the global debate on foreign and security policy - has developed a research and advocacy project aimed at addressing the "crime-terror nexus" in Europe. Titled From Criminals to Terrorists and Back?, the remit of the project is to: 1. collect, collate and analyse data on terrorism convicts from 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK) with the highest number of arrests for terrorism offences. We will investigate whether these individuals had prior criminal connections, and if so, whether a specific connection to illegal trade is a precursor to terrorism, and to what extent this trade funds terrorism. In short, we will check whether crime-terror nexus exists and how strong it truly is. 2. disseminate project findings at high profile GLOBSEC Strategic Forums (GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum, TATRA Summit, Chateau Bela conferences) and other internationally acclaimed gatherings which attract decision makers, experts, private sector and law enforcement representatives, while also incorporating their expert level feedback into our work. 3. help shape and strengthen the European counter-terrorism efforts by providing tailor made solutions on combating crime-terror nexus and terrorist financing via education and awareness, and advocacy efforts involving decision makers and security stakeholders in the 11 targeted countries. This line of activity directly links the project to the widely acclaimed work of the GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative (GIRI), led by Sec. Michael Chertoff, which is involved in developing and promoting more effective transatlantic counter-terrorism solutions. Details: Bratislava, Slovak Republic: GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2019 at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Year: 2019 Country: France URL: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/From-Criminals-To-Terrorists-And-Back-Quarterly-Report-France-Vol-2.pdf Shelf Number: 155599 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime-Terror NexusIllegal TradeSecurity TerrorismTerrorist FinancingTerrorists |